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Abstract
In this project we develop a microsimulation model for retirement behaviour in Austria based on
two administrative datasets. We match data from the Austrian social security database (ASSD) to
a dataset (VVP) that contains very detailed information on all pension-relevant information on the
individual level, e.g. insurance records as well as complete earnings histories. Based on this data
we develop a comprehensive microsimulation model of the Austrian pension system. This model
allows us to calculate the retirement benefit entitlements for each and every individual, and to
double-check our calculation rules with the actual, administratively calculated pension entitlements.
We construct a range of (forward-looking) incentive measures that describe the individual decision
problem. Specifically, we compute social security wealth, accrual rate, peak and option values for
more than 300,000 individuals within each year of the observational period (2002-2009). Based
on this characterisation of the incentive structure we develop an econometric model and provide
robust evidence for the effects of the incentive measures on old age labour supply. Simulation
of several reform scenarios shows that a stronger emphasis on financial incentives in the pension
system (the introduction of additional bonusses and deductions) reduces the out-of-labour-force
ratio of individuals aged 56-65 by 16.3% for females and 13.4% for males.
Executive Summary
Most European countries, just as other developed countries around the world, are facing funding problems
in their public pension systems. In particular, pay-as-you-go pension systems are confronted with two major
developments: the trends of declining fertility and increasing life expectancy led to population ageing and
therefore to an increase of the number of retirees relative to the working age population. Compounding this
demographic development is the tendency towards later entry and earlier exit from the labour market. The total
number of years spent in the labour force thus decreased in all European countries during the past decades,
putting further financial pressure on those currently in the labour force (see chapter 1).
In Austria this development is particularly pronounced since life expectancy and living conditions are com-
paratively high while actual retirement age is among the lowest in all OECD countries. As has been repeatedly
argued, for instance by Gruber and Wise (1999), the incentives delivered by the pension system are a major
driving force of individual retirement behaviour. However, a more thorough analysis of the incentive structure
of the Austrian pension system hinges on the ability to capture the full complexity of the Austrian retirement
regulations while linking them to individual level data. This project thus offers a major contribution to evidence-
based policy evaluation by making use of a newly available administrative dataset and developing a full-scale
microsimulation model capable of simulating (ex-ante) the employment effects of reforms in the Austrian re-
tirement regulations.
Via social security identification, the Austrian social security database (ASSD) is merged with a dataset
(VVP) containing a detailed account of all pension-relevant information on individual level, e.g. insurance
records as well as complete earnings histories. The connected datatset contains information on 314,805 Austrian
individuals who have been exiting the labour market between 2002 and 2009. It is described in chapter 3, while
chapter 2 gives an overview of the Austrian pension system. Based on this data we develop the IHS-Micro-
Simulation-Model-for-REtirement-Behaviour-in-Austria (IREA) following the framework laid out in (Gruber
and Wise, 2002, 2004).
To describe the incentive structure as perceived by the individual decision makers we adopt an option value
framework. This approach is built on the empirical observation that retirement is an absorbing state and it thus
captures the opportunity costs of immediate retirement as measured by the maximum utility gain that could
be obtained from staying in the labour market. To implement this approach it is thus not sufficient to calculate
retirement benefits corresponding to the observed retirement date of a given individual. It is, however, necessary
to calculate them for each possible retirement year in the planning period 2002-2014 taking counterfactual
employment careers into consideration. Being able to access complete insurance and employment records on
individual basis allows us to do these calculations and construct several incentive measures, including social
security wealth, accrual rate, peak and option value (as described in chapter 4), thus characterising the incentive
structure of the Austrian pension system as faced by individual decision makers.
The procedures needed to calculate the incentive measures are discussed in chapter 5. First, we project an-
nualized gross incomes beyond the actual retirement year based on the individual income time series. Second,
we calculate individual assessment bases based on contribution and substitution periods, including childcare.
Third, we calculate gross retirement benefits as defined by the assessment base, retirement plan and insurance
record and define eligibility for all relevant retirement plans as implicated by the individual insurance record.
However, since in the Austrian context it is vital to account for different forms of disability pensions, we addi-
tionally estimate individual probabilities to obtain disability status and use these to define expected eligibility.
Fourth, we apply the Austrian income tax and social security legislation of the corresponding planning year
(as modelled in the tax-benefit microsimulation model ITABENA, Hofer et al. (2003)) in order to obtain net
retirement benefits as well as net labour income.
Since our dataset additionally contains the actual outcome of the calculations of the Austrian pension in-
surance office, we initially compute gross retirement benefits for the actual retirement date so that we are able
to double-check our calculations against actual outcomes. Having thus calculated net retirement benefits and
labour income for every possible work-retirement pathway allows us to construct the incentive measures for
each year of the observational period 2002 to 2009 based on a consistent 5-year planning horizon.
In order to model retirement behaviour we estimate several binary probit models with retirement in the plan-
ning year as dependent and social security wealth plus an additional incentive measure as the main independent
variables. The introduction of forward-looking independent variables into our econometric specification thus
allows us to capture intertemporal variation within a comparatively simple framework. To account for the ef-
fects of aging on retirement we let age enter the model in two different ways, either linearly or through a full set
of age indicators. In addition, we differentiate between females and males, thus resulting in a total of 12 model
specifications. The results are described in detail in chapter 6, indicating that the parameter estimates of the
incentive measures have the expected sign and are highly significant throughout all specifications. Although the
magnitude of the effects varies depending on the incentives included, these results imply a robust relationship
between the incentive structure of the Austrian pension system and retirement behaviour as observed for the
individuals in our dataset.
Simulations show that our model replicates expected retirement ages and empirical hazard rates very well
(see section 6.4). These are therefore used to assess the full quantitative impact of several reform scenarios on
(cumulative) hazard rates, expected retirement ages and out-of-labour-force ratios (in chapter 7). We implement
two standard reforms as laid out in Gruber and Wise (2004). The first reform evaluates the effect of an increase
in the statutory retirement age by three years and is shown to reduce the out-of-labour-force ratio of individuals
aged 56-65 by 6.5% and 14.3% for females and males respectively. The second common reform scenario
pronounces financial incentives through additional bonusses and deductions, thus reducing the ratio by 16.3%
for females and 13.4% for males. As a more policy relevant application, we also shortly discuss the abolition
of the hard-worker-rule, which is a specific pathway into retirement that was originally aimed at blue-collar
workers.
Direct international comparison on the basis of the results in Gruber and Wise (2004) is somewhat hindered
by the fact that current legislation differs substantially among countries. However, it is apparent from our
results that the Austrian case is characterised by several special features. Although the estimation results show
a very robust relationship between incentive measures and retirement behaviour, the overall quantitative impact
is somewhat lower than in comparable countries, especially when considering the fact that actual retirement
ages are among the lowest in Europe. Another characteristic feature, which is of course related to the low
actual retirement ages, is the importance of several health-related pathways into early retirement. Although our
approach captures this feature quite well, the magnitude of this phenomenon in Austria is likely to countervail
the pure incentive effects delivered by the pension system. A third relevant aspect is hidden in the fact that the
Austrian retirement regulations are characterised by a considerable degree of diversity, especially for individuals
retiring within the time frame of our dataset. This complexity, combined with the uncertainty of future reforms,
makes it more difficult for Austrian individuals to form rational expectations about their future entitlements.
However, as this situation will give way to more transparent regulations in the future, it is to be expected that
the observed incentive effects are further strengthened along with this development.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Most EU countries, just as other developed countries around the world, are facing funding problems in their
public pension systems. In particular, pay-as-you-go pension systems are confronted with two major develop-
ments: the trends of declining fertility and increasing life expectancy led to population ageing and therefore to
an increase of the number of retirees relative to the working age population. Compounding this demographic
development is the tendency towards later entry and earlier exit from the labour market. The total number of
years spent in the labour force decreased in all European countries during the past decades, putting further fi-
nancial pressure on those currently in the labour force (Wise, 2005). The fact that people live longer and retire
earlier leads to adults spending about a third of their lifetime in retirement (Lumsdaine et al., 1992).
Knowing what determines retirement decisions and being able to carry out successful reforms is therefore
crucial for ensuring the solvency of western public pension systems going forward. Adding to the practical and
political importance of this issue are methodological advances and the establishment of large micro-datasets
that enable the meaningful analysis of individual (retirement- and labuor force participation) behaviour.
Many factors influence individual retirement decisions. The economic literature is mostly concerned with
financial incentives to retire inherent in the design of (public) pension systems. That the incentive structure
of the pension system has a significant impact on individual retirement behaviour is well established in the
literature, and has been investigated using data from many countries around the world — see, among others,
Gruber and Wise (1999); Boersch-Supan (2000); Wise (2005) for cross-country comparisons. These papers
corroborate the thesis that cross-country differences in actual retirement ages are largely due to differences in
the incentive structures of the respective pension systems.
The gap between statutory and actual retirement age is especially high in Austria, as actual retirement age
is among the lowest in all OECD countries (OECD, 2011). Yet, not a lot of empirical research has been done
regarding retirement behaviour in Austria. Though cohort discontinuities have been used to evaluate labour
supply effects of specific reforms ex-post (see Mastrobuoni, 2009; Liebman et al., 2009; Karlstrom et al., 2008;
Duggan et al., 2007), only Staubli and Zweimueller (2011) apply this approach to Austrian data. They make use
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of the gradual increase in statutory pre-retirement ages that came about with the reforms of the Austrian pension
system in 2000 and 2004, and find that retirement ages increased by 19 and 25 percentage points among affected
males and females respectively. Though this lead to an increase in employment of 7 and 10 percentage points,
sizeable spillover effects imply that parts of the old-aged workforce moves into unemployment as retirement
ages are increased. Hofer and Koman (2006) use a case study approach to directly analyse the incentive effects
of the pension system on retirement. They conclude that the Austrian pension system is likely to be (at least) part
of the reason for the sharp decline of old-age labour force participation by providing strong incentives to retire
before statutory retirement age. Mara and Narazani (2011) employ the microsimulation model EUROMOD
to approach this issue empirically, and present a simplified econometric approach that allows them to evaluate
pension and tax reforms on the basis of a purely cross-sectional analysis. However, their approach has severe
limitations as (i) the EU-SILC (Survey on Income and Living Conditions) neither contains employment nor
insurance records, and (ii) they disregard the dynamic nature of retirement since their econometric model only
captures static aspects of the income-leisure trade-off faced by old-age individuals. Raab (2011) accounts for
these effects by developing a model based on the approach of Gruber and Wise (2004) to Austria. However,
the data he uses also lacks information on individual insurance and employment records and he therefore has to
rely on a range of strong assumptions in order to be able to calculate retirement benefits and define eligibility.
This project thus aims to fill this gap by developing a full-scale microsimulation model capable of simulat-
ing (ex-ante) the employment effects of reforms in the Austrian retirement regulations based on the option value
framework as developed by Stock and Wise (1990) and Gruber and Wise (2004). We model retirement decisions
in Austria based on data from two administrative sources: Via social security identification, the Austrian social
security database (ASSD) is merged with a dataset containing a detailed account of all pension-relevant infor-
mation (VVP), including individual insurance records and earnings histories (cf. chapter 3 and A). This enables
us to model the Austrian pension system in detail, calculate retirement benefits for every individual, and double
check our calculation rules with the actual, administratively calculated pension entitlement. This approach thus
allows us to construct a range of (forward-looking) incentive measures that characterise the decision problem
as faced by the individuals. Specifically, we compute social security wealth, accrual rate, peak and option val-
ues for more than 300,000 individuals within each year of the observational period 2002-2009. Based on this
characterisation of the incentive structure we develop an econometric model and provide robust evidence for the
effects of the incentive measures on old age labour supply. Simulations of several reform scenarios underline
the incentive effects on retirement behaviour, and highlight a wide range of potential applications.
This report is organised as follows. We dedicate the rest of this chapter to a discussion of some of the
important funding problems of European pay-as-you-go pension systems, highlighting the effect the incentive
structure of these pension systems had on the labour market participation of older workers. Chapter 2 provides
an overview of the basic workings of the Austrian pension system, and the economic situation of Austrian
retirees. In chapter 3, we provide a detailed account of how we construct our dataset from the complex admin-
istrative data at hand. We discuss key concepts for the assessment of the incentive structure of pension systems
in chapter 4. Chapter 5 describes how retirement benefits are calculated and discusses the implementation of
the incentive maesures in our model. We present the econometric model in chapter 6, and the simulation results
in chapter 7. As supplements to this report we provide an overview of the historical development of pension
systems in Europe in section F, and a country comparison of pension systems in chapter G.
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1.2 The Sustainability of European Pension Systems
In this section, we want to discuss the two major threats to the solvency of public pension systems — what
Gruber and Wise (2004) call "unused labour force capacity" due to population ageing and the decreasing labour
force participation of older workers - from an EU perspective, thus emphasising the Austrian situtation relative
to a topical selection of European countries (see also G).
1.2.1 Ageing Populations
1.2.1.1 Fertility
Presently, birth rates fall short of the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman in all European countries.
However, fertility has historically been subject to fluctuations. In the inter-war years, a time of high unemploy-
ment and poor economic prospects in parts of Europe, birth rates were also below the replacement level; this
situation persisted until the baby boom started in the 1950s. In Britain, concerns about future pensions were al-
ready raised at that time. But then economic conditions brightened with employment and wages on the rise and
low prices, and fertility rates picked up. They reached a climax in 1964 with 6.25 million live births (Willetts,
2007). Only after the first oil crisis all European countries experienced a decline in fertility. In Austria fertility
has decreased by 50 percent since 1960; the fertility rate was 1.39 in 2009, which is below the EU average (see
table 1.1). There was a strong decline in the new EU Member States’ fertility rate between 1980 and 2000. E.g.
in the Czech Republic fertility is now below the EU-15 average. The same holds for Germany, whereas Sweden
and the United Kingdom have fertility rates closer to the replacement rate.
Table 1.1: Fertility Rates
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009
AT 2.69 2.29 1.65 1.46 1.36 1.39
CZ 2.09 1.92 2.08 1.90 1.14 1.49
DE 1.38 1.36
SE 1.92 1.68 2.13 1.54 1.94
UK 1.90 1.83 1.64
Source: Eurostat (a)
This decline in fertility has been described as a second demographic transition that is linked to overall
changes in social and family life. Marriage rates have decreased over the past decades, while the age at marriage
has increased. Cohabitation is on the rise as is the number of children born out of wedlock. An increase in the
education and labour market participation of women lead to higher opportunity costs of the time of women
(European Commission, 2007). Improvements in the availability and reliability of contraception have decreased
the incidence of stochastic fertility.
But also public policy has to take part of the blame for the decrease in fertility. In all European countries
except Austria and Romania, the average desired number of children is two or slightly more, a number relatively
constant across cohorts and genders. Only in Austria and Belgium, the number of childless women between 25
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and 39 who do not wish to have children exceeds ten percent. However, the percentage of women who actually
remain childless lies above this number in all EU countries, indicating that there is unrealised fertility potential
that governments could exploit with appropriate family-friendly policies. One also has to keep in mind that
small family sizes might have knock-on effects for future generations, as their ideal might be shaped by their
own experience. Actual trends however point into a different direction. In the early years of this millennium,
fertility rates have increased in most member states and stood at 1.5 in 2004/2005. The EU projects the fertility
rate to increase to 1.6 until 2030 and remain at this level until 2050 (European Commission, 2007).
Since children are the future labour force, a high fertility rate is desirable from a pension-funding perspec-
tive. The child ratio relates the number of working age (15-64 years) people in a country to the total number
of dependent children (below the age of 15). Austria’s child ratio is 11.3, that is, there are almost ten working
age people per child (Eurostat, b). The UK’s child ratio is comparable, in the Czech Republic and Germany
the child ratio is about eight percent while in Sweden it is higher at 13 percent, see figure 1.2.1.1. The child
dependency ratio for the EU-27 population is projected to rise moderately (Giannakouris, 2008).
Figure 1.1: Old Age and Child Dependency Ratios in selected EU Countries
25% 
21% 
30% 
27% 
23% 
11% 
8% 8% 
13% 
11% 
AT CZ DE SE UK 
Old-Age Dep. Ratio Child-Dep. Ratio 
Source: Eurostat (b), IHS 2011
1.2.1.2 Life Expectancy
Life expectancy has been increasing in Europe for decades. In Austria, life expectancy at birth increased from
72.8 to 81.1 for women and from 66.5 to 75.1 for men between 1961 and 2000 (Statistik Austria, 2011). In
2010 life expectancy was 83.2 and 77.7 for women and men, respectively. Average life expectancy in Austria
was a year above the EU-27 average and about a third of a year below the EU-15 average between 2000 and
2007 (Eurostat, a). In 2006 men aged 65 could expect to live 4 years, women 5 years longer than 65-year-olds
in 1978. Not only overall life expectancy, but also years of good health have been increasing since 1978, while
years of poor health have decreased.
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Table 1.2: Life Expectancy and Expected Years in Good/Bad/Moderate Health at age 65 in Austria
Health status in years
(very) good moderate (very) bad Life Expectancy
1978 Men 4.1 5.3 3.1 13
Women 3.6 7.6 4.7 16
2006 Men 8.7 6.0 2.5 17
Women 8.9 8.4 3.2 21
Source: Statistik Austria (2012c)
It is widely assumed that this positive trend will continue, although forecasts are not unanimous. In the early
20th century, the added years of life expectancy that were won due to medical advancements and increasing
job security were largely spent in the labour force (Willetts, 2007). In the future, the main increases in life
expectancy will come from lower mortality at older ages, but also health at higher ages is expected to improve.
The effects future lifestyle choices will have on life expectancy are, however, difficult to predict. The decrease
in smoking was found to have a positive effect; uncertainty remains about the future impact of rising obesity
rates (European Commission, 2007).
There still exists a strong albeit decreasing difference in life expectancy between men and women, now
amounting to 6 years in the EU-25. Women, however, are less healthy later in life. The difference between New
Member States and Old Member States is also considerable. In the former, men die on average 6.3 years and
women 3.7 years earlier. Most of these higher mortality rates could be prevented by different lifestyle choices
or safety measures. Furthermore, life expectancy differs along socio-economic lines (European Commission,
2007). The European Commission (2007) predicts life expectancy to increase to 86.8 years for women and
81.7 for men in 2050. The number of persons aged 80 or over will almost triple from 20 million to 60 million
between 2010 and 2060 in the EU-27. The share of Austrian population over 80 is predicted to increase to
almost 12 percent of the total population until 2053 and then to start decreasing. The share of over 80-year-olds
of the EU-27 population is not forecasted to decrease in the next 50 years.
This development is of course straining pay-as-you-go pension systems. The old age dependency ratio
relates the working age population of a country to the population of retirement age; it is therefore a good
basic indicator for the demographic sustainability of a pension system. Austria’s old-age dependency ratio,
for example, is about 25 (there are four working age people for every person of retirement age). The fastest
rate of growth of the old-age dependency ratio will be reached in 2013, but for most countries the rise will
continue at least until 2050. For most northern countries (like Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands) the peak
in the dependency ratio is predicted to occur before 2050 (OECD, 2009b). Currently, Germany, Italy, Sweden
and Greece have the highest dependency ratios, all close to 30 percent (Eurostat, b). Some new member states
have slightly lower dependency ratios. However, especially the New Member states will experience the fastest
increase in dependency ratios until 2050 (OECD, 2009b). By 2050, southern European countries already starting
from a higher level, namely Italy, Spain and Greece will have dependency ratios between 64 and 66 percent,
meaning there will only be 1.5 working age people for every person of retirement age. The most favourable
conditions are predicted to be in northern Europe, namely Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway and the Netherlands
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with a ratio between 38 and 44 percent. These are also the countries with the smallest growth in the old age
dependency ratio (OECD, 2009b).
As a consequence of the decrease in fertility and therefore numerically small younger cohorts, and the
increase in life expectancy, the fraction of the population that is of working age has shrunk in recent decades,
putting pressure on publicly funded pay-as-you-go pension systems. Although low birth rates have been around
for a while, related sustainability problems in the pension system are just about to start, since the large baby
boom cohorts who were born between 1955 and 1975 have not reached retirement age yet. The EU projected
the share of working age population to peak at 67 percent in 2010. After this point, an increasing share of the
baby-boomers will retire and cause the dependency ratio to rise.
1.2.1.3 Migration
According to forecasts, continuing high levels of immigration into the EU would delay the start of population
decline that is caused by low birth rates in Europe (European Commission, 2007). In 2008 nearly 3.8 million
people immigrated to and 2.3 million people emigrated from the European Union, which yielded a net migration
of about 1.5 million people. In Austria net migration was 8,451 in 1998 and 34,436 in 2008. Austria’s net
migration reached 0.4 percent of its population, which is above the EU average of 0.3 percent (see table 1.3).
The southern European countries Spain, Italy, Cyprus and Malta, which, a century ago, experienced impor-
tant emigration to America, now observe the largest inflows of migrants relative to their population (although
in the case of Spain and Italy this is mainly due to the regularisation of illegal immigrants). In 2008, Germany,
Poland and the Baltic countries had more emigrants than immigrants.
Table 1.3: Migration between 1999 and 2009
Immigrants Emmigrants Net Migration
1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009 % of Pop. 2009
AT 86,710 73,278 66,923 56,397 19,787 16,881 0.20%
CZ 9,910 75,620 1,136 61,782 8,774 13,838 0.13%
DE 874,023 346,216 672,048 286,582 201,975 59,634 0.07%
SE 49,839 102,280 35,705 39,240 14,134 63,040 0.68%
UK 354,077 566,490 245,340 368,150 108,737 163,034 0.26%
Source: Eurostat (a), IHS 2011
A diminishing of the European labour force might become a strong pull factor for immigration, since skill
shortages are likely to arise. Flexible labour markets with high employment rates — predominantly found in the
northern countries and the UK — are accessible more easily than heavily regulated ones and are therefore likely
to be more attractive to immigrants (European Commission, 2007). The Austrian labour force is projected to
decrease continuously for the next 40 years if there were no immigration and remain more or less constant with
migration (European Commission, 2007). In addition to the direct effect of migrants on the labour force, they
also increase the future labour force because they often have a higher birth rate than the native population. UK
government projections estimate that it takes around 15 years for migrants to adopt fertility patterns of their new
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home country (Willetts, 2007).
However, immigration is the most uncertain factor influencing the size of the working age population for
the next 30 years. The EU projections for the period 2015 to 2050 forecasts the net migration to fall to 800.000
persons per year — a number insufficient to offset a decrease in total population (European Commission, 2007).
According to the forecasts immigration can hold the labour force constant even when national working age
population declines; however, this does not affect the change in the share of the old age population. Therefore
migration is not a viable solution to the ageing problem, neither in Austria nor in other European countries.
According to estimates by the European Commission (2007) a net immigration of about 56 million people
of working age, who actually find jobs, would be required for the EU-27 to keep the population of working
age constant. Such high levels of migration might cause social and political problems, as societies struggle to
accommodate large influxes of people of foreign descent.
While the demographic trends of fertility and longevity do have an important impact on the solvency of
public pension systems, they are not easily influenced by public policy. The second contributing factor, the low
labour market participation of older workers, on the other side has been shown to be responsive to public policy,
most crucially to pension reforms (see, e.g. Wise, 2005). We now turn to discuss the trends in labour market
participation of older workers in Europe, and the interesting differences that can be observed between countries.
1.2.2 Labour Market Participation of Senior Workers
Starting in the late 1960s, labour force participation of older men has dropped in almost all western countries,
with EU countries like Belgium and Spain experiencing some of the largest drops (Wise, 2005). Although the
official regular retirement age for men is 65 in most European countries (women are allowed to retire earlier
than men in Italy, Poland, the UK, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Austria (OECD, 2006)), the average actual
retirement age is lower than the official age in all European countries; 61 years in the European average (see table
1.4). In the EU-15 on average 14 percent of the population in their late 50s and around half of the population
between the ages of 60 and 64 are already retired (OECD, 2006). Early retirement has been introduced in many
Table 1.4: Actual and Official Retirement Age in 2007
Actual Average Official
EU 61.2
AT 60.9 65/60
CZ 60.7 62
DE 62 65
SE 63.9 65
UK 62.6 65/60
Source: Eurostat (a) , IHS 2011
European countries as a measure to decrease the rising youth unemployment, or has been rationalised as such
ex-post. The conjecture that early retirement creates employment opportunities for young people can however
not be backed up empirically — there is no evidence that increasing the employment rate of older persons has
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Figure 1.2: Activity Status of the Age Group 55-60
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Source: Eurostat (b), IHS 2011
Figure 1.3: Activity Status of Age Group 60-65
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Source: Eurostat (b), IHS 2011
detrimental effects on youth employment (Gruber et al., 2009). The introduction of early retirement provisions,
however, had a large effect on older workers’ participation rates (OECD, 2006).
Most countries allow those with a long insurance history to retire before reaching the regular retirement
age.Additionally, many European countries provide other benefits, like unemployment or disability benefits,
that are equivalent to early retirement provisions — this is evidenced by the striking differences in the number
of claimants of disability benefits between European countries that are unlikely to be due to actual differences
in health status (Milligan and Wise, 2011). Defining ones activity status may depend on which kind of benefit
is easier to obtain at a given age in each country OECD (2006), which is why the labour force status of older
workers who are not currently employed differs so much between EU countries (see figures 1.2 and 1.3).
Austria and the Czech Republic display high numbers of young pensioners, indicating that early retirement
is comparatively accessible in these countries. In Austria, more than 80 percent of those aged 60 to 65 are
already retired, half of all early retirees retire because they fulfilled the eligibility criteria for early retirement,
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without having to refer to health reasons. The same is true for the Czech Republic (Statistik Austria (2007),
Eurostat (a), see table 1.5). For Austria, other reasons for early retirement include ill health, being pushed
into retirement by their employer, lay-offs or redundancy, being offered financial retirement incentives, or care
responsibilities. Asked under what conditions they would have continued working, 61.4 percent of Austrian
early pensioners stated that they would have worked longer if they were healthier, 30.6 percent would have
worked longer for higher earnings and a low percentage of early pensioners stated that they would work longer
if flexibility, work atmosphere and education possibilities were better (Statistik Austria, 2007).
In Sweden, less than a third in the 60-65 age group are retired; but of those who are retired, more than a
third retired because of ill health. In fact, more than a third of 64-year-old Swedish men are collecting disability
benefits, indicating that this is a loophole into early retirement in the Swedish system (Milligan and Wise, 2011).
Italy, Spain and the Netherlands display quite high shares of non-participation in the labour force for this age
group, while in Germany, Spain and Finland the unemployment rates for this age group are high. In countries
with stricter regulations for early retirement, like the United Kingdom, Sweden and Germany, around a third
of early pensioners retire early because of health problems, see table 1.5. In Germany and the UK, a high
percentage of early retirement decisions is caused by a job loss (Eurostat, a).
Table 1.5: Self-reported Retirement Reasons in the Age Group 50-69
Total in 1000 Lost Job Reached Retirement Age Health Reason
EU 23321,4 16% 61% 22%
CZ 885,4 12% 81% 7%
DE 3842,5 23% 42% 31%
AT 571,6 14% 62% 23%
SE 540,9 14% 56% 31%
UK 2295,1 27% 39% 34%
Source: Eurostat (a), IHS, 2011
Once established it seems rather difficult to abolish these schemes. Because those desiring to retire divert
to other social benefits, such as unemployment and sickness benefits or employer sponsored early retirement,
the reform of early retirement schemes has to be considered in conjunction with other benefits for which older
people are in general eligible.
One frequently quoted reason for the low labour force participation of older people is unemployment, as
senior workers often struggle to find a new job which may be less appealing than moving into early retirement
(Eurostat, a). More senior workers might find it harder to find jobs because employers hold negative preconcep-
tions about older workers’ productivity or flexibility, or may worry about their skill set being out of date. Also,
higher wage costs due to seniority wages and special protection rules can make more senior workers undesir-
able on the labour market (OECD, 2006). Any policy aiming to effectively increase labour force participation
of older workers has to address this issue. Education is also an important determinant of the retirement decision
— more highly educated individuals tend to continue working longer than unskilled workers, just like the self
employed work longer than the employed (Statistik Austria, 2007)1. A better educated workforce is therefore
1Austrian civil servants retire earlier than the general population (Statistik Austria, 2007), which is due to attractive early retirement
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desirable from a labour force participation perspective.
The target employment rate (according to the Stockholm Euopean Council of 2001) for 55- to 65- year-
olds was 50 percent in 2010 (Eurostat, 2010). The employment rate for older workers increased in almost all
countries from 1998 to 2010. Across the EU-27 the employment rate for older workers increased from 40
percent in 2003 to 45.6 percent in 2008. Twelve Member States achieved 50 percent: Iceland shows the highest
share of employed 55- to 65-year-olds, followed by Sweden, Norway and the United Kingdom (see figure 1.7).
In Austria, the employment rate for 55- to 64- year-olds has increased from 29 percent in 1995 to 42 percent in
2010 which is still far below the target (Eurostat, a).
As a result of stagnant or decreasing retirement ages over time and increasing life expectancy, time spent in
retirement became longer. Hungarian men enjoy the longest retirement phase in Europe, followed by Austrian
and Italian men (OECD, 2006). The longest retirement phase for women can be found in Belgium, followed by
France and Austria (2006). At the same time, entry into the labour force has been delayed as a consequence of
prolonged education and training. In Austria the average entry age increased from 17 in 1971 to 23 in 2001 (see
table 1.6). As a result, working years decreased too from 44 to 36 years between 1971 and 2001.
Table 1.6: Evolution of Average Entry Age, Working Years and Exit Age in Austria since 1971
entry age working years exit age
1971 17 44 61
1981 18 42 60
1991 19 40 59
2001 23 36 59
Source: Eurostat (b), IHS 2011
Table 1.7: Retired People in Absolute Numbers, by Age Groups
55-60 60-64 over 65 total % of total population
AT 205.295 329.825 1.213.416 1.851.019 22.46
CZ 206.676 472.654 1.299.012 1.982.001 19.38
DE 557.072 3.012.601 14.800.000 18.604.325 22.87
SE 70.958 276.946 1.428.375 1.898.215 20.65
UK 454.021 1.527.571 7.463.051 9.579.429 15.82
Source: Eurostat (b), IHS 2011
1.2.3 Female labour force participation
The evolution of female labour force participation in Europe over the life cycle and between generations is more
complex than the development of male employment rates. While labour force participation of women in general
provisions.
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Figure 1.4: Labour Force Status by Sex, 30-40 Year-olds
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Figure 1.5: Labour Force Status by Sex, 40-50 Year-olds
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has gone up during the second half of the last century, there is also a trend to early retirement among older
women, mirroring the trend for men. Female labour force participation has been on the rise since the 1960s, due
to better education and training of women (Eurofound, 2010). However, women’s labour force status is more
dependent on life cycle events than men’s (see figures 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6) — young women between 30 and 40
often withdraw from the labour market to take care of small children.
The activity rates of older women are lower than the activity rates of older men in all EU countries (see
figure 1.7); in fact, the gender difference in activity rates is higher in the 55-65 age group than across all ages
(30-65) for most EU countries, as can be seen in figures1.4 1.5 and 1.6. This is a cohort effect: many women
who are now this age dropped out of the labour force when they had small children and never returned to the
labour market. Even though this phenomenon is still prevailing in Austria, it is declining over time (Statistik
Austria, 2007). High labour force participation among women aged 40-50 might thus point into the direction of
higher labour force attachment of older women in the years going forward.
Although men of all age groups display higher activity rates than women in all European countries, differ-
ences in labour force participation rates between men and women are higher in Austria, the Czech Republic and
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Figure 1.6: Labour Force Status by Sex, 50-55 Year-olds
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Germany than it is in Sweden and the UK, indicating that it is easier to combine work with child rearing in the
latter countries.
Women’s propensity to work part-time is higher than men’s (Eurostat, a). Consequently, the increase in
female labour force participation brought about an increase in the overall proportion of workers working part-
time, from 15.9 percent in 1998 to 18.2 percent in 2008 in EU-27 (Eurofound, 2010). In Germany around half,
in Austria and the UK around 40 percent and in Sweden and the Czech Republic about a third of all working
women work part time (see table 1.8). This points to a potential of increasing employment and the labour
force in the face of the insolvency of pay-as-you-go pension systems: by facilitating the combination of work
and family responsibilities, countries could motivate women to increase their working hours and labour force
attachment throughout the life cycle.
Table 1.8: Part-time Working Women as a Share of all Working Women, by Age Groups
30-40-year-olds 40-50-year-olds 50-60-year-olds
AT 44.7% 41.3% 37.9%
CZ 7.3% 3.9% 5.9%
DE 49.5% 51.9% 48.7%
SE 35.6% 31.9% 33.8%
UK 40.0% 39.7% 38.9%
Source: Eurostat (b), IHS 2011.
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Chapter 2
The Austrian Pension System
2.1 Legal Framework
The main tier of the Austrian pension system is statutory, publicly organised and part of the social security sys-
tem that further comprises unemployment, accident and health insurance. It is a pay-as-you-go system, financed
by social insurance contributions (75 percent) and means out of the general budget (25 percent) (Bundesmin-
isterium für Arbeit, Soziales und Konsumentenschutz, 2012). Individual pension entitlements depend on the
assessment base and the number of insurance years. In case of early retirement deductions are apply, in the
case of retirement later than the statutory age premiums are paid. Next to this earnings-related scheme small
pensions are topped-up to the minimum pension amount of 815 Eurow for one person and 1,222 Euros for a
couple in 2012. Elderly people without the right to a pension might apply for social benefits of the same amount
as the minimum pension, these benefits are however means tested (on both income and wealth). Compared to
other European countries occupational and individual private pensions are of little importance in Austria. Nev-
ertheless, the number of contribution payers as well as benefit receivers has increased during the last decade.
The number of prospective beneficiaries has increased from 307,421 to 715,649 from 2002 to 2010. The num-
ber of individuals who draw a private pension benefit has increased from 37,525 to 63,449 during this period.
(Wirtschaftskammer, 2012)
Over the last fifteen years, the public pension system has experienced a numerous reforms and changes,
all aimed at increasing the sustainability of the system in light of increasing life expectancy and low fertility.
The biggest change came with the so-called pension harmonisation. In 2005, the formerly independent pen-
sion systems for the self employed, private sector employees and farmers were joined into one single system
(Allgemeines Pensionsgesetz, (APG)). The rules for public sector employees, covered by a separate retirement
system, are gradually adapted to the APG.1 The APG was built around the 45/65/80 formula: After 45 insur-
ance years, retiring at the age of 65 leads to a replacement rate of 80 percent of the average lifetime income.
The current contribution rate on income varies from 22.8 percent for private sector employees (12.55 paid by
1Our data does not comprise public sector employees, thus we will not model their retirement decisions. Within this text specific rules
and differences to the private sector are sometimes mentioned, however these will not be covered in a complete way.
IHS — Hanappi, Hofer, Müllbacher, Winter-Ebmer / IREA — 15
the employer and 10.25 by the employee), to 17.5 percent for the self employed and 15.5 percent for farmers.
All contributions are listed on an individual pension account, set up to increase transparency. Times with pen-
sion insurance but without direct contributions, such as parental leave, sickness, unemployment, military/civil
service, are treated like contribution periods using a defined contribution base.2 Once in the pension account,
entitlements are supposed to be unchangeable for future reforms. Past contributions are to be reevaluated by
the growth of the average contribution base, while the revaluation factor for existing pensions is set equal to the
annual consumer price inflation.
However, this system will only come into full effect in 45 years, when the cohort who started to pay con-
tributions in 2005 retires. For everyone with contribution periods before 2005, the pension calculation follows
transition rules: The pension is calculated twice, following old and new rules, and the individual entitlement
is calculated as a weighted average between the two. People born before 1955 are not affected by the pension
account system even if they retire after 2004. Their pension calculation is the result of a mixture of rules that
were in force in 2003 and rules that apply from 2004 onwards. Before 2004, the assessment base was calculated
by averaging over the 15 years with the highest income. From 2004 onwards this period is extended by 1 year
every year, reaching 40 years in 2028.3 Each year of insurance before 2004 is valued with an accrual rate of 2%,
after 2004 the accrual rate decreases stepwise to 1.78 until 2009. Deductions for early retirement used to be 2-3
percentage points for every year up to a maximum of 10 points. From 2004 onwards, deductions are 4.2% per
year, with a maximum of 15% of the pension. If a person was entitled to a pension before 2004, their pension
is calculated according to the old rules. If not, 2004 rules are applied; however, the maximum loss due to the
change from 2003 to 2004 rules is capped at 5-7%.
Apart from new calculation rules the objective of all pension reforms was to increase effective retirement age
and abolish early pathways into retirement. The statutory retirement age is 65 for men and 60 for women. The
lower retirement age for women will be increased to 65 between 2024 and 2033.4 In the new pension account
system early retirement is replaced by the corridor pension. This allows retiring from the age of 62 onwards
with deductions of 4.2% per year. Until the end of 2013, individuals who have having acquired 45 (men) or
40 (women) years of contributions into the pension system, and who were born before 1954/1959 can retire at
the age of 60/55 without any deductions on the basis of the hard-worker-rule.5 Later cohorts’ earliest possible
retirement age will be 62, deductions will apply. Additional pathways into early retirement that were already
abolished include retirement due to unemployment as well as the so-called gliding pension. However, we do not
consider three more retirement pathways within our framework: These include regulations concerning heavy
and night-time labour and a specific programme that subsidises working time reductions beginning at ages 58.5
and 53.5 for males and females respectively (cf. Hofer et al. (2011)).
In 2010, 33% of male retirees and 15% of female retirees entered retirement on the basis of one of several
2Payments for these periods are transferred to the pension agency, e.g. by the unemployment agency or by the public health insurance.
3For every child the averaging period is reduced by 3 years with the minimum of 15 years.
4Female civil servants retire regularly at 65.
5The classification of contribution years applied in this rule was changed several times. Apart from contribution periods based on
employment, other periods were considered as well, e.g. sickness, education or, for some cohorts, even unemployment spells. The German
term ’Hacklerregelung’ is translated as hard-worker rule, although this retirement pathway does not depend on the type of occupation. Quite
to the contrary, this pathway is typically used by civil servants, because it is easier to accumulate of 45/40 contribution years in a steady
occupation within the public sector than in blue-collar occupations.
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disability pension options (Arbeiterkammer, 2012). Disability is defined as the incapacity to exercise the occu-
pation that was predominantly exercised within the last 15 years due to health reasons. Disability pensions are
calculated similar to old-age pensions, depending on the years of insurance, the assessment base and deductions
for retiring before the statutory retirement age. Taking into consideration the high share of retirees using this
pathway into retirement, we will later on treat it as another form of early retirement (see section 5.4.1).
In spite of several pension reforms that took place in the last fifteen years, the Austrian pension system can
still be called generous. According to the OECD, the median net replacement rate is 89.9% percent. Individuals
at the 25th income decile receive a replacement rate very close to the median replacement rate (91.3%), whereas
individuals at the 75th decile receive a lower replacement rate of 84.6 percent (OECD, 2011). The following
section discusses the income situation of Austrian retirees compared to the working age population and to other
European countries.
DEFINITIONS
Disposable Income: The sum of all household members’ gross personal income components (gross employee
cash or near cash income; gross non-cash employee income; gross cash benefits or losses from self-employment
including royalties; unemployment benefits; old-age benefits; survivor benefits, sickness benefits; disability
benefits and education-related allowances) plus gross income components at household level (income from
rental of a property or land; family/children related allowances, housing allowances, regular inter-household
cash transfers, interests, dividends, profit from capital investments in unincorporated business, income received
by people aged under 16) minus regular taxes on wealth, regular inter-household cash transfers, tax on income
and social insurance contributions (note that disposable income can be negative). The disposable household
incomes are equalised according to the modified OECD scale.
Modified OECD scale: All household incomes are summed up and divided by an equalised number of house-
hold members. The first household member gets a weight of 1, each additional adult gets a weight of 0.7,
children get 0.5.
Retiree: The person’s basic activity status is "retired" (as opposed to "at work", "unemployed" or "inactive") and
self-defined current economic status is "in retirement".
Retired-Couple-Household: 2 retirees and nobody else in the household.
Retired-Single-Household: One retiree and nobody else in the household.
non-Retired-Couple-Household: 2 individuals between 18 and 65 years (not retirees) in a household.
non-Retired-Single-Household: 1 person between 18 and 65 years (not retirees) in a household.
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2.2 Old-age Income and Living Conditions
As discussed at length in supplement F, pension systems generally serve multiple purposes. On the one hand,
mandatory schemes oblige people to save during their working career to avoid a drop in consumption caused
by the loss of labour income after retirement. Maintaining the standard of living of retirees is the consumption
smoothing function of the pension system (Borella and Fornero, 2009). On the other hand, the pension system
has to ensure an adequate standard of living for those who could not accumulate enough contributions because
of health problems, disability or other reasons.
According to the OECD typology (see supplement F), pension systems focus mainly on these two objectives:
the first tier ensures adequate levels of retirement incomes such to avoid the risk of poverty in old age, while the
second tier ensures that the standard of living does not excessively change after retirement (OECD, 2009b). By
focusing on the replacement of earnings the Austrian pension system mainly concentrates on the second tier,
although, as described above, a minimum pension is foreseen to address the first objective as well. Countries
which focus on the replacement of labour income generally provide higher pension incomes, but they also have
higher public pension expenditures (OECD, 2009b). In 2007 Austria had the third highest public expenditures
on old-age and retirement benefits compared to the GDP of all OECD countries, 12.7% (OECD, 2011). Only
Italy and France spent more than Austria, 14.1% and 12.8% respectively.
Table 2.1: Sample Sizes EU-SILC 2008
(a) Sample Size given Activity Status is "Retired"
Economic Status AT DE CZ SE UK
In Retirement 2,963 7,399 6601 2,952 3,913
Disabled 22 0 0 304 0
Domestic and Care Tasks 61 0 0 0 0
Other Inactivity 2 0 0 0 0
(b) Sample Size given Economic Status is "in Retirement"
Activity Status AT DE CZ SE UK
At work 38 0 154 0 0
Unemployed 9 0 0 0 0
Retired 2,963 7,399 6,601 2,952 3,931
Inactive 20 0 0 0 0
Source: Eurostat (b), IHS 2011
The EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC 2008) allow a closer look at the disposable
incomes of the elderly and enable us to compare the situation of Austrian retirees to those in other European
countries. We discuss the pension systems of four specific countries, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Germany and
the United Kingdom alongside Austria, because they represent different types of public pension systems (sup-
plement F gives a description of Esping-Andersen’s typology that leads us to choose these countries). Within
this group Austria devotes the highest share of public expenditures on retirement benefits (12.7% of GDP),
while Germany (10.7%), Sweden (9.5%), the Czech Republic (7.7%) and the United Kingdom (5.9%) all spend
18— Hanappi, Hofer, Müllbacher, Winter-Ebmer / IREA — IHS
less (OECD, 2011). The box 2.1 on the opposite page shows some definitions that we will use in this section.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the number of observations as well as their weighted equivalent by status and
economic activity.
Table 2.2: Retired Households
Retired-Couple-Households AT DE CZ SE UK
Sample Size 1,020 29,707 2,866 3,816 22,259
Weighed Sample Size 534,652 9,414,384 794,384 803,816 4,100,418
Retired-Single-Households AT DE CZ SE UK
Sample Size 893 1,671 1,980 626 1,213
Weighted Sample Size 592,043 6,010,470 559,036 636,504 3,421,488
Source: Eurostat (b), IHS 2011
Table 2.3 shows the average equalised household income per income decile for every country. To get an idea
of the financial situation of retirees in comparison to the rest of the population the average income of retired
couple households and retired single households are shown separately. The average income per decile of retired
households can be compared to that of non-retired households. Consistent with the aim of the Austrian pension
system to maintain the standard of living, Austrian retirees achieve a comparatively high income. Compared to
the other countries, retired couples and singles of each decile have a high mean income throughout the income
distribution. Looking at income inequality in Austria, the lowest two deciles of couple retirees and the lowest
decile of single retirees enjoy a higher income than the equivalents of non-retired couple and single households.
Similarly, in the Czech Republic and in Germany the lowest deciles of retired couples and singles on average
dispose of a higher income than non-retired couples and singles. In Sweden retired couples seem to have very
low incomes; however, the standard deviation is very high, thus indicating that some extreme cases with negative
incomes (for example due to losses in self-employment) reduce the average. In the United Kingdom, the first
decile of retired couples also has lower incomes than the first decile of non-retired couples; the small standard
deviation indicates that this is system-immanent. In Germany, especially the incomes of single retirees are quite
low compared to Austria. In all these countries the mean equalised disposable houshold income is higher for
couples than for singles in almost every decile. This is true for retirees as well as for non-retirees.
With regards to the second objective of public pension systems, poverty prevention, an increase in the risk
of poverty with age could be explained by the cohort effect, the age effect and the compositional effect (OECD,
2009b). The cohort effect occurs because real income at the time when those now aged 65-year-olds and older
were active in the labour force used to be lower than it is now; this depresses their present income because
pension schemes are typically related to past labour market earnings. The age effect occurs because of the way
the relative value of the pension evolves after retirement according to the index scheme. The compositional
effect occurs because women tend to live longer; because many women have to rely on a survivors pension they
obtain on average lower pension incomes. The compositional effect, however, can also go the other direction:
since rich people tend to live longer, older retirees may have higher average pension incomes (OECD, 2009b).
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Table 2.4 shows the average, gender specific risk-of-poverty-rate for retired people in five countries6.
Table 2.4: At-risk-of-Poverty Rates
Total Population Retired People, by Age Group
Women 55-60 60-65 older than 65 Retired Women
AT 13.5% 12.1% 10.1% 16.2% 14.9%
CZ 10.1% 8.7% 7.4% 10.5% 9.5%
DE 16.2% 20.9% 12.5% 16.4% 15.9%
SE 13.1% 9.9% 13.8% 21.3% 19.5%
UK 20.2% 19.9% 31.0% 34.0% 32.5%
Men 55-60 60-65 older than 65 Retired Men
AT 11.2% 9.4% 7.6% 11.9% 11.6%
CZ 8.0% 6.1% 3.1% 3.5% 3.5%
DE 14.3% 16.0% 16.8% 11.2% 12.6%
SE 11.4% 16.0% 7.7% 9.6% 10.5%
UK 17.7% 29.0% 32.2% 29.9% 30.1%
Source: Eurostat (b), IHS 2011
In Austria, the average risk-of-poverty rate of the total population is 12.4%, lower than in Germany (15.2%)
and the United Kingdom (18.8%), but higher than in Sweden (12.1%) and the Czech Republic (9.0%). The
risk-of-poverty rate is higher for women than for men in all countries.
Comparing retirees to the total population, retired women in Austria aged 65 and below face a lower poverty
risk than the average Austrian woman, while women aged 65 and above have a slightly elevated poverty risk.
This might be due to the fact that a fifth of all women who receive a public pension only receive a widow’s
pension (Statistik Austria, 2012b). Also, older retired women are more likely to rely exclusively on a survivor’s
pension than younger cohorts of female retirees, since female labour participation rates have increased over time.
Having said that, the risk of poverty rate for retired women is still much lower than in the United Kingdom and
Sweden, and comparable to the poverty risk German women in this age group face.7 The same pattern holds
for all other countries, except Germany, where a fifth of all retired women between the ages of 55 and 60 live
in risk of poverty; in the UK, risk-of-poverty rates are more than ten percentage points higher than the national
female average for retired women above the age of 60.
For Austrian men, a similar although milder pattern emerges — poverty rates for men aged 65 and younger
are below the national average, and while men 65 and older do have a minimally elevated risk of poverty, retired
men taken together are not more at risk of poverty than the average Austrian man. This is a further indication
6The risk-of-poverty rate is defined as the share of the population receiving less than 60 percent of the median equalised disposable
income of the total population.
7The lower risk-of-poverty-rates in the Czech Republic fit into a common picture of Eastern European countries where disposable
incomes are generally lower, which leads to lower poverty rates, because the definition of the poverty risk depends exclusively on the
income distribution, not on actual standard of living.
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that the somewhat higher poverty risk of Austrian women aged 65 and above is in fact due to a high share of
women whose only source of income is a survivor pension. As was the case for women, Germany displays
higher poverty risks for male pensioners aged 65 and younger, while male retirerees over the age of 65 have a
lower risk of poverty. Also in Sweden, poverty rates for young pensioners (early retirees below the age of 60)
are elevated as compared to the national average. In this country comparison, pensioners in the United Kingdom
clearly fare worst; with male retirees in the UK displaying almost the double, female retirees a third more than
the national risk-of-poverty rates.
This indicates a satisfactory performance of the Austrian pension system with regards to the prevention of
old-age poverty. Although care must be taken to preserve a decent standard of living especially for older female
pensioners, retired men and women below the age of 65 actually have a lower risk of poverty than the general
population. Thus, it can be argued that there is leeway for reforms geared at improving the sustainability of the
Austrian pension system for the future, especially if these reforms aim at increasing the retirement age and thus
decreasing the years spent in retirement (as opposed to cutting the pensions of older retirees at the lower tail of
the income distribution).
Chapter 3
Data: Sources and Definitions
3.1 Data Sources
Our dataset combines data from two different sources: the Austrian Labour Market Database and the Con-
densated Insurance-periods and Pension Calculation Dataset (Verdichtung von Versicherungszeiten und Pen-
sionsberechnung, VVP). The Austrian Labour Market database is compiled from the Austrian Social Security
Database and data from the Austrian Job Centre; it is provided and maintained by the Austrian Ministry of
Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection (BMASK).
The data collected in the Austrian Social Security Database comprises data from the Umbrella Institution
of Austrian Social Security Institutions (Hauptverband der Österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger). It
collects individual data that is relevant for a variety of social benefits such as unemployment and health insur-
ance, calculation of pension entitlements or maternity leave. It contains detailed information on unemployment
spells, sick-days, days on parental leave etc. Spells of employment are typically associated with a firm identifier
(matched employer-employee data). Data is available from January 1972 to 2009. There is also information
on labour market history before 1972 for a subset of individuals, but no matched firm data is available before
1972.1 The dataset is organised according to individual spells of qualifications that can roughly be translated
into labour market states. The more than 200 different types of spells were converted into seven categories. At
any given time, a person can
- Be employed as a civil servant, a blue or a white collar employee,
- be working as a farmer or in a free profession
- work "atypically" (timed contracts, free contracts etc.) or have an income too low to be subject to social
insurance contributions, or be in an apprenticeship program,
- be unemployed, irrespective of unemployment benefit entitlement,
1We do not need this information because we have access to the VVP database, see below.
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- be on parental leave, whether or not the person has been working before, or is planning to go back to their
job afterwards,
- be out of the labour force (military or civil service, retired, in full time education)
- miscellaneous (missing data, person died, in between labour market states etc).
Demographic information is the most recent at the time of data delivery, and includes sex, year and month of
birth, academic degree, nationality, nationality in 1999 and information on the date of death. Firm specific
information is also accurate at the time of data delivery and includes the year of data delivery, geographical
information and industry affiliation (for a very useful and detailed description of this data-set, see Zweimueller
et al., 2009). The Austrian Labour Market Database (AMDB) matches this data to additional data from the
Austrian Job Centre. This data-set only covers individuals who were registered job seekers at some point during
their working lives, and contains additional information on education, migration status etc.
The second data-set we use is the Condensated Insurance-periods and Pension Calculation Dataset (VVP),
that is collected by the Austrian Public Pension Association (Pensionsversicherungsanstalt). It contains the
complete insurance history of the majority of individuals who received a positive adjudication for a pension
in the years 2001-2009 (for a discussion of the representativeness of the data set, see section 3.3.2). That is,
this dataset contains all the information the Austrian Pension Association uses to calculate pension entitlements
(employment history, assessment base etc.). This unique dataset enables us to replicate the Austrian pension
system in great detail. We can calculate pension entitlements using an individual’s exact employment history,
substitution periods (these are periods for which a person did not pay insurance, but are counted as insurance
months, for example parental leave and child rearing periods, or military service), and assessment base (the
assessment base is related to gross earnings). Because the dataset also contains the actual pension entitlement,
as calculated by the Austrian Public Pension Association, we can double-check that we model the complex
Austrian pension system correctly. For our simulation, we can therefore use actual pension entitlements, without
having to resort to assumptions about pension entitlements as has been done in previous work (e.g. Raab, 2011).
3.2 Adjustements and Definitions
Our dataset is a sample of people who have received a positive adjudication of one or more types of pension
(except the so called Ruhegenuss of public servants) between 2001 and 2009. In total, there are 513,182 pension
adjudications registered. Because the dataset entries are pension adjudications, not retired individuals, we have
to modify it so it fits our purpose of modelling individual retirement decisions. A pension adjudication does not
automatically imply that a person retired: An adjudication might be objected by the retiree and revised by the
agency or people might already ahve retired, their pension claim, however, was temporary and is now renewed.
The matched data from the labour market data base is of help in identifying actual retirement dates. In this
section, we discuss how we define retirement dates and retirees and restrict the dataset to a sample that fits our
purposes.
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3.2.1 Retirement Status
The data from the Austrian Public Pension Association contains all information required to calculate individual
pension entitlements, including the pension valuation date (Stichtag). The pension valuation date is the date
the Public Pension Association uses as the start-date for retirement in calculating the amount of pension an
individual is entitled to. An individual wishing to retire can ask for his or her pension to be calculated from
the day he or she wants to retire, as long as this day is after the earliest possible pension valuation date (which
depends on the individual’s age and insurance history).
For our purpose, it is paramount that we know the actual, exact retirement year of a person. This is why
we match this data to data from the Austrian Job Centre. It contains the date when a person retires for the
first time, the so called first labour market exit date. The pension valuation year and the first labour market
exit year coincide in 423,244 cases, so for these cases we can assume that the pension valuation year is the
actual retirement year. However, in some cases, the first labour market exit date is missing, or the pension
valuation year from the Social Security System and the first labour market exit year of the Austrian Job Centre
do not coincide, causing uncertainty about the actual retirement year. 21,174 registrations have their first labour
market exit year before their pension valuation year. These people might have received a disability pension
once, then they either returned to their jobs before retiring later due to old-age, or the disability pension was
temporary and is now renewed, or they switched directly from disability to any kind of old-age pension. Since
the dataset covers only registrations from 2001 to 2009, such (interrupted) careers cannot be reconstructed, so
we eliminate these cases from our dataset. 24,436 pension registrations miss a first labour market exit date —
either these people have not retired yet (but are receivers of a pension) or the datea is imprecise with regard to
their retirement year, which is why they, too, are omitted from the dataset. We only keep individuals whose first
labour market exit year is in the same year or after the pension valuation year, 467,572 individuals.
3.2.2 Multiple Registrations
As mentioned above, the data entries are pension adjudications, not individuals retiring. Individuals can be
registered more than once during the observation period (2001-2009) because
- They are registered once for a survivor pension, and then subsequently (during the observation period)
for any kind of old-age pension, or they are registered for a disability pension, and later for any old age
pension.
- They receive a temporary disability pension, and are registered each time this temporary pension is re-
newed.
- They are re-registered every time they ask for a recalculation of their pension entitlement.
Table 3.1 shows the number of multiple registrations in the system. 15,106 people show up two times, 599
people show up three times and 46 people show up even more often. In total, there are 513,182 registrations,
but only 496,730 individuals.
In order to construct a dataset of individuals instead of registrations, we have to eliminate multiple registra-
tions so that information according to actual retirement dates are preserved. For multiply registered individuals,
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Table 3.1: Number of Adjudications per Person
number of positive number of
adjudications per
person
people
1 480,979
2 15,106
3 599
4 39
5 5
6 1
7 1
Total 496,730
Source: AMDB and VVP, IHS 2011
we keep the pension registration with the pension valuation year and month closest to the Job Center’s first
labour market exit month while we delete the other registrations. 2,534 registrations are deleted in this way.
Each registration also has a pension notification date, which is the date of the pension adjudication. If the
pension valuation date is the same for a person with different pension notification dates, then we keep the
registration where the notification date is closest to the first first labour market exit date. 8,926 registrations are
thusly deleted (most likely recalculations of pensions).
For individuals who are registered more than once, but with identical pension valuation and notification
dates, we retain the registration with the highest pension. In this manner, another 466 registrations are deleted.
The remaining 377 double registrations are identical with respect to valuation and notification dates and pension
incomes; in these cases we eliminate the entry with the lowest ID number.
3.2.3 Further Restrictions
After the previous two steps, 455,269 individuals who have retired for the first time in the same year as the
pension valuation year or afterwards remain in our dataset. Of these, 65,718 have worked abroad at some point
in the past, and therefore receive pension incomes which depend on various international agreements. Since we
are interested in evaluating the incentive effects of the Austrian pension system, we eliminate these people from
our dataset.
Furthermore, there are 12,042 survivor pension registrations — since we simulate retirement decisions at
the individual level, we have to exclude those drawing survivor pensions from our dataset. If data on household
income and the income of the deceased person were available, it would be interesting to include survivor pen-
sions into the simulation of retirement decisions — unfortunately this is not possible at the moment due to data
limitations. This further reduces the dataset to 388,562 individuals.
Additionally, we limit the simulations to old-age pensions (Alterspension, AP), corridor pensions (Korridor-
Pension, KOP), pensions due to long insurance history (vorzeitige Alterspension aufgrund von langer Ver-
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sicherungszeit, VAPL) and disability pensions. Disability pensions can be further subdivided into disability
pensions for the self-employed (Erwerbsunfähgikeit, EU), for white collar employees (Berufsunfähigkeit, BU)
and for blue collar workers (Invaliditätspension, IP). People with gliding pensions and pensions due to un-
employment are eliminated from the dataset because these pension schemes have been abolished since 2004.
Furthermore, we do not consider miner pensions and heavy labour pensions because only a small, homogeneous
group of people is affected by these regulations. This eliminates 9,853 individuals.
701 men who were born before 1937, and 7,898 women born no later than 1941, are drawing pensions
according to out-dated regulations and are therefore eliminated. This leads to the sample of individuals who
retired in 2001 being relatively small, which is why we drop 9,576 who retired in this year. Similarly, 45,734
people, who were born in 1955 and later, are deleted from the dataset, because this age group will fall under
a new regulation (the draft of an individual pension account). We do not consider this new regulation because
the sample is relatively small, given that only younger cohorts are eligible. Our final dataset covers 314,805
individuals.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Final Dataset
In this section, we want to briefly present the dataset we use for our simulation exercises, the "final dataset" of
the last step detailed in table 3.2. This final dataset contains information on 314,805 individuals, slightly more
women than men. Women have a higher share of old age pensions than men (35% as compared to 6%). As
more men than women exhibit long and steady contribution periods more men than women qualify for early
retirement pathways. Similarly, because the corridor pension enables individuals to retire between the ages of
62 to 65 with deductions to their pensions, only men draw this type of pension (women can retire with full
pension amounts at the age of 60) — 5,242 or 3% of all men in our dataset, see table 3.3. Conversely, the
share of men drawing disability pensions is higher (43% as compared to 18%). Disability is defined by the
incapacity for health reasons to exercise the occupation that was predominantly exercised within the last 15
years. Disability pensioners can further be subdivided into the self-employed (including farmers) and blue- or
white collar employees. As can be seen from table 3.3, a similar percentage of men and women who were self-
employed or white-collar employees retire under the disability pension scheme, whereas the huge majority of
men retiring due to disability were blue-collar workers. The pension type "early pension due to a long insurance
history" was subject to pension reform during our reference period (that is, the regulations and eligibility criteria
for this pathway into retirement changed during the period 2001 to 2009, depending on the birth cohort and
retirement year, cf. 2). Early retirement due to a long insurance history starts at 55 for women and 60 for men,
respectively (with the age being increased for later cohorts). This is why the mean age of men and women
who retire in this scheme is so dense around 56 and 61 years for women and men respectively — individuals
basically retire as soon as they are entitled to do so (see table 3.4).
Most individuals retire before the statutory retirement age — 96,129 or 65% of all women retire before the
statutory age of 60, 133,239 or 64.23% of all men retire before the age of 65. Because of the higher share of
disability pensions among men and the higher share of men eligible for early retirement schemes the mean age
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Table 3.2: Data Adjustements
initial 513,182 513,182
dataset
24,436 missing Labour Market Exit Date 488,746
21,174 Labour Market Exit Date before Valuation Date 467,572
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467,572 467,572
2,534 Multi-Registrations with different Valuation Dates 465,038
8,926 Multi-Registrations with different Notification Dates 456,112
(the registrations furthest away from Labour Market Exit Date are deleted)
456,112 456,112
466 Multi-Registrations with different pension income (lowest income is deleted) 455,646
377 Multi-Registrations with identical dates and income (lowest ID is deleted) 455,269
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455,269 455,269
65,718 People with pension income from foreign countries 389,551
989 Survivor Pensioners 388,562
388,562 388,562
9,853 People with: Gliding Pension, Heavy Labour Pension, 378,709
Miner Pension or Early Pension due to unemployment/unemployability
701 Men born before 1937; 7,893 women born before 1942 370,115
45,734 People born after 1955 324,381
9,576 People with Valuation Year 2001 314,805
final 314,805
dataset included: Old Age and Corridor Pensions, Disability Pensions,
Early Pensions due to long insurance history
Source: AMDB and VVP, IHS 2011
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Table 3.3: Number of Individuals by Retirement Plan and Age
Total Women Men
314,805 161,406 51% 153,399 49%
Pension Type Women Men
old-age pension 56,007 35% 8,748 6%
disability
self-employed 7,572 5% 12,920 8%
white-collar 10,336 6% 13,096 9%
blue-collar 11,782 7% 39,193 26%
corridor pension 0 0 % 5,242 3%
long insurance hist. 75,709 47% 74,200 48%
Total 161,406 100% 153,399 100%
Age Structure Women Men
below 51 1,633 1.0% 1,755 1.1%
51 to 55 33,949 21.0% 14,650 9.6%
56 to 60 121,740 75.4% 88,609 57.8%
61 to 65 4,006 2.5% 47,788 31.2%
66 to 70 78 0.05% 591 0.39%
70+ 0 0.0% 6 0.00%
Total 161,406 100% 153,399 100%
Sample of new pension accruals 2002-2009, samplesize: 314,805, standard deviations in parenthesis. Disability
pensions include white-collar, blue-collar and the self employed. All monetary values inflated to base year 2009.
Source: AMDB and VVP, IHS 2012
difference between men and women is less than half of the difference in statutory pension ages (see table 3.4).
Table 3.4 also gives information on mean assessment bases and benefits. The assessment base is crucial for
the determination of benefit entitlements. For individuals retiring before 2004, it was calculated as the average
wage income of the 180 months of highest earnings throughout the individual’s labour market career; since
2004 this averaging period is extended by one year each year until 480 months are reached in 2028.
The mean benefits of women who retired according to the old age or disability scheme are roughly half
of men’s mean benefits, women with a long insurance history get pensions about a third lower than the mean
male pension. Male assessment bases are about a third higher than women’s, except for pensioners who retired
according to the normal old age pension — in this group, men’s mean assessment base is nearly twice the
women’s. It is interesting to see that individuals who retire according to both the old age and the disability
scheme have nearly the same number of contribution years (about 23 years for women and 33 years for men).
Disability pensioners however do have more insurance years, probably due to past illnesses. As was to be
expected, men of this generation (born from 1937 to 1954) have almost no child-rearing episodes accounted
for in their pensions; women who retire of old age had on average 6.6 years of child rearing, female disability
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pensioners 6.9 and women with a long insurance history 5.3 years. Note that these are not years spent out of
the labour force primarily taking care of children; instead for every child 4 insurance years are granted2, not
depending on the actual labour market status.
2In case a second child is born within in these 4 years only the years until the birth of the second child are counted.
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3.3.2 External Representativeness
Our sample does not provide data on everybody who retired (or got a positive pension adjudication) in the years
2002-2009 — according to official statistics, 659,944 individuals were granted a "direct pension" (an individ-
ual pension, excluding survivors’ pensions) during those years (Bundesministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und
Konsumentenschutz, 2009-2010, Sozialbericht 2007-2008,p.199 and p.68f, respectively). If we disregard ob-
servations with missing or inconsistent labour market exit dates and multiple registrations as measurement error,
and subtract survivors’ pensions from our initial dataset, we have data on 454,280 individuals, or nearly 69% of
the population of new pensioners. Because we further need to eliminate individuals who draw pension income
from foreign countries and individuals who draw pensions according to outdated regulations, our sample shrinks
to just below half of the population (we "loose" most individuals because they have a work history abroad). As
can be seen from table 3.5, our data is more representative for old age pensioners than for those drawing a dis-
ability pension — we have data on 54% of old age pensioners, but only 40% of disability pensioners.3 Another
striking feature of our data is that we do not have the same coverage across our observation period — while
our final data set includes 57% of all individuals who retired in 2008, we only have data on 24% of those who
retired in 2004. Men are slightly under-represented in our dataset (with a coverage rate of 45% as compared to
51% for women). Note that this is not due to our under-coverage of disability pensioners, because men are in
fact more likely to retire on a disability pension.
Table 3.5: Sample as a Fraction of the Population
total women men disability old age
2002 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.57
2003 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.66 0.56
2004 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.24
2005 0.48 0.52 0.44 0.45 0.53
2006 0.58 0.64 0.52 0.48 0.69
2007 0.40 0.44 0.38 0.33 0.50
2008 0.57 0.63 0.51 - -
2009 0.50 0.55 0.45 0.31 0.71
total 0,48 0,51 0,45 0,40∗ 0,54∗
Disability pensions include white-collar, blue-collar and the self employed, old-age pensions aggregate the standard old-age pension, early
pension due to long insurance history, and corridor pension (population data not available on a less aggregated level).
∗ Disaggregated data on disability and old-age pensioners not available, total statistic is therefore calculated without 2008.
Source: Bundesministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Konsumentenschutz (2007-2008, 2009-2010, p.199 and p.68f, respectively), for the
population of new pensioners, 2002-2009, and IHS: Sample of new pension accruals 2002-2009 (AMDB and VVP, IHS 2012).
3For 2008, we do not have information on how many individuals retired under the old-age or disability scheme, we only know the total
number of retirees. These statistics are calculated disregarding the year 2008 and are therefore subject to measurement error.
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3.3.3 Key Statistics on the Austrian Pension System
Here we present some more detailed summary statistics on the dataset of Austrian pensioners, who have received
a positive adjudication of any type of old-age or invalidity pension between 2001 and 2009 (excluding those who
are entitled to a pension from a foreign country, survivor pensioners and civil servants, the data set of 388,562
from table 3.2). In contrast to section 3.3.1, these statistics include individuals who draw miner pensions, heavy
labour pensions, or retired according to the gliding pension or early-retirement-due-to-unemployment scheme
that were both abolished in 2003. It is therefore more representative of the Austrian population than the sub-
sample we use for our micro-simulation purposes.
Table 3.6 gives an overview of the composition of the dataset according to the different pension types. Most
individuals that are included in table 3.6, but not in the sample we use for our simulations, are individuals born
after 1955 (45,734), or individuals born before 1942 (women) and 1937 (men) or retiring in 2001; the additional
pension types we include in this sample do not quantitatively add much information. Disability pensioners are
better represented in this bigger sample, they now constitute 27% of all retiring women and 59% of all retiring
men (as opposed to 18% and 43% respectively). This makes this dataset more representative for Austrians who
retired between 2001 and 2009, which is why we provide more detailed summary for this sample.
From table 3.7 it is apparent that mean retirement ages for men and women cluster closely around the
statutory retirement age for each type of pension.4 The density of the distribution of retirement age around the
mean further indicates that few individuals postpone retirement beyond the lowest statutory retirement age, this
is further corroborated by the fact that there is a larger variation in retirement ages among disability pensioners
(were there is no lower age limit).
4Individuals who worked under exceptionally strenuous conditions for at least part of their career can retire at 60 (men) or 55 (women)
according to the heavy labour pension. For miner pensions, a variety of regulations apply. Gliding pensions were granted under special
regulations for women between 56 and 60 years old, and for men between 60 and 65 years old.
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Table 3.6: Number of Individuals by Retirement Plan and Age
Total Women Men
388,562 199,328 51% 189,234 49%
Pension Type Women Men
old-age pension 63,239 32% 9,440 5%
disability
self-employed 12,232 6% 14,733 8%
white-collar 18,234 9% 18,813 10%
blue-collar 24,004 12% 58,807 31%
corridor pension 0 0% 5,242 3%
long insurance hist. 77,249 39% 76,716 41%
unemployment 4,125 2% 702 0%
heavy labour 0 0% 1,270 1%
heavy labour, night 1 0% 2,583 1%
gliding pension 73 0% 123 0%
miners 171 0% 805 0%
Total 199,328 100% 189,234 100%
Age Structure Women Men
below 51 22,165 11.1% 23,424 12.4%
51 to 55 39,656 19.9% 18,204 9.6%
56 to 60 128,682 64.6% 97,003 51.3%
61 to 65 7,070 3.6% 49,610 26.2%
66 to 70 1,268 0.7% 813 0.4%
70+ 487 0.2% 180 0.1%
Total 199,328 100% 189,234 100%
Sample of new pension accruals 2002-2009, samplesize: 388,562 (including early pensions due to
unemployment or heavy labour, gliding pensions and miner pensions), standard deviations in parenthesis.
Source: AMDB and VVP, IHS 2012
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Figure 3.1: Boxplot of the Assessment Base, by Insurance Years
 
For ease of illustration, the 10% of the population with the highest assessment base have been excluded from this graph. 46% of these
individuals have 35 to 44 insurance years and 48 percent of them have 45 or more insurance years, which is why they do not substantially
alter our results. Values in Euro and valorised according to the Austrian Consumer Price Index
Sample of new pension accruals 2001-2009, samplesize: 349,706
Source: AMDB and VVP, IHS 2012
As for mean benefits and assessment bases, the discussion in section 3.3.1 also applies here with regards to
the old age, disability and early pensions. (Male) pensioners who retired under the heavy-night-labour provision
have a mean benefit and a mean assessment base very similar to men retiring in one of the early pension schemes,
although the distribution of both values is a little less dispersed. Gliding pensioners have the highest assessment
base and pension income for men and women, but these pension schemes are not very important quantitatively.
The assessment base is the average of the insurance years with the highest earnings over a certain period
(15 years until 2003, increased by 1 year each year from 2004 on). Because of the importance of seniority as a
determinant of wages in Austria, we would expect that more insurance years lead to a higher assessment base.
The boxplot in 3.1 illustrates this positive association of assessment bases and insurance years. As always, the
line in the rectangle is the median of the distribution for each sub-group. There is hardly any difference in the
median assessment base between the group with less than 15, and the group with between 15 and 24 insurance
years. For the groups with longer insurance histories, however, more insurance years clearly do imply a higher
assessment base. This effect does not differ substantially for women and men.
Figure 3.2 plots the percentage of women who retire against the number of their insurance years, for all
women and by their pension type. Retiring with less than 15 years is only possible within a disability pension
scheme, which is why we observe women with less than 15 insurance years only in the second histogram. The
first wave of women retires after 25 insurance years. This peak is mainly due to old-age retirees. The next peaks
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occur after 38, 40 and 41 insurance years, as can be seen from the fourth histogram, these are women retiring
under early pension schemes.5 For women drawing a disability pension, there is no striking peak, but a smooth
increase in pension adjudications for every insurance year until, after 35 years, the number of retiring women
decreases drastically. The reason is that anyone fulfilling the requirements for an old age pension is not eligible
for a disability pension. Only 0.4% of women achieve 45 or more insurance years.
Figure 3.3 shows the same histograms for men. At first glance, men’s histograms show higher peaks than
womens. The first peak of the retirement wave is reached only after 40 insurance years, which is likely due to
disability retirees — the number of men who retire remains relatively constant between 40 and 45 insurance
years. The peak at 45 is mostly due to the early pension schemes; i.e., men who have either reached the age
of 55 (or older, depending on the valuation year), having accumulated 37.5 years of insurance, or reached the
age of 60 and have attained 45 years of contribution. In the old-age pension scheme there are no striking peaks.
According to the first histogram, 34% of men achieve 45 and more insurance years.
Figure 3.2: Insurance Years by Pension Types, Women
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Note: Sample of new pension accruals 2001-2009, samplesize: 388,562
Source: AMDB and VVP, IHS 2012
Table 3.9 shows the corresponding statistics for women. Eighteen years before their pension valuation year,
women have on average more unemployment days than men; but they experience less increments over time
5After 40 contribution years retiring at 55 is possible without deductions. After 37.5 insurance years retiring at 55 (or older, depending
on the cohort) is possible with deduction.
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Figure 3.3: Insurance Years by Pension Types, Men
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Source: AMDB and VVP, IHS 2012
than their male peers. Women who later draw a white collar disability pension average the highest number of
unemployed days eighteen years before retirement, and the biggest increases over time.
Our dataset furthermore allows us to examine individual’s labour market careers leading up to retirement.
We have information on individual labour market status and on their sick days from the data (in addition to their
occupational industry). We have information on the complete labour market status histories for the four years
leading up to the pension valuation date for our entire sample; for 94% of the sample, we even have data on
eighteen years before the pension valuation date.
Table 3.8 shows the development of mean days in unemployment per year for men for the eighteen years
leading up to their pension valuation year. Eighteen years before retirement, those who later retire within the
blue collar disability scheme or corridor pension scheme display the most unemployed days.6 The mean days
of unemployment are increasing among all pension types as the pension valuation year approaches. Those
drawing a disability or corridor pension experience the biggest increases in unemployment over time. Heavy
labour workers and workers with long insurance history have the fewest unemployment days in the year before
retirement (51 and 34 days, respectively).
Table 3.10 shows the evolution of the mean number of sick days per pensioner for the ten years leading up to
6Men being unemployed and eligible to the corridor pension are obliged to retire by the job centre.
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the pension valuation year. Sick days are clearly increasing as people approach retirement. Corridor pensioners
seem to be an exception, but this might be due to the fact that a large share of prospective corridor pensioners
was unemployed when they approached their retirement year. Looking at men and women separately shows
that women have on average slightly more sick days than men.
Table 3.8: Men’s Mean Number of Unemployed Days in the 18 Years until Pension Valuation
years disability
before long
pension old-age white- blue- insur. corridor heavy
valuation pension collar collar history pension labour
18 12 (52) 14 (53) 27 (62) 5 (31) 28 (76) 6 (25)
17 13 (54) 15 (57) 29 (66) 5 (32) 30 (78) 7 (29)
16 15 (59) 16 (59) 32 (69) 5 (34) 36 (88) 7 (29)
15 17 (62) 18 (63) 33 (71) 6 (36) 41 (93) 7 (31)
14 18 (66) 20 (68) 36 (75) 6 (37) 46 (100) 8 (31)
13 19 (70) 22(70) 39 (79) 7 (40) 52 (107) 9 (34)
12 22 (75) 24 (74) 42 (84) 8 (43) 62 (115) 10 (38)
11 23 (77) 26 (78) 45 (88) 9 (48) 70 (123) 10 (38)
10 24 (80) 28 (82) 49 (92) 10 (53) 79 (131) 10 (39)
9 24 (81) 31 (86) 52 (96) 12 (57) 84 (133) 12 (42)
8 25 (82) 34 (91) 56 (99) 13 (61) 89 (135) 13 (46)
7 26 (84) 38 (95) 60 (103) 15 (66) 98 (140) 16 (53)
6 28 (88) 42 (100) 65 (108) 17 (70) 111 (147) 19 (60)
5 30 (92) 48 (106) 71 (113) 18 (74) 124 (154) 20 (65)
4 33 (97) 55 (114) 78 (119) 21 (79) 132 (158) 23 (71)
3 37 (104) 64 (121) 88 (125) 23 (85) 140 (161) 29 (82)
2 40 (108) 76 (129) 101 (132) 27 (91) 148 (163) 37 (95)
1 43 (113) 91 (135) 116 (137) 34 (102) 162 (165) 51 (110)
Notes: SD in parentheses. Sample of new pension accruals 2001-2009, samplesize: 388,562
Source: AMDB and VVP, IHS 2012
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Table 3.9: Women’s Mean Number of Unemployed Days in the 18 Years until Pension Valuation Year
years before disability pension
pension old-age white- blue- long
valuation collar collar insur.
18 10 (43) 26 (62) 19 (70) 10 (44)
17 11 (46) 29 (65) 21 (73) 10 (45)
16 12 (48) 31 (67) 23 (76) 11 (46)
15 13 (51) 34 (69) 24 (81) 11 (47)
14 14 (53) 37 (72) 26 (83) 11(47)
13 15 (55) 39 (75) 27 (86) 11 (48)
12 15 (57) 42 (76) 28 (89) 12 (50)
11 16 (59) 45 (79) 30 (93) 12 (52)
10 17 (62) 47 (83) 32 (94) 13 (54)
9 17 (64) 50 (84) 33 (98) 14 (57)
8 18 (66) 52 (88) 36 (100) 15 (60)
7 19 (68) 55 (91) 39 (102) 16 (64)
6 20 (71) 59 (95) 42 (105) 19 (69)
5 22 (76) 64 (99) 46 (110) 21 (75)
4 26 (82) 70 (105) 51 (114) 24 (82)
3 30 (91) 79 (111) 58 (120) 28 (89)
2 34 (98) 90 (116) 66 (127) 34 (98)
1 39 (105) 105 (121) 78 (132) 45 (118)
SD in parentheses. Sample of new pension accruals 2001-2009
Source: AMDB and VVP, IHS 2012
Table 3.10: Mean Number of Sick Days 10 to 1 year before Pension Valuation, by Pension Type
years
before pension old-age disability early corridor heavy
valuation year pension pension pension pension labour
10 47 (59) 44 (57) 41 (52) 51 (65) 38 (52)
9 48 (64) 46 (61) 45 (58) 50 (62) 33 (41)
8 49 (62) 49 (61) 47 (61) 50 (62) 39 (51)
7 51 (66) 51 (63) 48 (59) 54 (65) 37 (49)
6 53 (62) 53 (65) 51 (61) 52 (57) 41 (49)
5 53 (62) 56 (66) 53 (63) 55 (62) 49 (59)
4 52 (60) 61 (70) 55 (64) 50 (55) 48 (58)
3 50 (60) 67 (72) 57 (64) 49 (54) 53 (60)
2 53 (63) 74 (76) 59 (66) 49 (52) 50 (56)
1 54 (64) 98 (87) 60 (65) 51 (56) 57 (60)
SD in parentheses. Sample of new pension accruals 2001-2009
Source: AMDB and VVP, IHS 2012
Chapter 4
IREA: Incentive Measures
4.1 Introduction
In order to analyse retirement behaviour within a systematic framework we develop the IHS-Micro-Simulation-
Model-for-REtirement-Behaviour-in-Austria (IREA). As described in chapter 3 the model is based on a large
adminstrative dataset that contains information on 314,805 Austrian individuals who were exiting the labour
market in the period 2002 to 2009. Since we do not allow for gradual retreat from the labour market (see 3.2.1),
each individual is associated with a unique retirement date.
Being able to access the complete insurance records on an individual basis allows us to compute gross
benefits for the observed retirement date with very high precision. However, since our main interest is to
quantify the extent to which retirement behaviour is affected by the incentive structure of the Austrian pension
system, we need to consider counterfactual scenarios. We therefore want to compute retirement benefits not
only for the actual retirement date, but also for a certain range of years before and after that date.
To describe the incentive structure as perceived by the individual decision makers we adopt an option value
framework. This approach has originally been developed by Stock and Wise (1990) and it is built on the empir-
ical observation that retirement is basically irreversible. Typically, an individual acquires pension entitlements
over his or her employment career depending on work duration and income. However, once he or she becomes
eligible and decides to transform these entitlements into actual benefits, it is very uncommon to return to the
labour market and begin another employment spell1. To account for this irreversibility, the option value captures
the opportunity costs of immediate retirement as measured by the maximum utility gain that can be obtained by
staying in the labour market.
Framing the decision problem in this way implies that an individual compares the utility value of immediate
retirement with the utilities associated with any future retirement option. Immediate retirement can thus be an
optimal choice only if the individuals expected present discounted utility cannot be further increased through
an extension of the employment career. The inclusion of the option value in a (pooled) cross-sectional analysis
1Although part-time work might be relevant in certain contexts, we do not model gradual pathways into retirement since these seem to
be of lesser importance for age cohorts in our dataset.
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thus implies that each individual reevaluates all future options associated with a continuation of work at each
point in time. This forward-looking character of the option value therefore allows for the construction of an
essentially static model that is still able to account for the intertemporal nature of retirement behaviour, albeit
within a comparatively simple framework.
Although this representation of individual behaviour can be derived from the standard dynamic model of
labour supply in discrete time on the basis of some additional assumptions (for a formal statement of this model
see e.g. Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)), it is not equivalent to a discrete choice dynamic programming (DCDP)
model. The latter approach would entail individual decision makers that maximise their expected intertemporal
utilities over the full sequence of states of the world. As Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) point out, the main
advantage of the dynamic programming approach is that the structural parameters of the econometric model
have a natural interpretation in terms of the related theoretical model. However, the necessity to solve the
dynamic optimisation problem while simultaneously evaluating the estimation criterion leads to a considerable
increase in computational complexity.
While Rust and Phelan (1997) were among the first to apply a DCDP approach to model retirement be-
haviour, recent applications of this approach in our field are rather limited2. Karlstrom et al. (2004) developed
a dynamic programming approach to model retirement decisions in Sweden. They present two versions of
their model, where the general version allows for a flexible specification of the preferences for leisure while
the restricted version assumes constant preference parameters over different ages. Although both specifications
perform quite well in the within-sample predictions of labour force participation, the authors report large dis-
crepancies between the out-of-sample predictions based on the two specifications. Heyma (2004) investigates
retirement behaviour in the Netherlands based on a DCDP approach. Although the author cites the richness of
the resulting dynamic structure as one of the advantages of this approach, he also recognizes the sensitivity of
his results with regard to data limitations and errors in the model setup. Both studies, however, find significant
effects of the incentive structure on retirement. In addition, Heyma (2004) reports that eligibility conditions and
strong preferences for leisure are the most important driving forces of labour market behaviour at old-age.
The option value framework, on the other hand, corresponds to a simplified decision rule as compared to the
dynamic programming approach. Although the former approach thus has some deficits in terms of the dynamic
structure, Stock and Wise (1990) argue that the validity of either approach ultimately rests on the question which
decision rule offers the best representation of the behaviour of real-life subjects. Although their original article
devotes quite some space to this discussion, only very limited effort has been excerted since then to resolve this
issue. The most comprehensive discussion is presented by Lumsdaine et al. (1992) who compare the predictive
validity of both approaches within a unified framework. Their results show that both approaches do equally well
in predicting in-sample and out-of-sample retirement probabilities and the authors thus conclude that the option
value framework offers a good approximation to actual retirement behaviour.
The question of the behavioural realism inherent in the different modelling approaches has also been taken
up from other perspectives. While sophisticated modelling techniques typically rely on detailed information
on individual insurance records as collected e.g. in administrative or employer-provided datasets, some recent
research also resorts to other data sources. Vonkova and van Soest (2009), for instance, analyse retirement
behaviour based on stated preference data. In addition to clear evidence on the impact of financial incentives
2Keane and Wolpin (2009) present a survey of six applications of the DCDP paradigm in other research fields.
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on preferred retirement ages, they are also able to distinguish between income and substitution effects based
on their experimental design. Chan and Stevens (2008) combine administrative data sources with self-reported
information on retirement behaviour, expectations and income sources. Although a significant amount of the
individuals in their dataset is misinformed about the financial factors underlying their retirement options, they
find that retirement behaviour is strongly influenced by the incentive structure. However, as misinformed indi-
viduals do not respond to the incentive structure, the results seem to be driven by the minority of well-informed
individuals.
Mastrobuoni (2011) exploits a natural experiment based on the stepwise introduction of a social security
statement in the US containing information on expected individual retirement benefits at various ages. Al-
though the individuals’ knowledge about their own retirement benefits is found to be incomplete, the additional
information does not have any significant effect on observed retirement behaviour in this study. The role of
information in planning individual retirement decisions is also highlighted by Duflo and Saez (2003). In this
paper the authors study an economic experiment where a random sample of university employees of a subset
of departments is financially encouraged to attend an information fair related to an (actuarially fair) voluntary
retirement scheme. The results from this experiment show that fair attendance increases the probability to en-
roll not only for the treated employees but also for their department members, thus suggesting that individual
participation decisions are not exclusively driven by the informational content. Rather, the authors argue that
these results are largely due to social network effects.
However, while the behavioural interpretations underlying actual retirement decisions remain an unresolved
issue, there have been several studies adopting the option value framework so as to quantify the incentive
effects of social security on old-age labour supply (see e.g. Boersch-Supan (2000) Blundell et al. (2002) Coile
and Gruber (2007)). In addition, research based on this approach has been actively promoted by the Economics
of Aging Programme located at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) as well as by the Munich
Institute for the Economics of Aging3 (MEA). Two regular book series collect empirical results from different
country groups in order to consolidate findings and compare results within a unified framework (see Gruber and
Wise (2010); Wise (2011) for the latest editions). Since the data necessary for a thorough implementation of this
approach in the Austrian context became available only through this research, we closely follow the modelling
approach outlined in an earlier NBER publication (Gruber and Wise, 2004).
4.2 Social Security Wealth
A key measure for the description of the incentive structure as faced by the individuals is the Social Security
Wealth (SSW), laid out for example in Boersch-Supan et al. (2002) or Gruber and Wise (2002). SSW is the
expected present discounted value of all future pension benefits minus all applicable social security contributions
that will be levied on gross labour income in the future. In contrast to the option value (that will be discussed
subsequently) it is a pure accounting identity, however, it will also serve as a basis for other incentive measures.
3The institute recently changed its name since it moved from Mannheim to Munich.
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Explicitly, SSW at planning age S, given retirement at age R, is defined as:
SSWS(R) =
∞
∑
t=R
Y RET NETt (R) ·νt ·δ t−S−
R−1
∑
t=S
INSCt ·δ t−s (4.1)
With Y RET NETt (R) being the net retirement benefit at age t for retirement at age R; INSCt the insurance contri-
bution (levied on gross labour income) at age t; νt the probability to survive at least until age t given survival
until age S (as computed on the basis of the survival tables4 Statistik Austria (2012a)); δ is the discount factor
1/(1+ r) with rate r = 0.03. In general, the insurance contributions to the pension system are often calcu-
lated as a simple rate (potentially depending on age), however, as will be discussed in section 5, we are able
to compute them with much higher precision based on the complete tax-benefit code as modelled in ITABENA
(IHS-TAx-BEnefit-model-for-Austria, see Hofer et al. (2003) for a detailed documentation).
In general, we expect the level of SSW and its trend over time to have a significant impact on retirement
decisions. Individuals with higher levels of SSW should be, all other things equal, associated with higher
probabilities to retire. Since leisure is assumed to be a normal good, individuals are expected to demand more
of it as their SSW increases. This wealth effect on retirement is documented e.g. in Coile and Gruber (2004)
and Palme and Svensson (2004). On the contrary, an increase in SSW in the future is expected to reduce the
retirement probability at planning age, an effect which is often called the accrual effect. In order to be able to
describe different features of the decision problem we calculate not only SSW, but several incentive measures.
All of these will be calculated for all feasible combinations of planning age S and retirement age R within our
period of interest (see 5 for a detailed discussion).
4.3 One Year Accrual
Apart from the effect of the current wealth level on retirement, it is reasonable to believe that individuals also
consider the expected future development of their SSW. If individual decision makers only considered changes
from one year to the next, their retirement behaviour would be influenced by the one year accrual in SSW5. This
incentive measure compares the SSW of immediate retirement with the SSW associated with retirement in the
subsequent year. At planning age S given postponement of retirement from age R to R+1 it is defined as:
ACCS(R) = SSWS(R+1)−SSWS(R) (4.2)
Postponing retirement by one year has three effects: First, working an additional year means social security
contributions have to be paid for one more year. Second, the individual foregoes one year of receiving retirement
benefits, which consequently reduces the total years of benefit receipt6. Both effects reduce SSW and are
therefore seen as incentives to retire immediately. Third, working an additional year increases the per year
retirement benefit through additional years of contribution and, in some cases, a higher assessment base, thus
4Although Kuhn (2010) argue that early retirement increases mortality of blue-collar workers due to changes in health related behaviour,
we do not account for this in our analysis.
5Note that this definition is not equivalent to perfect myopia since the formulation of the SSW implies an infinite planning horizon.
6For this to be true one has to assume that one additional year in the labour force has no detrimental effect on life expectancy. While
this assumption might not hold in special cases (e.g. in occupations with hard work), we expect the effect to be negligible.
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representing a positive incentive for staying in the labour force. Therefore, a social security system that offers no
substantial growth (or even decline) in the SSW due to a postponement of retirement from one year to the next,
hence a low or negative one year accrual, will be associated with high individual probabilities of immediate
retirement.
The relative change of the SSW for a one year postponement of retirement, which is the one year accrual
divided by the level of social security wealth, defines the accrual rate:
ACCRS(R) =
SSWS(R+1)−SSWS(R)
SSWS(R)
(4.3)
Although this incentive measure additionally accounts for the scale of the one year accrual relative to current
SSW, its expected effect on retirement probabilities is analogue to that of the simple one year accrual.
Boersch-Supan et al. (2002) define another incentive measure which directly links the one year accrual to
the amount of net labour income earned through an additional year of employment, Y LABNETR+1 . Since a negative
one year accrual can be seen as a tax on next years labour income (and a positive accrual as a subsidy), this
incentive measure is called implicit tax rate. The implicit tax rate at planning age S if retirement is postponed
from R to R+1 is defined7 as:
TAXRS(R) =−SSWS(R+1)−SSWS(R)Y LABNETR+1
(4.4)
In an actuarially fair adjusting pension system8 the one year accrual would be zero and, hence, the accrual rate
and the implicit tax rate as well. Again, we expect the effects on retirement probabilities of the current period
to be determined through the same three channels as for the one year accrual (although with an inversed sign).
4.4 Peak Value
Although it is often hypothesized that individuals are rather myoptic in terms of their planning horizon, it is
natural in our context to allow for a more forward-looking retirement behavior. Limiting the scope of the
planning horizon has an obvious weakness: the design of the social security system may lead to discontinuous
changes in SSW over time. Even though increases in SSW due to a postponement of retirement from one year to
the next might occasionally be very low, it could very well be the case that an increase in the employment career
by two or three years (or even longer) pays off substantially. Not accounting for such longer term changes in
SSW could lead to a suboptimal (or even wrong) representation of retirement behaviour and consecutive errors
in prediction.
The peak value takes these issues into consideration. So as to construct this incentive measure SSW has
to be calculated for every possible future retirement age or, at least, until a certain planning horizon has been
7The minus on the right side of the equation is included to get a genuine tax rate in the usual meaning of the word. A positive TAXRS(R)
therefore corresponds to a tax rate, while a negative TAXRS(R) can be seen as a subsidy.
8The term actuarially fair is used in different ways in the literature. While Gruber and Wise (2004) or Hofer and Koman (2006) refer to
a pension system with a one year accrual equal to zero as actuarially fair, Queisser and Whitehouse (2006) call this characteristic actuarially
neutral. However, we follow the former in their use of the term.
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reached. The peak value at planning age S for retirement at age R is then defined as the maximum value of all
the future SSW (i.e. for all T > R within the planning horizon) minus the SSW of retiring at age R:
PEAKS(R) = max
T>R
[SSWS (T )]−SSWS (R) (4.5)
A higher peak value is associated with higher future gains in SSW (measured in money terms) and is, therefore,
expected to lower the probability of retirement at planning age S, all other things held equal.
4.5 Option Value
All of the above incentive measures are defined in money terms, thus only taking financial aspects of retirement
into account. To allow for a utility based incentive measure that is able to capture the labour-leisure trade-off
inherent in this decision, one has to turn to the option value framework (see 4.1). The option value is defined
by the difference between the maximum attainable utility through postponing retirement to some later age and
the utility derived through immediate retirement at planning age. The introduction of a utility framework thus
allows us to take into consideration not only the retirement benefits, but also the stream of net labour income
until retirement as well as the utility gain associated with the increase in leisure time while retired.
To derive a definition of the option value from the life-cycle model we have to make some simplifying as-
sumptions (cf. Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) p.19-27 for a general definition of the intertemporal maximisation
problem). First, we assume that the utility function of the individuals is temporally separable so that the utility
gathered in each time period is described by an instantaneous utility function9. Second, instantaneous utility
depends only on after-tax income thus implying that we assume a direct link10 between after-tax income and
consumption: u(Yt) = Y
γ
t where γ measures the marginal utility of consumption. Third, we assume that the
labour-leisure trade-off can be represented by the weighting parameter α , where α > 1 implies a relative utility
increase in retirement due to additional leisure time. Correspondingly, 1/α can be interpreted as the marginal
disutility of work.
The expected present discounted utility at age S if retirement occurs at age R can thus be formulated as
follows:
VS(R) =
R−1
∑
t=S
u(Y LABNETt ) ·νt ·δ t−S +α ·
∞
∑
t=R
u
(
Y RET NETt (R)
) ·νt ·δ t−S (4.6)
Where Y LABNETt is after-tax labour income at age t, Y RET
NET
t (R) after-tax retirement benefits at age t given
retirement at R; νt is, as before, the probability to survive at least until age t given survival until age S; δ is the
discount rate. The utility parameters α and γ measure the relative utility increase from leisure and the marginal
utility from consumption respectively.
The option value at planning age S of continuing work beyond retirement age R is denoted as follows:
OVS(R) = max
T>R
[VS(T )]−VS(R) (4.7)
9Note that this representation of utility is restrictive only in the sense that it does not allow for an influence of past on current decisions.
However, we argue that this assumption is appropriate in our case since we have defined retirement as an absorbing state.
10Although we do not model consumption and saving dynamics, we control for the stock of individual wealth in our econometric model,
see 6.2
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Where we allow for T to lie between planning age S and age 100. Given the utility parameters α and γ (see 6.2
for a description of our econometric approach), the OV can thus be computed for every planning age S within
the time period of interest.
Within this framework postponing retirement has three effects on utility: First, later retirement is associated
with additional labour income, which increases utility for all those individuals who are still well integrated in
the labour market (see 5.2 for details on this issue). Second, it decreases the time spent in retirement and,
consequently, the amount of retirement benefits received, thus decreasing utility. And, third, additional periods
of contribution to social security lead to a higher per-year retirement benefit when retired, which again has a
positive effect on utility. The latter two effects have additional weight due to the consideration of α , the relative
utility of leisure. In general, current retirement probabilities should depend negatively on the option value up
to the point where no utility gains can be achieved through further employment. Once this point is reached, the
option value turns negative and the individual is expected to retire with certainty.
Chapter 5
IREA: Microsimulation
5.1 Outline
To implement the option value framework on the basis of the dataset described in chapter 3, it is our aim to
calculate individual net retirement benefits for each year in the planning period 2002-2014 contingent on the
individually relevant retirement plans. In our basic datatset we observe each individual from the beginning of
his or her employment career until retirement which takes place in any year within the window period 2002 to
2009. Although the data includes all relevant information necessary to compute gross retirement benefits in the
year of actual retirement, we need to consider counterfactual retirement decisions in order to calculate incentive
measures (see 4).
Specifically, we proceed in the following way. First, we project annualised gross incomes beyond the actual
retirement year, e.g. for t ≥ R, based on the individual income time series. Second, we calculate individual
assessment bases based on contribution and substitution periods, including childcare. Third, we calculate gross
retirement benefits as defined by the assessment base, retirement plan and insurance record and define eligibility
for all relevant retirement plans as implicated by the individual insurance record. However, since in the Austrian
context it is vital to account for different forms of disability pensions, we additionally estimate individual
probabilities to obtain disability status and use these to calculate expected eligibility. Fourth, we apply the
Austrian income tax and social security legislation of the corresponding planning year (as modelled in the tax-
benefit microsimulation model ITABENA, Hofer et al. (2003)) in order to obtain net retirement benefits as well
as net labour income.
Since our dataset additionally contains the actual outcome of the calculations of the Austrian pension in-
surance office, we initially compute gross retirement benefits for the actual retirement date so that we are able
to validate our outputs. Having thus calculated actual and counterfactual net retirement benefits we calculate
the incentive measures for each year of the planning period 2002 to 2009 based on a consistent 5-year planning
horizon.
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5.2 Prediction of Future Labour Income
Our approach requires full individual employment records from the beginning of the career until retirement. To
allow for retirement dates after observed retirement we thus have to consider counterfactual extensions of the
employment career. As can be seen from the definition of the incentive measures (see chapter 4), future labour
income is expected to influence retirement behaviour in two major ways: First, it can alter the assessment base
through affecting the average life income (or the average income of e.g. the best 15 years). Second, receiving
labour income, which is usually higher than retirement benefits, acts as an incentive to stay in the labour market
in its own right.
5.2.1 Projection versus Estimation Methods
While, in our case, backward projection of labour income is not necessary, we have to consider alternative
approaches with regard to the prediction of future labour income. In general, the respective literature offers
two alternative ways to deal with this question. First, projection methods based on some assumptions regarding
real income growth rates can be adopted. Typically, authors either assume constant or slightly increasing real
wages, sometimes differentiated among age and/or work related subgroups. However, if individual income
time series are available (as in our case) projections can also be based on individual average growth rates of
the previous years, thus allowing for a fair amount of individual heterogeneity. A second, more sophisticated
approach would be to estimate a full econometric model typically based on either a fixed effects specification
or some autoregressive process. Table 5.1 summarises the favoured approaches for each of the country groups
in Gruber and Wise (2004).
Table 5.1: Method used to predict future labour income
Projection Estimation
Belgium constant real wage -
Canada 3 years avg. real growth rate -
Denmark constant real wage fixed effects
France constant real wage (only for civil servants) pooled cross-section
Germany 1% real wage growth -
Italy 3 years avg. real growth rate -
Japan - cross-section*
Netherlands constant real wage -
Spain constant real wage or 0.5% growth -
Sweden 3 years avg. real growth rate -
United Kingdom constant real wage -
United States 1% real wage growth -
Notes: * Model estimation on the basis of a cross-sectional data set. No further specifications available.
Source: Table refers to the country groups summarised in Gruber and Wise (2004)
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The merits and demerits of the different approaches are fairly obvious. On the one hand, projection methods
are straightforward to implement, however, in comparison with estimation methods they ignore some of the
individual income dynamic. While some of the authors in Gruber and Wise (2004) specifiy various econometric
models and compare them to simpler approaches, most of them find that projections on the basis of individual
3-year average growth rates yield satisfactory results (see table 5.1).
Mahieu and Blanchet (2004) use two different estimation methods based on french data. The first estimates
wage equations without individual fixed effects. This method is used on wage levels as well as on first order
differences. The second method estimates wage equations with fixed effects, though only on levels. The ex-
planatory variables they use include indicators for socio-economic and professional groups and activity types
(among others). For both methods they estimate several specifications with a varying number of wage lags.
Their main conclusion is that a projection based on constant real wage growth performs quite good, while the
second method leads to unsatisfactory results. Overall, method one, i.e., estimation on wage levels without
lagged income or fixed effects, is their preferred specification (cf. France).
Brugiavini and Peracchi (2004) apply several methods to deal with income projections. Their simplest
approach is to project future income on the basis of the average growth rate of the last three years of observed
income. In a second approach they use group-specific growth rates obtained from their sample, with groups
defined by sex, age, birth cohort and occupation. Finally, their third approach develops an econometric model
based on a first order autoregressive process. However, the authors conclude that the first method is the most
suitable one. In their view the second approach is flawed since individual-specific growth rates are found
to differ quite substantially from those of the relevant group and, further, group-specific growth rates again
differ from the macroeconomic growth rates. Regarding the third method they conclude that it does not give
satisfactory results (cf. Italy).
Baker et al. (2004) also evaluate a range of different approaches. They compare a projection on the basis
of a 1% real growth rate with estimates from a fixed-effects model including socio-demographic variables and
lagged income. However, their conclusion is that the income projection yields more satisfactory results (cf.
Canada).
In their original contribution Stock and Wise (1990) generate income predictions based on a second order
autoregressive model with age, years in the labour force, age indicators and several interaction terms as control
variables. However, this approach is developed on the basis of a firm-specific dataset that includes all workers
from one large firm thus being able to neglect heterogeneity among different employers.
5.2.2 Empirical Patterns
Based on this short assessment we conclude that it is sensible to develop a full econometric model only in case
longer term predictions are needed. However, due to the highly fragmented retirement legislation in Austria
(cf. chapter 2) we base the calculations of the incentive measures on a consistent planning horizon of only 5
years. To predict future labour income in this time period we thus apply projection methods based on individual
income time series. Under the assumption that income dynamics are rather minimal towards the end of the
employment career, we construct individual average real growth rates based on the annualised gross income of
the previous 5 years and use these to project the income trajectory 5 years into the future.
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This approach corresponds to the empirical observation that Austrian labour markets are, in general, not
among the most flexible compared to other European (or OECD) countries (Kiander and Viren, 2001; OECD,
2004). Research on specific aspects of old-age labour market outcomes confirms this result. Ichino et al.
(2007) show that although displaced workers in the age group 45-55 face reduced re-employment probabilities
compared to prime-age workers, their employment prospects catch up over a consecutive period of 2 years.
However, displacement of older workers is hindered by employment protection legislation like, for instance,
the layoff tax which has been shown to reduce displacement probabilities of older workers (Schnalzenberger
and Winter-Ebmer, 2009). Winter-Ebmer et al. (2011) analyse the relationship between job quality and re-
tirement for several European countries, arguing that job dissatisfaction induces early labour market exit, with
job insecurity being a major predictor of early retirement. Although subsidisation of part-time employment of
older workers yields modest increases in employment probabilities, Hofer et al. (2011) find that this policy has
negative overall effects on labour supply, as most older workers simply substitute part-time for full-time work.
Although some simplifications are necessary in order to construct counterfactual employment careers, we
give special consideration to these issues when predicting future labour income. In order to account for the
limited reemployment possibilities of elder unemployed, we consider individuals that are without labour income
for a period of 2 or more years up to their observed retirement date as basically out of the labour force1. For
these individuals a postponement of retirement is associated only with an increase in insurance periods (due
to the receipt of unemployment or social benefits), but not with any additional labour income. On the other
hand, individuals who obtain labour income up to the year before their observed retirement date are assumed
to continue their employment career thus being able to collect not only further insurance periods, but also
additional labour income based on their individual real income growth rates. The results from the projection are
depicted in table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Distribution of Real Growth Rates in Gross Income
mean std.dev. skewness kurtosis p25 p50 p75 N
women 0.0046 0.1036 -3.286 34.05 -0.0022 0.0129 0.0271 128,929
men -0.0015 0.1071 -3.292 33.61 -0.0034 0.0117 0.0211 136,099
Source: IREA, 2012
Based on the definition given in the previous paragraph, approximately 11% of males and 20% of females
are already out of the labour force when they retire. For the remainder of the individuals the table shows that
real income growth is very close to zero for both genders. Although the median is in the same region for
both (somewhat above 1%), the female average is only slightly above zero (0.46%) while the male2 average is
negative (-0.15%).
1Note that other specifications have been applied in order to check the sensitivity of our results with regard to these assumptions.
However, shortening the required unemployment spell to 1 year did not affect the results qualitatively. The same is true for a change in the
averaging period to either 3 or 10 years.
2Since we do not observe working hours decreases in income due to a reduction in labour supply can not be identified, thus potentially
leading to a downward bias in real income growth for some of the individuals.
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5.3 Retirement Benefits
We take into consideration the following pathways into pension:
- old-age pension (AP): at age 65 for men and 60 for women after 15 years of contribution or 25 years of
insurance 3
- early retirement due to long insurance (VAPL): retirement age depends on cohort (60-65 for men and
55-60 for women)4, after 37.5 insurance years or 35 years of mandatory contribution out of employment
- hard-worker rule ("Hacklerregelung"): a special rule allowing retirement at 60 for men and 55 for
women after 45 and 40 contribution years, respectively
- corridor pension (KOP): at age 62 after 37.5 insurance years
- invalidity pension (BU/EU/IP): at any age, 15 contribution years, 25 insurance years or 5 insurance
years within the last 10 years, conditional on the incapacity to exercise an occupation or the occupation
predominantly exercised within the last 15 years
We ignore special rules for heavy labour, rules that were abolished soon after our observation period starts
(gliding pension, early pension due to unemployment) or rules being not explicitly part of the pension system
(like a programme of working time reduction which is paid partly by the unemployment service). As there are
no civil servants in our data set we do not treat their, to some extent, special rules.
As displayed in section 2 pension benefits in Austria are calculated by multiplying the assessment base (an
average of the best income years) with a percentage depending on the numbers of insurance years and the age of
retirement. The following sections describe in more detail how we implemented the pension calculation rules of
the years 2002 to 2014 into our model, how close our calculations of gross pensions are to the actually received
pension and how we calculate net pensions.
5.3.1 Assessment Base
Until 2003 the assessment base was calculated by the average of 15 years with the highest income. From 2004
on the assessment period is extended by one year each year. For women the period is reduced for every child
by 3 years until the minimum of 15 years.5 In both regimes years of child-rearing are valuated with a special
assessment base. For every individual we calculate the assessment base for retirement in the period 2002 to
2014. For some years income information in the data is sufficient as the true retirement date of the individual
lies after the year of calculation. For other years we fall back to the income projection described in the beginning
3Contribution years are all years for which actual insurance contributions were paid (employment, self-employment, voluntary insur-
ance or voluntary contributions for years of education). Insurance years are all contribution years plus so-called substitution periods like
unemployment, military service, child rearing, illness.
4The retirement age depends on the month and year of birth. For reasons of privacy we do not dispose of the exact date of birth, but only
of the year of birth. Thus, we have to be less exact in this point.
5We have no information on the number of children. For every child one parent gets 4 insurance years. However, if a second child is
born within these 4 years, the next 4 years start such that the number of children remains unclear even with this information available. To
account for this rule we use the information on the true assessment base in the data and search for the assessment period most suitable.
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of this chapter. For 2002 and 2003 we calculate the assessment base according to the old rules only. For the
other years we calculate two assessment bases, as the pension itself will be a mixture of both rules (see below).
5.3.2 Gross Retirement Benefits
According to the pathways into pension subscribed above we start the calculation of gross retirement benefits
by deciding for every year in our period 2002 to 2014 whether an individual is eligibile to the pathways into
pension considered. For invalidity pensions we check whether the relevant restrictions out of the pension system
are fulfilled.6 In the period of interest pension calculation rules changed every year. However, in case retirement
was already possible the year before some rules were maintained for the individual. Thus, in order to choose the
right rule we also define whether retirement was already possible in the years before the calculation year. Given
eligibility to the different pathways and the assessment base for 2003 and 2004 gross benefits are calculated.
Until 2003 every insurance year is valuated with 2 percentage points. Thus, after 40 insurance years retiring
at the regular retirement age leads to a pension of 80% of the assessment base. In case of early retirement due
to long insurance contribution deductions were executed: Depending on the cohort7 2 or 3 percentage points
per year of early retirement up to a maximum of 10 (10.5) points or 15% of the percentage rate are deducted.
The maximum percentage rate after deductions is 80%. In case of postponed retirement after the regular age a
bonus of 4 percentage points per year is given until a percentage rate of 80% is reached. Above this, a bonus of
only 2 percentage points is granted. The highest achievable percentage rate with bonus is 90 %.
From 2004 on the percentage points granted for every insurance year were decreased steadily until 1.78
were reached in 2009. Thus, instead of 40 now 45 insurance years are necessary to reach a pension of 80% of
the assessment base. However, in case a regular pension claim already exists for a preceding year the percentage
points of that year are kept even if retirement occurs in later years. The highest percentage rate possible is 80 %.
Possible deductions take place after this maximum rule is applied. Deductions for early pensions are 4.2% of
pension per year of early retirement, with a maximum of 15 %. In case of retirement after the legal retirement
age a bonus of 4.2% is granted, with a maximum percentage rate of 91.76. As already mentioned above, next
to changes in the percentages points the averaging period for the assessment base is extended for one year each
year.
In order to reduce the loss in pension that might occur due to the transition from 2003 to 2004, rules the
reform effects were softened by a maximum loss cap: Pensions are calculated according to 2003 and 2004 rules;
in case the loss due to the reform 2004 exceeds the loss cap (5% in 2004, increased by 0.25 percentage points
every year) the 2003 pension minus the accepted loss is granted (eg. 95% of 2003 pension in 2004). In case a
person retires in 2004 or later but could have already retired before in 2003 the old rules are applied.
The retirement age for early retirement due to long insurance is increased constantly until 65 for men and 60
for women is reached in 2017. Closing this pathway into early pension, another one was opened: The corridor
pension allows retirement from 62 on, with additional deductions of 2.1% per year of retirement before the
possible retirement age in the early retirement due to long insurance pathway. Instead of the deductions within
6We cannot check the invalidity of a person. In this step of the model we only assure if in case of invalidity a pension would be granted
and how much this pension would be. 5.4.1 then shows how we acount for the uncertainty an individual faces regarding its invalidity status
and the consequential pension benefits.
7Again we have to be imprecise on this point, as we do not dispose of the exact date of birth of a person.
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the cap for every year of early retirement these deductions are drawn after the maximum loss cap is applied.
Further, we model the so-called hard-worker rule ("Hacklerregelung"’), allowing retirement at 60/65 without
any deductions and with a more generous validation of insurance years.
Invalidity pensions are calculated similar to regular pensions. For 2004 the same percentage points and
deductions are applied, however, in case of retirement before a certain age8 additional insurance years are
granted, thus the pension is calculated as if retirement occured at this later age. Before, in the 2003 rules, the
assignment of additional insurance years occured only until the age of 56.5, no deductions were applied, but
the percentage points for every insurance year were lower than the ones applied for regular pensions. In case of
additional insurance years granted the maximum percentage rate is 60% in both regimes.
5.3.3 Output Validations
Our data comprises the actual assessment base and actual gross pension benefits for every individual. Thus, we
can compare our simulations with the pension calculation actually applied. 5.3 shows the ratio of simulated to
actual assessment base. Looking at the mean the simulated assessment base exceeds the actual one by 2 % for
women and 1 % for men. The range of deviation is quite low, with 0.99 at the border of the first decile and
1.01 between ninth and tenth decile for women and 0.97 and 1.01 for men, respectively. Looking at the pension
calculation as a whole (5.4) the medium deviation is +1 % for women and +2 % for men. So both, simulated
assessment base and pensions, are slightly higher than the actual values. Regarding pension calculations the
range of deviations is higher. Reasons for the deviations might lie in missing information in the data, such as
the exact date of birth or the number of children. The database might also lack the last update of some variables.
However, the possibility admitted by this kind of data, to simulate the Austrian pension system with such a
precision and even being able to double check the calculations, is unique for Austria.
Table 5.3: Distribution of Simulated/Actual Assessment Base
mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 N
women 1.020 0.356 0.994 1.000 1.003 1.003 1.011 161,330
men 1.009 0.412 0.965 0.987 1.000 1.002 1.014 153,388
Source: IREA, 2012
Table 5.4: Distribution of Simulated/Actual Gross Retirement Benefits
mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 N
women 1.010 0.461 0.927 0.980 1.054 1.125 1.164 161,351
men 1.018 0.499 0.944 1.001 1.042 1.122 1.140 153,393
Source: IREA, 2012
857 in 2004, this number is increased by several months every year until 60 is reached in 2009
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5.3.4 Net Retirement Benefits
The pensions simulated so far are gross pensions. However, for calculating the present value of future pension
benefits net pensions are needed. The Austrian tax system is quite progressive, thus, an increase in gross pension
might lead to a much lower increase in net pensions and therefor lower or abolish a possible effect on retirement
behaviour. For the calculation of net pensions the IHS tax-benefit model ITABENA was applied (Hofer et al.,
2003). Gross pensions were reduced by social insurance contributions and income tax. We took into account
the different contribution rates for all insurance carriers, different contribution and tax rates over the years and
all kind of deductions and tax reductions where the information necessary was available. However, all kind of
family or spousal benefits could nod be modelled, as we are lacking information on family status.
5.4 Eligibility Conditions
Our interpretation of the individual decision problem, as described in 4, basically views retirement as a dichoto-
mous choice. This perspective entails specific assumptions with regard to the eligibility conditions for different
retirement plans. On the one hand, we do not consider gradual retreat from the labour market e.g. through a
subsidised part-time employment scheme for the elderly. On the other hand, we need to allow for the multiple
pathways into retirement that the Austrian legislation provides.
5.4.1 Multiple Pathways into Retirement
As has been outlined in section 3 we model six different retirement plans. This includes old-age retirement (AP),
pre-retirement due to long insurance records (VAPL), pre-retirement through the corridor option (KOP) as well
as retirement due to disability (BU, EU and IP). While the former three retirement plans will be summarised
as regular retirement schemes, we refer to the latter three as disability pensions. Old-age retirement (AP) as
well as the two pre-retirement schemes (VAPL and KOP) are regular in the sense that there exists a set of
deterministic rules that govern eligibility based on age, cohort, gender and individual insurance records. As
long as only regular retirement plans are considered, it is therefore possible to compute incentive measures
based on equations 4.1, 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7.
However, eligibility to any of the three disability pensions is not conditional on insurance records, but only
on the individual health status. Accidents or diseases causing lifelong disability can, of course, occur without
preannouncement and these retirement plans were initially created with the intention to insure the working
population against such events9. In Austria workers are thus eligible for disability pension if their ability to
work is reduced by 50% due to any kind of accident or illness. In case of application physicians judge whether
this requirement is met in a specific screening process, which necessarily involves a certain degree of subjective
evaluation.
In addition to the subjectivity of such decisions, further complications arise from the fact that applications
for disability pension are potentially endogenous. Boersch-Supan (2001) argues that employers as well as
employees might make strategic use of the disability option. Employers, on the one hand, have an incentive to
9See section 5.3 for a description on how benefits for these retirement plans are calculated.
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restructure the labour force at the charge of the social security system. Likewise, employees have an incentive
to claim disability pension for their own personal benefit in a misuse of the pension system. As a result, it has
to be expected that eligibility for disability pension is, at least to some extent, manipulated, as the incentives to
do so are often quite high.
Although the data includes ex-post information on the actual retirement plan, the probability of a positively
evaluated application remains ex-ante uncertain. This issue is discussed in depth by Boersch-Supan (2001),
where the author analyses retirement incentives in Germany based on the option value framework. Four different
strategies to handle uncertain disability options are presented10:
a) The tough variant: All individuals are assigned retirement incomes according to the old-age retirement
plan.
b) The generous variant: All individuals are assigned retirement incomes as if they were eligible for disabil-
ity pension.
c) The endogenous variant: Ex-post disabled persons are assigned disability pension, all other individuals
are assigned regular pensions.
d) The probabilistic variant: Individuals are assigned an expected value based on a probability p of obtaining
disability status.
Variant a and b obviously represent extreme cases: While a ignores the disability pathway and only considers
old-age retirement, b does the opposite and assigns the disability option to all individuals. Variant c, the en-
dogenous variant, uses the disability status according to the rules that have ex-post been applied to a sample
individual. This means that if, in retrospect, a person is granted disability status, this will be taken into con-
sideration when calculating the incentive measures as if it was already known by the individual ex-ante. For
persons who did not obtain disability pension, this option was not taken into consideration at all, similar to the
tough variant. However, this method appears to be a serious misinterpretation of the decision problem faced by
the individuals since the ex-ante uncertainty about his or her future health status is not properly accounted for.
Variant d clearly is the most promising approach, as it preserves a higher degree of individual heterogeneity.
In this case, the main idea is to construct a weighted average on the basis of the probability p of obtaining
disability status in the current period. In order to do that one first has to define two complementary event-paths
depending on the specific institutional and legal setting. For instance, an application for disability pension in
the current period can either be accepted or rejected. Correspondingly, an applicant might become eligible for
disability pension in the current period if his case is positively evaluated. However, in the event of a negative
evaluation, it needs to be defined what options he or she has until finally being eligibile for regular retirement11.
Depending on the context there will, of course, be a wide range of complementary event-paths that are con-
ceivable and, in general, a sensible approach should thus consider not only legislative context and empirical
regularities but also the corresponding interpretation of the decision problem.
10Note that these approaches can be extended to account for more than two different pathways, however, this does not apply to out case.
11Note that it is obviously inconsistent with our approach to allow for an immediate return to the labour market once having applied for
disability pension.
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The second aspect that needs to be addressed in order ot implement this approach is how to derive the
weighting probability p. A comparison of the models described in Gruber and Wise (2004) shows that it can
be obtained either as the population frequency of being disabled or through the specification of an econometric
model. Summing up, Boersch-Supan (2001) interprets variants a and b as boundary solutions, with the respec-
tive methods over- and underestimating the real effects. While method d performs best, variant c only gives
poor results. As is shown in table 5.5 most country groups in Gruber and Wise (2004) apply variant d based on
population frequencies, only few of them develop seperate models for the estimation of disability probabilities.
Table 5.5: Methods used to handle uncertain disability options
not considered population frequency econometric model
Belgium X
Canada X
Denmark X
France X
Germany X
Italy X
Japan X
Netherlands X
Spain X
Sweden X
United Kingdom X
United States X
Source: All countries refer to the country groups in Gruber and Wise (2004)
Specifically, Dellis et al. (2004), Bingley et al. (2004) and de Vos and Kapteyn (2004) all use variant d while
taking the empirical take-up rates from their samples as probability weight p. Among these studies, Bingley
et al. (2004) use the most subtle classification, as they distinguish subgroups according to age, year, gender
and the degree of disability which can be either high, middle or low. Mahieu and Blanchet (2004) basically use
approach d, although they represent a special case because they only include unemployment and early retirement
pathways but not disability. Furthermore, they conclude that a distinction between sectors of activity is the most
suitable approach for calculating probability weights based on their data. However, the authors acknowledge
that this procedure does not full justice to the situation in France because access probabilities are likely to be
firm specific. The lack of appropriate firm-level data thus presents a important restriction to their modelling
efforts.
Palme and Svensson (2004) also apply probability weights to deal with multiple pathways to retirment in
Sweden. The authors identify two major challenges. First, taking into consideration all possible pathways into
retirement of the Swedish system, including the possibility of switching between different retirement plans,
presents a very high degree of complexity12. They therefore concentrate on the most frequent retirement plans
12The labour market insurance programs in Sweden mainly consists of the disability, sickness and unemployment program.
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observed in their sample. The second challenge refers to the computation of the probability weights, how-
ever, they approach this issue by specifying a probit model with the observed take-up of disability pension as
dependent variable and an age polynomial, education as well as occupation indicators as independents.
Apart from the swedish researchers, Blundell et al. (2004) and Boldrin et al. (2004) both use a similar
approach, where the former authors include some additional explanatory variables, i.e. indicators for tenure,
marital status as well as spousal employment status. The latter, however, allow for some more heterogeneity by
estimating separate models by gender and retirement plan, also including a set of regional dummies and a cubic
time trend. From the remaining country groups, Baker et al. (2004), Brugiavini and Peracchi (2004) and Coile
and Gruber (2004) do not use probability weights to model multiple pathways to retirement. Oshio and Oishi
(2004) represent a special case as their research is based on a solely cross-sectional datatset.
5.4.2 Eligibility for Disability Pensions
In Austria there are basically three relevant disability options: BU, EU and IP (cf. chapter 3 for a more general
description of retirement plans). However, as each of these is associated with a different occupational group, it
can be ruled out that any person is eligible for two (or more) of these retirement plans at the same time. As in
the German context, we expect applications for any of these disability options to reflect strategic behaviour by
employers as well as employees (see 5.4.1 for a discussion). The fact that almost 30% of the individuals in our
dataset retire via one of the disability options underscores the relevance of this issue. As shown in table 3.4 the
mean retirement ages associated with these retirement plans are between 54-56 for women and 56-57 for men.
It is thus not implausible, at least in the Austrian context, to speak of these disability options as a form of (very)
early retirement.
To approach this issue in a comprehensive way, we deal with uncertain disability options by interpreting
the incentive measures as expected values. Thus following variant d as set out in the previous subsection, we
define two complementary event-paths and weight them by their respective probabilities. Taking the SSW from
equation 4.1 as an example we define the expected social security wealth as follows:
E[SSWS(R)] = p ·SSW DISS (R)+(1− p) ·SSW DISS (Rˆ) (5.1)
As the superscript DIS denotes the SSW associated with being eligible for any of the three disability options,
the expected SSW of retirement at age R (at planning age S) is a weighted sum of the SSW associated with
retirement at age R or at a later age Rˆ. Since Rˆ is defined as the earliest possible date at which the individual is
eligible for any regular retirement plan, this formulation implies that we allow for an early exit from the labour
force (even before pre-retirement age) on a voluntary basis. However, due to the probability weights associated
with either of the two event-paths, the expected SSW will reflect (i) how likely it is that the application receives
a positive evaluation and (ii) how long it might otherwise take to become eligible for any possible pre-retirement
plan (in case the initial application was turned down).
Our approach thus captures the two essential features of the Austrian system. On the one hand, individuals
start retiring on the basis of the disability options already at a very early age and, on the other hand, applications
can basically be repeated several times until early exit is finally granted13. Although it has been layed out only
in case of the SSW, we apply exactly the same approach to all the other incentive measures.
13Note that due to the comparatively young retirement ages associated with the disability options, we do not allow for later switches
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Table 5.6: Probability of Obtaining Disability Pension at Pre-Retirement Ages
mean sd skew kurt min max N
women: all ages 0.042 0.060 3.67 24.32 0.0001 0.9850 1,134,662
age 56 0.060 0.072 3.02 17.12 0.0007 0.9850 143,167
men: all ages 0.083 0.097 2.18 9.06 0.0000 0.9543 1,466,506
age 57 0.120 0.115 1.78 6.67 0.0000 0.9543 120,754
Source: IREA, 2012
To preserve as much individual heterogeneity as possible, we estimate a probit model to derive individual
probabilities to apply for and obtain disability pension. Therefore, we take observed (successfull) applications
in our dataset as dependend variable and link these to an age-cubicle, migrational background, year indicators,
average lifetime income as well as cumulative daily information on employment, industrial sector, unemploy-
ment and sick leave14. Regressions are run for men and women separately and are depicted in tables C.1 and
C.2.
Based on these estimates we predict the individual probabilities to obtain disability pension at ages 50 to
either 60 or 65 for females or males, respectively. Table 5.4.2 summarises some descriptive results. The mean
probability over all possible pre-retirement ages is around 4.6% for females and 8.3% for males. Although
individual results range from zero to more than 95%, most probabilities are close to zero, resulting in a rightward
skewed distribution. For both genders, the mean (per age group) is rising from age 50 until 56 and 57 for females
and males respectively. At the latter age the probabilities reach their maximum, which is about 6% for females
and 12% for males. For older age groups the individual probabilities are declining rapidly, reaching zero at
regular retirement ages.
5.5 Empirical Patterns of the Incentive Structure
The procedures laid out in sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 allow us to calculate the incentive measures as discussed
in chapter 4 for each planning year in the period 2002-2009. Specifically, we compute one-year accruals, one-
year accrual rates, tax rates, peak values and option values. While the SSW measures an individuals current
accounting balance versus the pension insurance office, the accruals consider changes in this balance from the
planning year to the next. The two forward-looking variables, the peak and option values, are each calculated
based on a 5-year planning horizon. Taken together, these variables therefore summarise the incentive structure
of the Austrian pension system as faced by each individual in our dataset.
towards regular retirement plans. In our view this would be rather speculative, as specific assumptions would have to be taken with regard
to the employment options of individuals who have already opted out of the labour market. Our present approach, however, avoids this since
disability pensions are rather insensitive with regard to further employment spells and we allow for the accumulation of further contribution
periods due to the receipt of social benefits.
14The latter four groups of variables come from the Austrian social security database, cf. 3.
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Table 5.7 summarises the distribution of the expected SSW by age and gender. For both genders eligibility
effects are clearly visible. While for females a jump in SSW can be observed at age 55, a related increase is
observed for men just before age 60. As has been laid out in section 5.4, SSW at pre-retirement ages is defined
as an expected value with a 5-year planning horizon. Females of age 55 will thus just be able to take their
future eligiblity, at the statutory retirement age of 60, into account. As a result, their expected SSW shows
a strong increase at this age, a phenomenon that is more pronounced for individuals at the lower end of the
distribution. Since some of the individuals will be eligible for pre-retirement (or have a high probability of
receiving a disability option), their SSW will already be higher at younger ages thus placing them in higher
percentiles. A similar picture evolves for males, though the latter are more likely to receive disability options
therefore resulting in a smoother increase of expected SSW around age 60. However, a considerable amount of
males is eligible for pre-retirement plans that typically start at age 60, thus leading to large increases in SSW
already at age 55 for individuals in higher percentiles.
A further empirical result emerges from table 5.7. For both genders it is striking that the SSW is basically
stagnant as soon as pre-retirement ages, at 55 for females and 60 for males, are reached. This result is even
more relevant as it is clearly visible for all parts of the distribution, and emerges from observations on the
individual level as well as from aggregate figures. Although the incentive measures are very dispersed and
strongly dependent on individual characteristics, it is thus fair to say that (based on an analysis of the SSW)
the incentive structure discourages individuals from continuing to work beyond the earliest possible retirement
date.
However, this result is somewhat qualified when looking at the option values (see also table XX). Since we
would expect incentive effects to be strongest for the old-age retirement (AP) and pre-retirement plans (VAPL
and KOP), we take a closer look at these15 in figures 5.1 and 5.2. The figures show the evolution of the option
value by age for different parts of the distribution. Specifically, we seperate between genders and retirement
plans and plot the option value at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile against age. Since a negative option value
implies that a further extension of the employment career yields a loss in present discounted utility, we would
expect individuals to retire as soon as this age threshold is reached.
15Individuals retiring through one of the disability options are generally much younger and, since eligibility for regular retirement plans
is reached only later on, their incentive measures are mostly driven by the probability to obtain disability status.
Fi
gu
re
5.
1:
E
vo
lu
tio
n
of
th
e
O
V
w
ith
A
ge
,W
om
en
08001600
mean
45
50
55
60
65
a
ge
AP VA
PL
08001600
p25
45
50
55
60
65
a
ge
08001600
p50
45
50
55
60
65
a
ge
08001600
p75
45
50
55
60
65
a
ge
®
So
ur
ce
:I
R
E
A
,2
01
2
Fi
gu
re
5.
2:
E
vo
lu
tio
n
of
th
e
O
V
w
ith
A
ge
,M
en
08001600
mean
55
60
65
70
75
a
ge
08001600
p25
55
60
65
70
75
a
ge
AP VA
PL
KO
P
08001600
p50
55
60
65
70
75
a
ge
08001600
p75
55
60
65
70
75
a
ge
®
So
ur
ce
:I
R
E
A
,2
01
2
IHS — Hanappi, Hofer, Müllbacher, Winter-Ebmer / IREA — 63
In fact, for women whose observed retirement plan is VAPL, the Austrian pension system gives more in-
centive to delay retirement for individuals at higher percentiles. While for women at the 25th percentile of the
distribution the option value turns zero at age 55, this is the case at age 56 for women at the median and at age
57 for those at the highest quartile. Regarding women retiring through the old-age retirement plan (AP) similar
results can be observed, although threshold ages are higher. For women at the 25th percentile, the option value
is zero at 60 which is exactly their statutory retirement age. For those at the median it is around 63 while at the
75th percentile this is only the case at around age 65.
For men, the evolution of the option value with age is more similar across the distribution. The option value
hits zero for men retiring through VAPL at 60 which is, again, the age they become eligible for this retirement
plan. Although this result is true for the largest part of the distribution, men at the 75th percentile have an
incentive to delay retirement for another year. Men who retire according to the old age retirement plan (AP),
however, do not have an incentive to continue working until they reach 65 if they are in the lower half of the
income distribution. Only those in the upper half retain positive option values slightly beyond the age of 65.
Looking at men retiring through the other pre-retirement plan (KOP), similar results emerge, as the latter face a
negative option values exactly at age 62 which corresponds to their statutory retirement age.
Analysis of the option value thus offers a more complete picture of the incentive structure of the Austrian
pension system. On the one hand, it is an economically more interesting statistic because it is utility based
and incorporates future utility from labour income and leisure (see chapter 4). On the other hand, it shows that
the incentive effects are not as discouraging as seemed to be the case when looking at the SSW alone, at least
when considering only regular retirement plans. Nevertheless, even accounting for utility from labour income
does not alter the general conclusion that the Austrian pension system delivers only very limited incentives to
continue work beyond statutory (pre-)retirement ages (cf. appendix XX for the complee set of tables).
Chapter 6
IREA: Econometric Model
6.1 Data
Although, in principle, we compute the incentive measures for every individual in every planning year, we
reduce our dataset for the econometric analysis mainly due to computational tractability. First, we are interested
in exit probabilities, so we only include observations from the beginning of the planning period, 2002, up to the
actual retirement date, i.e. 2009 at the latest. Second, we do not want to include observations which are too far
removed from observed retirement, thus restricting the individual observations to only 5 years prior to the actual
retirement date. The resulting left-censored dataset thus contains between 1 and 6 observations per individual,
depending on the actual retirement date. Third, we randomly draw 5,000 individuals from the full dataset, thus
resulting in an estimation sample of 14,301 person-years.
6.2 Specifications
In order to model retirement behaviour within the option value framework we estimate several cross-sectional
probit models with retirement in the planning year as dependent and SSW plus an additional incentive measure
as the main independent variables. As discussed in section 4.1, the introduction of forward-looking variables
like the option value in a cross-sectional model allows us to capture most of the intertemporal variation within
a comparatively simple framework1. To capture the effects of aging on retirement we let age enter the model
in two different ways, either linearly (LA) or through a full set of indicators (AD). In addition, we differentiate
between females and males, thus resulting in a total of 12 model specifications. The estimation results for the
option value (OV) specifications are shown in tables 6.1 and 6.2, while the results from the accrual rate and peak
value specifications (ACCRA, PEAK) are shown in the appendix C.
While we are abstracting from equilibrium effects on interest rate and discount factor2 by assuming a con-
stant δ = 0.97, we implement a grid search mechanism in order to find the optimal values for α and γ . Table
1In order to better deal with unobserved heterogeneity among individuals we have additionally estimated several random-effects speci-
fications, however, none of these offered significant improvements over the original option value specification.
2Based on a corresponding discount rate of r = 0.03.
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Table 6.1: Option Value Specification with Linear Age (OV-LA-MEN)
coeff. std.
# MALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 social security wealth 3.10e-06 3.42e-07 9.06 0.000
2 option value -0.000788 0.0000441 -17.86 0.000
3 age 0.0490289 0.0088135 5.56 0.000
4 migration 0.1464948 0.0365513 4.01 0.000
5 sick leave 0.0006478 0.0001536 4.22 0.000
6 regular employment 0.0000237 0.0000173 1.37 0.171
7 self-employment 0.0000273 0.0000174 1.57 0.117
8 fragmented employment -9.50e-06 0.0000850 -0.11 0.911
9 unemployment -0.0000712 0.0000245 -2.91 0.004
10 avg. monthly income -0.0004606 0.0000466 -9.89 0.000
11 NACE A 0.2309181 0.1848995 1.25 0.212
12 NACE B -0.3338738 0.2823768 -1.18 0.237
13 NACE C 0.0820796 0.1001994 0.82 0.413
14 NACE D -0.0739154 0.1474779 -0.50 0.616
15 NACE E 0.6126561 0.4596404 1.33 0.183
16 NACE F 0.3319055 0.1034424 3.21 0.001
17 NACE G 0.0238435 0.1001503 0.24 0.812
18 NACE H -0.0386803 0.1137415 -0.34 0.734
19 NACE I 0.2267986 0.1405453 1.61 0.107
20 NACE J -0.1725319 0.1603280 -1.08 0.282
21 NACE K -0.1830038 0.1206741 -1.52 0.129
22 NACE L -0.0016103 0.2115430 -0.01 0.994
23 NACE M -0.0918498 0.1271987 -0.72 0.470
24 NACE N 0.1998773 0.1451288 1.38 0.168
25 NACE O 0.0751489 0.1120666 0.67 0..502
26 NACE P -0.2915570 0.2974188 -0.98 0.327
27 NACE Q -0.1512520 0.1752370 -0.86 0.388
28 NACE R -0.1189379 0.2224540 -0.53 0.593
29 NACE S -0.0695682 0.1760470 -0.40 0.693
30 NACE T -0.2590911 0.5140223 -0.50 0.614
31 NACE U (referrence)
32 YEAR 2002 -1.0713500 0.0701397 -15.27 0.000
33 YEAR 2003 -1.0352270 0.0681197 -15.20 0.000
34 YEAR 2004 -1.3838770 0.0703666 -19.67 0.000
35 YEAR 2005 -1.0934620 0.0653927 -16.72 0.000
36 YEAR 2006 -0.8323986 0.0641612 -12.97 0.000
37 YEAR 2007 -0.9224212 0.0680696 -13.55 0.000
38 YEAR 2008 (referrence)
39 YEAR 2009 (referrence)
38 Constant -2.5604260 0.5772210 -4.44 0.000
Summary Statistics: number of observations 8867
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -3632.4976
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.2580
Source: IREA, 2012
6.3 summarizes the favoured approach as well as the actual values used by the various country groups in Gruber
and Wise (2002). The most general approach to determine optimal values for α and γ would be to develop
a full structural model that delivers estimates of the two utility parameters along with other parameters. This
approach is described in more detail in the original contribution of Stock and Wise (1990). Though they succeed
in determining structural utility parameters on the basis of the retirement behaviour of workers from one large
firm, none of the authors in Gruber and Wise (2002) (or elsewhere) implement this approach on the basis of a
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Table 6.2: Option Value Specification with Linear Age (OV-LA-WOMEN)
coeff. std.
# FEMALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 social security wealth 8.47e-06 3.92e-07 21.63 0.000
2 option value -0.0003609 0.0000332 -10.86 0.000
3 age 0.1999934 0.0081175 24.64 0.000
4 migration 0.1543268 0.0333787 4.62 0.000
5 sick leave 0.0006876 0.0001425 4.83 0.000
6 regular employment -2.86e-06 0.0000113 -0.25 0.801
7 self-employment -1.46e-06 0.0000124 -0.12 0.906
8 fragmented employment -0.0000848 0.0000390 -2.17 0.030
9 unemployment -0.0000622 0.0000243 -2.56 0.010
10 avg. monthly income -0.0014097 0.0000765 -18.44 0.000
11 NACE A -0.071935 0.2168824 -0.33 0.740
12 NACE B (reference)
13 NACE C -0.0721004 0.8871410 -0.81 0.416
14 NACE D 0.2461368 0.3155584 0.78 0.435
15 NACE E -0.2019777 0.3638039 -0.56 0.579
16 NACE F -0.1577642 0.1237474 -1.27 0.202
17 NACE G -0.1950140 0.0836146 -2.33 0.020
18 NACE H -0.1883729 0.1248225 -1.51 0.131
19 NACE I -0.1010081 0.0969629 -1.04 0.298
20 NACE J -0.0737845 0.1826955 -0.40 0.686
21 NACE K -0.1327506 0.1203130 -1.10 0.270
22 NACE L -0.2696328 0.1213721 -2.22 0.026
23 NACE M -0.2294154 0.1140781 -2.01 0.044
24 NACE N -0.0138500 0.1079309 -0.13 0.898
25 NACE O -0.1510573 0.0907597 -1.66 0.096
26 NACE P -0.1903601 0.1707463 -1.11 0.265
27 NACE Q -0.2639135 0.1022324 -2.58 0.010
28 NACE R 0.3685364 0.3759394 0.98 0.327
29 NACE S -0.0843404 0.1102427 -0.77 0.444
30 NACE T 0.1979234 0.1910086 1.04 0.300
31 NACE U (reference)
32 YEAR 2002 -0.8845741 0.0648686 -13.64 0.000
33 YEAR 2003 -0.7891009 0.0624716 -12.63 0.000
34 YEAR 2004 -1.3395620 0.0674459 -19.86 0.000
35 YEAR 2005 -1.1091810 0.0601959 -18.43 0.000
36 YEAR 2006 -0.9180255 0.0586510 -15.65 0.000
37 YEAR 2007 -0.9559141 0.0613606 -15.58 0.000
38 YEAR 2008 (reference)
39 YEAR 2009 (reference)
40 Constant -11.1362100 0.4995615 -22.29 0.000
Summary Statistics: number of observations 10405
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -3877.4475
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.3152
Source: IREA, 2012
more differentiated dataset.
In chosing the utility parameters for their models, the majority of the research teams thus simply refers to
the results of Stock and Wise (1990), that is to say they assume α = 1.36 and γ = 0.75. The results from the grid
search, however, suggest that in our case the likelihood of the econometric model increases as α increases and/or
γ decreases. While the magnitude of the effect of the incentive measures increases along with the likelihood,
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the age-effect on retirement probabilities decreases until it eventually turns insignificant3 (only for very low
values of γ , see appendix D). To avoid this, we chose a boundary solution, α = 1.92 and γ = 0.56, such that the
significance of all variables is preserved while the likelihood of the model is maximised.
Table 6.3: Utility Parameters: Methods and Values
BE CA DEN FRA GER IT JPN NED ESP SWE UK US AUT
exog. α 1.36 1.36 1.36 - - 1.25 1.36 1.36 1.25 - 1.36 1.36 -
γ 0.75 0.75 0.75 - 1 1 0.75 0.75 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 -
δ 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.985 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
grid α - - - 1.12 2.8 - - - - 3.19 (m) - - 1.92
search 1.18 (f)
γ - - - 0.25 - - - - - - - - 0.56
Note: Countries taking α = 1.36 and γ = 0.75 are referring to the structural model developed by Stock and Wise (1990).
Source: All country groups refer to Gruber and Wise (2002)
6.3 Estimation Results
As shown in the estimation tables 6.1 and 6.2, the parameter estimates of the incentive measures have the
expected sign and are highly significant throughout the 12 specifications4 (see appendix C for the complete
set of estimates). In general, the stock of social security wealth (SSWS) increases, while additional incentive
measures (ACCRAS, PEAKS or OVS) decrease the probability to retire at planning age S. Though the magnitude
of the effects varies, this pattern is found in all specifications (including the grid search) thus pointing to a robust
relationship between the incentive structure and retirement behaviour.
With regard to the control variables the estimation results are also as expected. All other things held constant,
an additional year of age increases the probability to retire, where the age indicators show that men and women
are most likely to retire at ages 65 and 60 respectively. Additional peaks in the age indicators are observed at
50, 60 and 62 for men and at 57 for women, however, year and industry indicators display no particular pattern.
Migrational background as well as days in sick leave (per year) both have a positive effect on retirement at
planning age.
However, as no educational information is included in either of our data sources, we include averages of
monthly income over the entire employment record to approximate educational attainments. As expected, a
higher income potential corresponds to a lower probability of leaving the labour market. Regarding employment
we include four different variables that are all measured on a days per year basis: regular employment, self-
employment, fragmented employment and unemployment. While regular employment has a positive effect on
retirement for males, the parameter turns insignificant in the female models, which fits well with the fact that
3As depicted in the two tables in appendix D our results suggest that, although it keeps on increasing, the likelihood function does not
reach a maximum within reasonably defined boundaries. In a first round the grid search includes values of α ∈ [1,10] and γ ∈ [0.25,1] in
order to check for an eventual maximum. However, based on the results from the first round, the grid has been narrowed to α ∈ [1.88,2.07]
and γ ∈ [0.53,0.57].
4Only the accrual rate parameter in the age indicator specification shows a somewhat lower level of significance.
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a considerable part of the female entitlements in the observed age cohorts are due to childcare periods. Self-
employment turns out to be insignificant in most specifications, however, time spent in fragmented employment
or unemployment has a significantly negative effect on retirement probabilities.
Although these results are qualitatively the same for different values of the two utility parameters, α and γ ,
the quantitative effects of the respective incentive measure increase as α increases and/or γ decreases. In general,
the incentive effects are stronger in the specifications with age indicators, where the option value models reach
the highest log-likelihood values thus resulting in likelihood ratio indices ρ2 of 0.46 and 0.34 for females and
males, respectively.
6.4 Discussion
Table 6.4 summarises signs and significance of the incentive measures in various model specifications5, thus
comparing parameter estimates among the countries collected in Gruber and Wise (2004). It suggests that the
Austrian model compares quite favourably to the others, as incentives are significant and behave as expected
throughout all specifications. We thus interpret our results as robust evidence of the effect of the incentive
structure on retirement behaviour in Austria.
Table 6.4: International Comparison of Parameter Estimates
ACCUAL RATE PEAK VALUE OPTION VALUE
LA AD LA AD LA AD
BE ACC -* SSW -* ACC -* SSW -* PEAK -* SSW -* PEAK -* SSW - OV -* SSW -* OV -* SSW -*
CAN ACC -* SSW +* ACC -* SSW +* PEAK -* SSW +* PEAK -* SSW +* OV -* SSW +* OV -* SSW +*
DEN ACC +* SSW +* ACC -* SSW +* PEAK -* SSW +* PEAK -* SSW +* OV -* SSW +* OV -* SSW +*
FRA ACC -* SSW-* ACC -* SSW -* PEAK -* SSW -* PEAK -* SSW - OV -* SSW -* OV -* SSW -*
GER ACC -* SSW - ACC -* SSW - PEAK -* SSW - PEAK -* SSW - OV -* SSW - OV -* SSW -*
IT ACC -* SSW-* ACC -* SSW - PEAK + SSW + PEAK - SSW - OV + SSW + OV - SSW +
JPN ACC -* SSW + ACC -* SSW- PEAK -* SSW - PEAK -* SSW - OV -* SSW + OV + SSW -
NED ACC +* SSW +* ACC +* SSW + PEAK -* SSW +* PEAK -* SSW +* OV -* SSW +* OV -* SSW +*
ESP ACC -* SSW + ACC + SSW +* PEAK -* SSW - PEAK + SSW + OV - SSW + OV + SSW +
SWE ACC -* SSW +* ACC - SSW +* PEAK -* SSW +* PEAK -* SSW +* OV -* SSW +* OV -* SSW +*
UK ACC -* SSW +* ACC - SSW +* PEAK - SSW +* PEAK - SSW +* OV -* SSW +* OV -* SSW +*
US ACC +* SSW +* ACC + SSW + PEAK -* SSW +* PEAK -* SSW +* OV -* SSW +* OV -* SSW -*
AUT ACC -* SSW +* ACC -* SSW +* PEAK -* SSW +* PEAK -* SSW +* OV -* SSW +* OV -* SSW +*
Notes: This table summarises information from Gruber and Wise (2004), where +/- indicate the sign of the corresponding parameter and *
indicates singnificance at 5% level. Although the Austrian model distinguishes between the genders, we summarise both specifications in
one line since results are qualitatively similar.
Since the effect of a given change in the pension system is determined by changes in the wealth level as well
as in the forward-looking incentive measure, the quantitative relevance of our estimation results is best judged
through simulations. While the latter will be discussed in depth in chapter 7, the following section evaluates
the performance of our estimates with regard to several (internal) dimensions. First, we calculate expected
5Note that most authors did not estimate seperate models for females and males.
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Table 6.5: Retirement Ages: Simulated and Empirical
males females
retirement plan empirical OV-LA OV-AD empirical OV-LA OV-AD
AP 65.08 64.03 63.86 60.08 59.31 59.45
VAPL 60.67 60.01 60.08 56.27 56.02 56.05
KOP 62 60.15 60.23 - - -
BU 56.70 56.96 56.85 54.33 54.81 54.66
EU 57.17 57.13 57.02 56.38 56.35 56.41
IP 56.58 56.75 56.61 54.86 55.26 55.16
Note: OV-LA and OV-AD refer to the option value specification with linear age and age indicators, respectively.
Source: IREA, 2012
retirement ages by retirement plan and gender as simulated by the option value model and compare these to
the average retirement ages in our data. The results are summarised in table 6.5, where we distinguish between
option value specifications with linear age (OV-LA) and age indicators (OV-AD).
The table shows that the simulations typically underestimate retirement ages for regular retirement plans
(AP, VAPL, KOP) while slightly overestimating them for the disability options (BU, EU, IP). In case of the
old-age retirement plan (AP) male estimates are about one year below the observed average, though female
estimates are closer. Simulated retirement ages in the pre-retirement plan due to long insurance history (VAPL),
which is by far the most common pathway to retirement (cf. table 3.3), are generally very close to the observed
values. The characteristics of the other pre-retirement plan (KOP), however, are harder to account for, thereby
resulting in comparatively large differences. Our approach with regard to the disability options, on the other
hand, appears to capture observed behaviour quite well, as the results for all three options (BU, EU, IP) are very
close to empirical averages.
In addition, we compute empirical cumulative hazard rates and plot them against the simulation results
in figures 6.1 and 6.2. For both genders, it is apparent that the simulations fit the observed retirement data
very well. Though the specifications with linear age are not capable of reproducing the observed kinks at 60
(for males and females) and 65 (males only), the inclusion of age indicators yields almost exactly the same
structure.
A range of further empirical results emerge from these two figures. Both show that until the age of 55 only
less than 10% of the individuals in our dataset have already left the labour market. Starting at that age, however,
females begin to drop out very rapidly, so that female retirees account for around 35% at age 57 and 60% at ages
58 and 59. At statutory retirement age, 60, 65% of the female work force in our dataset is already retired. After
a further shift into retirement at 60, almost none of the females remains employed. For males, the picture shifts
somewhat to the right. Although 90% are still working at age 57, a considerable amount drops out in the next 3
years, resulting in 35% already being retired at age 60. As for the females, many leave the labour market at this
age so that only 10% of the male labour force remains at ages 61-63. Only a fraction of these workers continues
to be employed until the statutory retirement age, 65, is reached. After that age the amount of individuals who
are still in the labour market is negligible.
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Figure 6.1: Male Cumulative Hazard Rates: Simulated and Empirical
Notes: OV-LA and OV-AD refer to the option value specification with linear age and age indicators respectively. Empirical hazard rates
are computed on the basis of the estimation subsample, see section 6.1.
Source: IREA, 2012
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Figure 6.2: Female Cumulative Hazard Rates: Simulated and Empirical
Notes: OV-LA and OV-AD refer to the option value specification with linear age and age indicators respectively. Empirical hazard rates
are computed on the basis of the estimation subsample, see section 6.1.
Source: IREA, 2012
Chapter 7
IREA: Simulations
7.1 General Setting
This section presents a range of simulations that have been run on the basis of the estimation results as discussed
in the previous chapter (cf. 6.3). The simulations serve two main purposes. First, we want to apply the
estimated parameters from the full set of specifications so as to check external validity and make sure that no
unexpected results arise. Second, having discussed signs and significance of the estimated parameters, we need
to consider simulations in order to assess the full quantitative effects of a given change in the incentive structure
on retirement behaviour.
To this end we implement two standard reforms as laid out in Gruber and Wise (2004). The first reform
evaluates the effect of an increase in the statutory retirement age by three years (3Y), while the second common
reform scenario pronounces financial incentives through additional bonuses and deductions (CR). As a more
policy relevant application, we also shortly discuss the abolition of the hard-worker-rule, which is a specific
pathway into retirement that was originally aimed at blue-collar workers (see 5.3).
For the simulations we make use of an extended dataset which includes every individual not only until
observed retirement date, but until the end of the observational period in 20091. We chose the option value
model2 as the basis for the simulations because, on the one hand, its representation of individual behaviour is
more in line with economic theory and, on the other hand, due to its advantage in terms of explanatory power
(cf. 6.3). However, to abstract from idiosyncratic temporal effects we use estimation results from the linear
age specification (OV-LA). Though, in this section, results will be discussed on the basis of only one model,
simulation results are reported for every model specification in appendix C.
The baseline scenario is defined such that it represents the Austrian pension system exactly as it has been
faced by the individual decision makers in the corresponding year of the observational period 2002-20093. To
evaluate counterfactuals against this baseline we implement each of the reform scenarios on the basis of exactly
the same time period. However, since amendments of the retirement legislation are typically implemented over a
1Note that we exclude individuals who are either below 50 at the beginning, or above 70 at the end of the observational period.
2As discussed earlier, the option values are calculated on the basis of a 5-year planning horizon.
3Note that there existed considerable diversity with regard to retirement regulations within this time period, see 5.3.
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medium to long term horizon, a comprehensive prediction of future retirement behaviour would entail a careful
representation of the implementation process, depending not only on the reform scenarios but also on expected
changes in future regulations as formulated by current law. Although such predictions of future scenarios are
perfectly feasible on the basis of our model, the simulations we present in this section serve to evaluate what
would have been the case if reforms were enacted within the baseline period.
7.2 Scenario Description
7.2.1 Postponement of Statutory Retirement Ages (3Y)
The first reform scenario postpones statutory retirement ages for all regular retirement plans by three years, thus
implying the following structure compared to the status quo described in 5.3:
- AP: old-age retirement at 68 and 63 for men and women respectively
- VAPL: pre-retirement due to long insurance record is generally depending on the cohort, 63-68 for men
and 58-63 for women
- KOP: pre-retirement through the corridor option is possible at 65
- Hard-worker-rule remains in effect now allowing for retirement at 63 for men and 58 for women
- Disability options (BU, EU, IP) remain unchanged as eligibility depends on the health status
Since the availability of disability options mainly depends on the individual health status, eligibility regulations
for these retirement plans remain as described in 5.4. This, however, does not imply that the reform fails to
affect the incentive structure at earlier ages. Since expected incentive measures, as defined in equation 5.1,
depend also on future eligibility for regular retirement plans, changes in the statutory retirement ages will affect
incentives also through this channel.
7.2.2 Strengthening Financial Incentives (CR)
The second scenario aims at an unification of various retirement plans and a stronger pronounciation of the
financial incentives delivered by the pension system. It is based on the common reform proposed by Gruber and
Wise (2004), p.30-35.
- Unique statutory retirement at 65 (for men and women)
- Pre-retirement is possible beginning at age 60 for both genders
- Retirement benefits at statutory retirement age comprise 60% of labour income at age 59 (with a minimum
of 300 euros/month)
- Benefits are reduced by 6% p.a. for each year before age 65
- Benefits are increased by 6% p.a. for each year after age 65
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Again, in this case we model the disability options as before. However, as the pre-retirement character of the
disability options is in conflict with the spirit of this reform scenario, it is necessary to make some further
specifications. Although we keep access to the disability options open in this scenario, we apply the same
deductions as for regular pre-retirement ages, that is 6% p.a. for each year prior to 65.
7.3 Discussion
To discuss simulation results we aggregate individual retirement probabilities by age and gender and compare
aggregate results between base and reform scenarios. Specifically, we compute mean hazard rates as well as
cumulative hazards for all age groups between 50 and 68 for females and 69 for males. In addition, we compute
expected retirement ages at the beginning of the observational period, i.e. in 2002, and look at the proportion of
individuals aged 56 to 65 that is out of the labour force (OLF).
Figure 7.1 shows female hazard rates in the baseline simulation with linear age (OV-LA) as well as in the
reform scenarios 3Y (+3 years) and CR (common reform). Figure 7.3 has corresponding results from the model
with age indicators (OV-AD). While in the former model hazard rates are smoothly increasing with age, the
latter allows for fixed age effects which contribute to the observed peaks at 57, 60 and 65. Though the peak at
age 60 is due to eligibility age effects alone, the increase in mean hazards in the age group 55-57 is likely to
be related to the increased probability of obtaining disability pension. The peak at 65, however, might either
correspond to interrelations with male eligibility or else be due to some social norm about the accepted (female)
retirement age. Both specifications show that the reform scenarios reduce the average exit probability, though
in the female case the decrease in the hazard rates due to the common reform is stronger throughout all age
groups. As discussed in Gruber and Wise (2004), this is due to the fact that the common reform represents a
rather harsh regime as compared to the current Austrian regulations (especially for women). The main driving
forces are: (i) the common reform introduces a unique statutory retirement age of 65 for both genders, which
is higher than the female retirement age in the base (60) as well as in the 3Y scenario (63); (ii) pre-retirement
begins at age 60, which is again higher than in the other two scenarios (55-60 in the base and 58-63 in the 3Y
scenario); and (iii) access to disability options is allowed only under considerable deductions and without the
imposition of a maximum loss.
Table 7.1: Out of Labour Force Proportions
BASE 3Y CR
females 0.724 0.677 0.606
males 0.538 0.461 0.466
Source: IREA, 2012
The cumulative hazards in figure 7.5 confirm these results. While, in the baseline scenario about 18% of
females are already out of the labour force at age 56, reform 3Y decreases this number to 10%, and the common
reform reduces it even further, i.e. to 4%. Although the gap between the reform scenarios and the baseline
increases with age for women in their 50s, it begins to narrow again at 60, so that (even in the common reform
scenario) only very few females remain in the labour market after that age. Table 7.1 shows that these effects
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correspond to a reduction of the OLF proportion of females between 56 and 65 from 72.4% in the base to
67.7% and 60.6% in the 3Y and CR scenarios. Comparing these results to those in Gruber and Wise (2004)
indicates that Austrian women in this age group have the second highest OLF proportion among all countries
included in this volume. Although the abovementioned summary argues that dutch workers display a similar
OLF proportion, it is shown that the common reform is likely to reduce it to less than 30%. However, our results
imply that, although retirement behaviour of Austrian women is driven by incentives, the reduction due to an
implementation of the common reform would be much lower (thus placing them closer to the Italian case).
Figure 7.1: Female Hazard Rates by Age
Notes: This figure shows mean individual hazard rates by age in three different scenarios. OV-LA refers to the option value specification
with linear age; 3Y refers to scenario 7.2.1 and CR to scenario 7.2.2.
Source: IREA, 2012
Although both reform scenarios decrease the hazard rates considerably, the two reform scenarios have more
distinguished effects in the male case, see 7.2 and 7.4 for the model with linear age and age indicators, respec-
tively. Results from the model with age indicators shows similar, though somewhat less pronounced, peaks at
ages 57, 62 and 65. While the first of these is again related to the disability options, the second peak relates
to pre-retirement eligibility (either through VAPL or KOP retirement plans) and the third to old-age eligibility.
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Figure 7.2: Male Hazard Rates by Age
Notes: This figure shows mean individual hazard rates by age in three different scenarios. OV-LA refers to the option value specification
with linear age; 3Y refers to scenario 7.2.1 and CR to scenario 7.2.2.
Source: IREA, 2012
Comparing the relative impact of the two reforms, however, indicates that the 3Y scenario implies lower hazard
rates only for males between 55 and 61. This picture changes drastically as the hazard rates for males older than
61 show only a marginal decrease in the 3Y scenario relative to the base scenario. Since every retirement plan
is adjusted by 3 years and the disability options are not subjected to increased deductions, the impact of the 3Y
scenario peters out as soon as pre-retirement again becomes accessible starting at age 63. The common reform,
on the other hand, has stronger effects for males in the age group 60-69. This result is in line with the fact that
men, relative to women, show a much stronger response to incentive measures as indicated by the estimated
parameters. Although the statutory retirement age is the same for men in the base scenario as compared to
the common reform, the incentives introduced by the latter appear to yield strong impacts on male retirement
behaviour well beyond pre-retirement ages.
These results are again reflected in the cumulative hazards in figure 7.6. In the baseline scenario 47% are
out of the labour force at age 60, a number that is decreased to 38% and 34% in the common reform and
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Figure 7.3: Female Hazard Rates by Age
Notes: This figure shows mean individual hazard rates by age in three different scenarios. OV-LA refers to the option value specification
with linear age; 3Y refers to scenario 7.2.1 and CR to scenario 7.2.2.
Source: IREA, 2012
3Y scenarios respectively. While some positive difference between base and reform remains until age 65 in
the 3Y scenario, the common reform scenario succeeds in extending male employment careers up until age
68. A comparison of these results with discussions in the previous paragraphs demonstrates large differences
between Austrian men and women. On the one hand, males have a lower OLF proportion due to the current
difference in statutory retirement ages, as depicted in table 7.1. On the other hand, they also show a stronger
response to financial incentives, what gives rise to an increased scope for policy makers to influence male
retirement behaviour. Although the common reform basically introduces the same incentive structure for both
genders, it does therefore not fully succeed in bringing the female OLF proportion to about the same range
as the male. As for international comparisons, Austrian men are in the middle ranges with regard to their
OLF proportions. Although they are more responsive than their female counterparts, the impact of the reform
scenarios is still not as high as for countries like Germany or the Netherlands. The same picture emerges from
the consideration of expected retirement ages, see 7.2. While the general performance of our simulations in
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Figure 7.4: Male Hazard Rates by Age
Notes: This figure shows mean individual hazard rates by age in three different scenarios. OV-LA refers to the option value specification
with linear age; 3Y refers to scenario 7.2.1 and CR to scenario 7.2.2.
Source: IREA, 2012
terms of this number has been discussed in section 6.4, evaluation of the reform scenarios indicates that both
have the potential to increase male expected retirement ages by approximately 0.8-0.9 years on average. For
females the corresponding increase in the 3Y scenario would be around 0.5 years, while reaching 1.4 years
in the common reform scenario. In addition to these more general issues, we also evaluate another reform
measure that is often brought up in Austrian policy debates, that is the abolition of the hard-worker rule. This
rule basically represents a further pathway into retirement that allows for pre-retirement without any reductions
at age 60 and 55 for males and females respectively, provided a certain amount of insurance contributions
was accumulated over the entire employment career. This specific retirement pathway offers strong negative
incentives with regard to a continuation of work, as no further increases in retirement benefits can be achieved
once an individual is eligible. The last row in table 7.2 shows that, although only a fraction of the individuals
is potentially eligible, the abolition of this rule alone yields an increase in the mean expected retirement ages of
0.2 and 0.1 years for males and females, respectively.
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Figure 7.5: Female Cumulative Hazard Rates by Age
Notes: This figure shows mean cumulative hazard rates by age in three different scenarios. OV-LA refers to the option value specification
with linear age; 3Y refers to scenario 7.2.1 and CR to scenario 7.2.2.
Table 7.2: Expected Retirement Ages
exp. retirement difference
females males females males
BASE 57.6 59.7 - -
3Y: plus 3 years 58.1 60.4 + 0.5 + 0.8
CR: common reform 59.0 60.6 + 1.4 + 0.9
hard-worker rule 57.7 59.9 + 0.1 + 0.2
Source: IREA, 2012
Although international comparison on the basis of the results in Gruber and Wise (2004) is hindered by the
fact that current legislation differs substantially among countries, it is apparent from the results discussed in this
section that the Austrian case is characterised by several features. Although the estimation results show a robust
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Figure 7.6: Male Cumulative Hazard Rates by Age
Notes: This figure shows mean cumulative hazard rates by age in three different scenarios. OV-LA refers to the option value specification
with linear age; 3Y refers to scenario 7.2.1 and CR to scenario 7.2.2.
Source: IREA, 2012
relationship between incentive measures and retirement behaviour, the overall quantitative impact appears to be
somewhat lower than in other countries, especially when combined with the fact that actual retirement ages are
among the lowest. This feature is highlighted through a comparison e.g. with the danish case, where the com-
mon reform yields an increase of 1.4 years for women and men alike. Germany, which is typically assumed to
share some similarities in the institutional setting with Austria, also reports a stronger impact related to both re-
form scenarios, thus ranging up to 2.3 years for both genders. Another characteristic feature, which is of course
related to the low actual retirement ages, is the existence of several disability options. Although we believe that
our approach captures this feature quite well, a more comprehensive approach might be warranted, especially
with regard to the transition from these forms of early retirement to regular retirement. A third relevant aspect
might be hidden in the fact that the Austrian retirement regulations are characterised by a considerable degree of
diversity, especially for individuals retiring within the time frame of our dataset. Due to this complexity (as well
as the uncertainty related to potential future reforms), it is not entirely clear to what extend Austrian individuals
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are in fact capable of forming rational expectations about their future entitlements. However, as this situation
will give way to more transparent regulations in the near future, it is to be expected that the observed incentive
effects are strengthened along with this development.
Appendix
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Appendix A
Variable Description
A.1 VVP Database -
Verdichtung von Versicherungszeiten und Pensionsberechnung
Variables Description
id ID made up from penr and lf_n ID Nummer
penr Personal Number Personennummer
lf_ n Sequential Number Laufnummer
dn_male Sex Geschlech
dn_Gebjahr Birth Year Geburtsjahr
sdate Pension Valuation Date (date variable) Stichdatum
sjahr Pension Valuation Year (date variable) Stichjahr
smonat Pension Valuation Month (date variable) Stichmonat
bdate Pension Notification Date (date variable) Bescheiddatum
bjahr Pension Notification Year (date variable) Bescheidjahr
bmonat Pension Notification Month (date variable) Bescheidmonat
dn_age Age at Pension Valuation Day Alter zu Stichtag
dn_vstr Insurance Carrier Versicherungstraeger
dn_id_rla Legal Situation Rechtslage
dn_Waehrung Currency Waehrung
dn_PensArt Pension Type Pensionsart
dm_btr_anr Pension Benefit Pensionshoehe
dm_btr_stb Pension Benefit without Child-Leave Periods Pensionshoehe ohne Kinderersatzzeiten
and Additional Benefits und Zusatzleistungen
dn_GKiez Total Child-Leave Period Gesamte Kinderersatzzeiten
dm_BPens Gross Pension Income Bruttopensionseinkommen
dn_summ_kiez_ges Insurance Months Versicherungsmonate
of Child-Leave Period der Kinderersatzzeiten
dn_summ_fkiez Uncapped Insurance Months Ungedeckelte Versicherungsmonate
of Child-Leave Period der Kinderersatzzeiten
dn_summ_ukiez_leistw Capped Insurance Months Gedeckelte Versicherungsmonate
of Child-Leave Period der Kinderersatzzeiten
dn_VM_Leist Sum of Insurance Months for Pension Summe der Versicherungsmonate
Benefit Calculation zur Berechnung der Leistungshoehe
dn_VM_Wart Sum of Insurance Months for Summe der Versicherungsmonate
Fulfilling the Waiting Period zur Erfuellung der Wartezeit
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dm_btr_bes_stb Special Accrual Rate Erhoehter Steigerunsbetrag
dn_proz_stb Accrual Rate Steigerungsbetrag
dm_BMG_ER Assessment Base due to Employment Bemessungsgrundlage aus Erwerbsarbeit
dm_BMG_GES Assessment Base Gesamtbemessungsgrundlage
dm_BMG_KIEZ Assessment Base of Child-Leave Periods Bemessungsgrundlage der Kinderersatzzeiten
dm_btr_leizu Productivity Bonus Leistungsbonus
dm_btr_boni Bonus for Long Insurance Bonifikation
dn_kz_au Type of Labour Accident Unfall, Krankheit, Dienstbeschaedigung
dn_kz_zwst Inter-Country Pension Calculation Zwischenstaatliche Pension
dn_datum_unfall Date of Accident (date variable) Unfallsdatum
dn_VstPenr ID of dead Person ID des Verstorbenen
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A.2 ASSD (Austrian Social Security) Database - Arbeitsmarktdaten-
bank
redate Labour Market Exit Date (date variable) Beginn der ersten Renten Episode
rejahr Labour Market Exit Year (date variable) Erstes Rentenjahr
remonat Labour Market Exit Month (date variable) Erstes Rentenmonat
dn_amdb_stbg Nationality Staatsbuergerschaft
dn_migb Migration Background Migrationshintergrund
dn_edu Educational Attainment Bildungsstand
amdb_kst_#v Sick Days per Year Krankentage
of the years 1995 until 2008 pro Jahr von 1995 bis 2008
amdb_as_1_#v Main Occupation Arbeitsmarktstatus im Jahr
in the years 1978 until 2008 von 1978 bis 2008
Seven categories (summarized from 30 categories): 7 Kategorien
1 civil servants, employees Beamte, Arbeiter, Angestellte
2 farmers, self-employees Landwirte, Selbststaendige
3 trainees, marginally employed, Lehre, geringfuegig beschaeftigt,
freelancer freier Dienstvertrag
4 unemployed (with and without benefits) Arbeitslos (mit und ohne Leistungsbezug)
5 maternity benefits, child-care allowances Wochengeld, Kinderbetreuungsgeldbezug
6 pensioners, civil servants Erwerbspension, Zivildienst,
sonstige Versicherungszeiten
7 no data keine Daten, generierte Nullzeiten
amdb_nace_#v NACE Industry Indicator NACE Industrieindikator
of the Years 1978 until 2008 im Jahr von 1978 bis 2008
A Agriculture,Forestry,Fishing
B Mining,Quarrying
C Manufacturing
D Electricity,Gas, etc.
E Watersupply,WasteManagement
F Construction
G Wholesale and Retail Trade
H Transporting,Storage
I Accomodation,FoodService
J Information,Communication
K Financial,InsuranceActivities
L Real Estate Activities
M Professional,Scientific, TechnicalActivities
N Admin.,Support Service
O PublicAdministration, Defence, Social Security
P Education
Q HumanHealth,SocialAffairs
R Arts,Entertainment,Recreation
S Other service activities
T Activities of Households as Employers
U Activities of Extraterritorial Organisations
Appendix B
Empirical Incentive Measures
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Appendix C
Estimation Results
IHS — Hanappi, Hofer, Müllbacher, Winter-Ebmer / IREA — 93
Table C.1: Disability
coeff. std.
# MALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 age -8.9229960 2.8170100 -3.17 0.002
2 age2 0.1757204 0.0508968 3.45 0.001
3 age3 -0.0011420 0.0003059 -3.73 0.000
4 migration 0.1208689 0.0371022 3.26 0.001
5 avg. monthly income -0.0000846 0.0000248 -3.41 0.001
6 sick leave 0.0015879 0.0001532 10.36 0.000
7 regular employment 0.0000979 0.0000311 3.15 0.002
8 self-employment 0.0002069 0.0000178 11.65 0.000
9 fragmented employment 0.0001773 0.0001056 1.68 0.093
10 unemployment 0.0002806 0.0000261 10.77 0.000
11 NACE A 0.0432546 0.0154226 2.80 0.005
12 NACE B -0.0042950 0.0267653 -0.16 0.873
13 NACE C 0.0317609 0.0106440 2.98 0.003
14 NACE D 0.0176789 0.0140274 1.26 0.208
15 NACE E 0.0357124 0.0195022 1.83 0.067
16 NACE F 0.045759 0.0102780 4.45 0.000
17 NACE G 0.0241075 0.0107396 2.24 0.025
18 NACE H 0.0321721 0.0112446 2.86 0.004
19 NACE I 0.0451574 0.0112343 4.02 0.000
20 NACE J 0.0134792 0.0153328 0.88 0.379
21 NACE K 0.0137407 0.0123669 1.11 0.267
22 NACE L 0.0412128 0.0135569 3.04 0.002
23 NACE M 0.0186414 0.0128761 1.45 0.148
24 NACE N 0.0470014 0.0126390 3.72 0.000
25 NACE O 0.0216844 0.0110532 1.96 0.050
26 NACE P 0.0360243 0.0198986 1.81 0.070
27 NACE Q 0.0391706 0.0138466 2.83 0.005
28 NACE R 0.0454607 0.0155593 2.92 0.003
29 NACE S 0.0158934 0.0142941 1.11 0.266
30 NACE T 0.1537665 0.0661521 2.32 0.020
31 NACE U 0.0085322 0.0392446 0.22 0.828
32 YEAR 2002 -1.0211470 0.1378691 -7.41 0.000
33 YEAR 2003 -1.1390660 0.1352163 -8.42 0.000
34 YEAR 2004 -1.4999060 0.1436022 -10.44 0.000
35 YEAR 2005 -1.7224880 0.1341509 -12.84 0.000
36 YEAR 2006 -1.8357530 0.1336559 -13.73 0.000
37 YEAR 2007 -2.0029500 0.1367518 -14.65 0.000
38 YEAR 2008 -2.0487630 0.1347887 -15.20 0.000
39 YEAR 2009 -2.2701420 0.1364330 -16.64 0.000
40 Constant 148.2981000 51.8631800 2.86 0.004
Summary Statistics: number of observations 13616
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -3127.9204
likelihood ratio index ρ2 1290.19
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.1710
Source: IREA, 2012
94— Hanappi, Hofer, Müllbacher, Winter-Ebmer / IREA — IHS
Table C.2: Disability
coeff. std.
# FEMALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 age -40.3380400 5.3817150 -7.50 0.000
2 age2 0.7615687 0.1003164 7.59 0.000
3 age3 -0.0047784 0.0006221 -7.68 0.000
4 migration 0.1802927 0.0458683 3.93 0.000
5 avg. monthly income -0.0002371 0.0000617 -3.85 0.000
6 sick leave 0.0009780 0.0001613 6.06 0.000
7 regular employment -0.0000702 0.0000407 -1.72 0.085
8 self-employment 0.0001089 0.0000138 7.89 0.000
9 fragmented employment 0.0000213 0.0000604 0.35 0.724
10 unemployment 0.0001217 0.0000323 3.77 0.000
11 NACE A 0.0274589 0.0285609 0.96 0.336
12 NACE B (reference)
13 NACE C 0.0412519 0.0150957 2.73 0.006
14 NACE D (reference)
15 NACE E 0.0933529 0.0619484 1.51 0.132
16 NACE F 0.0357456 0.0183218 1.95 0.051
17 NACE G 0.0238352 0.0151875 1.57 0.117
18 NACE H 0.0324083 0.0171512 1.89 0.059
19 NACE I 0.0437480 0.0144386 3.03 0.002
20 NACE J -0.0774121 0.0930992 -0.83 0.406
21 NACE K 0.0210659 0.0175852 1.20 0.231
22 NACE L 0.0269948 0.0181060 1.49 0.136
23 NACE M 0.0135092 0.0183571 0.74 0.462
24 NACE N 0.0554348 0.0165710 3.35 0.001
25 NACE O 0.0357680 0.0151686 2.36 0.018
26 NACE P 0.0200142 0.0244480 0.82 0.413
27 NACE Q 0.0402572 0.0163325 2.46 0.014
28 NACE R 0.0210766 0.0254283 0.83 0.407
29 NACE S 0.0422131 0.0168633 2.50 0.012
30 NACE T -0.1612355 0.1274692 -1.26 0.206
31 NACE U (reference)
32 YEAR 2002 -1.245375 0.1870122 -6.66 0.000
33 YEAR 2003 -1.541068 0.1830589 -8.42 0.000
34 YEAR 2004 -1.705531 0.1885476 -9.05 0.000
35 YEAR 2005 -1.984252 0.1831530 -10.83 0.000
36 YEAR 2006 -2.181083 0.1820537 -11.98 0.000
37 YEAR 2007 -2.188116 0.1847223 -11.85 0.000
38 YEAR 2008 -2.371205 0.1827918 -12.97 0.000
39 YEAR 2009 -2.458082 0.1841069 -13.35 0.000
40 Constant 709.991003 96.0413000 7.39 0.000
Summary Statistics: number of observations 14408
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -1748.6792
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.1822
Source: IREA, 2012
IHS — Hanappi, Hofer, Müllbacher, Winter-Ebmer / IREA — 95
Table C.3: Accrual Rate Specification with Linear Age (AR-LA-men)
coeff. std.
# MALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 social security wealth 3.34e-06 3.28e-07 10.18 0.000
2 accrual rate -19.9033000 0.7910281 -25.16 0.000
3 age 0.1058270 0.0076338 13.86 0.000
4 migration 0.1248117 0.0373336 3.34 0.001
5 sick leave 0.0008281 0.0001569 5.28 0.000
6 regular employment -0.0000413 0.0000177 -2.34 0.019
7 self-employment -0.0000422 0.0000179 -2.36 0.018
8 fragmented employment -0.0000496 0.0000864 -0.57 0.566
9 unemployment -0.0000234 0.0000247 -0.95 0.343
10 avg. monthly income -0.0005541 0.0000441 -12.56 0.000
11 NACE A 0.1485128 0.1888419 0.79 0.432
12 NACE B -0.2729872 0.2983834 -0.91 0.360
13 NACE C 0.1118624 0.1030764 1.09 0.278
14 NACE D 0.0118273 0.1512027 0.08 0.938
15 NACE E 0.5095662 0.4602660 1.11 0.268
16 NACE F 0.2502772 0.1061367 2.36 0.018
17 NACE G 0.0458669 0.1031453 0.44 0.657
18 NACE H -0.0408009 0.1173716 -0.35 0.728
19 NACE I 0.3104447 0.1425199 2.18 0.029
20 NACE J -0.1633913 0.1646107 -0.99 0.321
21 NACE K -0.0736134 0.1239465 -0.59 0.553
22 NACE L -0.0140272 0.2128898 -0.07 0.947
23 NACE M -0.0836321 0.1300495 -0.64 0.520
24 NACE N 0.1821623 0.1494553 1.22 0.223
25 NACE O 0.1194860 0.1147898 1.04 0.298
26 NACE P -0.3566768 0.3072205 1.16 0.246
27 NACE Q -0.2301686 0.1807474 -1.27 0.203
28 NACE R -0.0156282 0.2253605 -0.07 0.945
29 NACE S -0.1448025 0.1787073 -0.81 0.418
30 NACE T -0.0017010 0.5335450 -0.00 0.997
31 NACE U (reference)
32 YEAR 2002 -1.2194010 0.0731589 -16.67 0.000
33 YEAR 2003 -1.1701030 0.0705422 -16.59 0.000
34 YEAR 2004 -1.5423030 0.0734932 -20.99 0.000
35 YEAR 2005 -1.2109020 0.0681595 -17.77 0.000
36 YEAR 2006 -0.9487656 0.0672413 -14.11 0.000
37 YEAR 2007 -0.9867182 0.0716572 -13.77 0.000
38 YEAR 2008 (reference)
39 YEAR 2009 (reference)
40 Constant -6.0756990 0.5053160 -12.02 0.000
Summary Statistics: number of observations 8867
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -3436.5942
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.2980
Source: IREA, 2012
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Table C.4: Accrual Rate Specification with Linear Age (AR-LA-women)
coeff. std.
# FEMALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 social security wealth 0.0000101 3.64e-07 27.87 0.000
2 accrual rate -0.5118065 0.3836233 -1.33 -0.182
3 age 0.2208522 0.0080014 27.60 0.000
4 migration 0.1514679 0.0331419 4.57 0.000
5 sick leave 0.0008077 0.0001427 5.66 0.000
6 regular employment -0.0000205 0.0000112 -1.82 0.068
7 self-employment -0.0000247 0.0000124 -1.99 0.046
8 fragmented employment -0.0000776 0.0000391 -1.99 0.047
9 unemployment -0.0000414 0.0000242 -1.71 0.087
10 avg. monthly income -0.0017107 0.0000714 -23.97 0.000
11 NACE A -0.1173780 0.2169442 -0.54 0.588
12 NACE B (reference)
13 NACE C -0.0090465 0.0886788 -0.10 0.919
14 NACE D 0.3248266 0.3124909 1.04 0.299
15 NACE E -0.2419323 0.3631863 -0.67 0.505
16 NACE F -0.1037603 0.1229458 -0.84 0.399
17 NACE G -0.1444719 0.0837470 -1.73 0.085
18 NACE H -0.12876840 0.1241727 -1.04 0.300
19 NACE I -0.6118520 0.0972477 -0.63 0.529
20 NACE J -0.6111450 0.1820282 -0.34 0.737
21 NACE K -0.08933700 0.1190246 -0.75 0.453
22 NACE L -0.2053401 0.1213428 -1.69 0.091
23 NACE M -0.1935775 0.1138394 -1.70 0.089
24 NACE N 0.0136430 0.1080548 0.13 0.900
25 NACE O -0.1400971 0.0908069 -1.54 0.123
26 NACE P -0.1831886 0.1695926 -1.08 0.280
27 NACE Q -0.2493340 0.1019669 -2.45 0.014
28 NACE R 0.3352619 0.3751787 0.89 0.372
29 NACE S -0.7754510 0.1099819 -0.71 0.481
30 NACE T 0.2279633 0.1905147 1.20 0.231
31 NACE U (reference)
32 YEAR 2002 -0.9434001 0.0642762 -14.68 0.000
33 YEAR 2003 -0.8455410 0.0619457 -13.65 0.000
34 YEAR 2004 -1.3766180 0.0669895 -20.55 0.000
35 YEAR 2005 -1.1697870 0.0596589 -19.61 0.000
36 YEAR 2006 -0.9769148 0.0581422 -16.80 0.000
37 YEAR 2007 -0.9918780 0.0610470 -16.25 0.000
38 YEAR 2008 (reference)
39 YEAR 2009 (reference)
40 Constant -12.4494600 0.4899790 -25.41 0.000
Summary Statistics: number of observations 10403
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -3935.951
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.3048
Source: IREA, 2012
IHS — Hanappi, Hofer, Müllbacher, Winter-Ebmer / IREA — 97
Table C.5: Peak Value Specification with Linear Age (PV-LA-men)
coeff. std.
# MALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 social security wealth 1.77e-06 3.44e-07 5.16 0.000
2 peak value -0.0000586 2.22e-06 -26.36 0.000
3 age 0.1054297 0.0074990 14.06 0.000
4 migration 0.1256002 0.0375073 3.35 0.001
5 sick leave 0.0008910 0.0001542 5.78 0.000
6 regular employment -0.0000252 0.0000177 -1.42 0.155
7 self-employment -0.0000228 0.0000179 -1.27 0.203
8 fragmented employment -0.0000343 0.0000862 -0.40 0.691
9 unemployment -6.65e-06 0.0000246 -0.27 0.787
10 avg. monthly income -0.0004501 0.0000446 -10.10 0.000
11 NACE A 0.2000435 0.1862964 1.07 0.283
12 NACE B -0.2370126 0.2978230 -0.80 0.426
13 NACE C 0.1317716 0.1025074 1.29 0.199
14 NACE D -0.0096981 0.1524652 -0.06 0.949
15 NACE E 0.5472541 0.4523126 1.21 0.226
16 NACE F 0.2577029 0.1054238 2.44 0.015
17 NACE G 0.0717719 0.1026133 0.70 0.484
18 NACE H -0.0130358 0.1167715 -0.11 0.911
19 NACE I 0.3189145 0.1415793 2.25 0.024
20 NACE J -0.1345914 0.1664748 -0.81 0.419
21 NACE K -0.0604640 0.1244124 -0.49 0.627
22 NACE L 0.0179694 0.2125391 0.08 0.933
23 NACE M -0.0881733 0.1301149 -0.68 0.498
24 NACE N 0.2098642 0.1477652 1.42 0.156
25 NACE O 0.1394149 0.1144427 1.22 0.223
26 NACE P -0.3213199 0.3063927 -1.05 0.294
27 NACE Q -0.2162886 0.1801759 -1.20 0.230
28 NACE R -0.0552001 0.2285551 -0.24 0.809
29 NACE S -0.1550605 0.1793716 -0.86 0.387
30 NACE T -0.1755909 0.5236753 -0.34 0.737
31 NACE U (reference)
32 YEAR 2002 -1.1222970 0.0728842 -15.40 0.000
33 YEAR 2003 -1.0462550 0.0702838 -14.89 0.000
34 YEAR 2004 -1.4279840 0.0731941 -19.51 0.000
35 YEAR 2005 -1.1266400 0.0680990 -16.54 0.000
36 YEAR 2006 -0.8656873 0.0673878 -12.85 0.000
37 YEAR 2007 -0.9174968 0.0719555 -12.75 0.000
38 YEAR 2008 (reference)
39 YEAR 2009 (reference)
40 Constant -5.9149170 0.4984206 -11.87 0.000
Summary Statistics: number of observations 8867
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -3400.2443
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.3054
Source: IREA, 2012
98— Hanappi, Hofer, Müllbacher, Winter-Ebmer / IREA — IHS
Table C.6: Peak Value Specification with Linear Age (PV-LA-women)
coeff. std.
# FEMALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 social security wealth 9.37e-06 3.74e-07 25.10 0.000
2 peak value -7.78e-06 1.05e-06 -7.41 0.000
3 age 0.2193333 0.0079164 27.71 0.000
4 migration 0.1499353 0.0332625 4.51 0.000
5 sick leave 0.0007799 0.0001422 5.48 0.000
6 regular employment -0.0000221 0.0000112 -1.97 0.049
7 self-employment -0.0000279 0.0000124 -2.26 0.024
8 fragmented employment -0.0000737 0.0000389 -1.89 0.058
9 unemployment -0.0000419 0.0000241 -1.74 0.083
10 avg. monthly income -0.0015713 0.0000732 -21.45 0.000
11 NACE A -0.1108304 0.2154715 -0.51 0.607
12 NACE B (reference)
13 NACE C -0.0133708 0.0884514 -0.15 0.880
14 NACE D 0.3373536 0.3192495 1.06 0.291
15 NACE E -0.2561777 0.3585772 -0.71 0.475
16 NACE F -0.0914330 0.1236625 -0.74 0.460
17 NACE G -0.1495704 0.0834678 -1.79 0.073
18 NACE H -0.1371849 0.1244905 -1.10 0.270
19 NACE I -0.0739690 0.0969366 -0.76 0.445
20 NACE J -0.0809736 0.1830310 -0.44 0.658
21 NACE K -0.0712981 0.1202462 -0.59 0.553
22 NACE L -0.2258500 0.1210681 -1.87 0.062
23 NACE M -0.1936790 0.1138495 -1.70 0.089
24 NACE N -0.0043599 0.1075506 -0.04 0.968
25 NACE O -0.1525240 0.0906946 -1.68 0.093
26 NACE P -0.1835155 0.1698432 -1.08 0.280
27 NACE Q -0.2525846 0.1020178 -2.48 0.013
28 NACE R 0.3555232 0.3787934 0.94 0.348
29 NACE S -0.0761444 0.1099663 -0.69 0.489
30 NACE T 0.2114158 0.1899168 1.11 0.266
31 NACE U (reference)
32 YEAR 2002 -0.9234194 0.0644301 -14.33 0.000
33 YEAR 2003 -0.8258191 0.0620171 -13.32 0.000
34 YEAR 2004 -1.3740460 0.0671667 -20.46 0.000
35 YEAR 2005 -1.1499780 0.0598797 -19.20 0.000
36 YEAR 2006 -0.9506571 0.0584822 -16.26 0.000
37 YEAR 2007 -0.9741880 0.0613776 -15.87 0.000
38 YEAR 2008 (reference)
39 YEAR 2009 (reference)
40 Constant -12.2781100 0.486061 -25.26 0.000
Summary Statistics: number of observations 10405
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -3908.6886
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.3097
Source: IREA, 2012
IHS — Hanappi, Hofer, Müllbacher, Winter-Ebmer / IREA — 99
Table C.7: Option Value Specification with Linear Age (OV-LA-men)
coeff. std.
# MALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 social security wealth 3.10e-06 3.42e-07 9.06 0.000
2 option value -0.000788 0.0000441 -17.86 0.000
3 age 0.0490289 0.0088135 5.56 0.000
4 migration 0.1464948 0.0365513 4.01 0.000
5 sick leave 0.0006478 0.0001536 4.22 0.000
6 regular employment 0.0000237 0.0000173 1.37 0.171
7 self-employment 0.0000273 0.0000174 1.57 0.117
8 fragmented employment -9.50e-06 0.0000850 -0.11 0.911
9 unemployment -0.0000712 0.0000245 -2.91 0.004
10 avg. monthly income -0.0004606 0.0000466 -9.89 0.000
11 NACE A 0.2309181 0.1848995 1.25 0.212
12 NACE B -0.3338738 0.2823768 -1.18 0.237
13 NACE C 0.0820796 0.1001994 0.82 0.413
14 NACE D -0.0739154 0.1474779 -0.50 0.616
15 NACE E 0.6126561 0.4596404 1.33 0.183
16 NACE F 0.3319055 0.1034424 3.21 0.001
17 NACE G 0.0238435 0.1001503 0.24 0.812
18 NACE H -0.0386803 0.1137415 -0.34 0.734
19 NACE I 0.2267986 0.1405453 1.61 0.107
20 NACE J -0.1725319 0.1603280 -1.08 0.282
21 NACE K -0.1830038 0.1206741 -1.52 0.129
22 NACE L -0.0016103 0.2115430 -0.01 0.994
23 NACE M -0.0918498 0.1271987 -0.72 0.470
24 NACE N 0.1998773 0.1451288 1.38 0.168
25 NACE O 0.0751489 0.1120666 0.67 0..502
26 NACE P -0.2915570 0.2974188 -0.98 0.327
27 NACE Q -0.1512520 0.1752370 -0.86 0.388
28 NACE R -0.1189379 0.2224540 -0.53 0.593
29 NACE S -0.0695682 0.1760470 -0.40 0.693
30 NACE T -0.2590911 0.5140223 -0.50 0.614
31 NACE U (reference)
32 YEAR 2002 -1.0713500 0.0701397 -15.27 0.000
33 YEAR 2003 -1.0352270 0.0681197 -15.20 0.000
34 YEAR 2004 -1.3838770 0.0703666 -19.67 0.000
35 YEAR 2005 -1.0934620 0.0653927 -16.72 0.000
36 YEAR 2006 -0.8323986 0.0641612 -12.97 0.000
37 YEAR 2007 -0.9224212 0.0680696 -13.55 0.000
38 YEAR 2008 (reference)
39 YEAR 2009 (reference)
40 Constant -2.5604260 0.5772210 -4.44 0.000
Summary Statistics: number of observations 8867
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -3632.4976
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.2580
Source: IREA, 2012
100— Hanappi, Hofer, Müllbacher, Winter-Ebmer / IREA — IHS
Table C.8: Option Value Specification with Linear Age (OV-LA-women)
coeff. std.
# FEMALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 social security wealth 8.47e-06 3.92e-07 21.63 0.000
2 option value -0.0003609 0.0000332 -10.86 0.000
3 age 0.1999934 0.0081175 24.64 0.000
4 migration 0.1543268 0.0333787 4.62 0.000
5 sick leave 0.0006876 0.0001425 4.83 0.000
6 regular employment -2.86e-06 0.0000113 -0.25 0.801
7 self-employment -1.46e-06 0.0000124 -0.12 0.906
8 fragmented employment -0.0000848 0.0000390 -2.17 0.030
9 unemployment -0.0000622 0.0000243 -2.56 0.010
10 avg. monthly income -0.0014097 0.0000765 -18.44 0.000
11 NACE A -0.071935 0.2168824 -0.33 0.740
12 NACE B (reference)
13 NACE C -0.0721004 0.8871410 -0.81 0.416
14 NACE D 0.2461368 0.3155584 0.78 0.435
15 NACE E -0.2019777 0.3638039 -0.56 0.579
16 NACE F -0.1577642 0.1237474 -1.27 0.202
17 NACE G -0.1950140 0.0836146 -2.33 0.020
18 NACE H -0.1883729 0.1248225 -1.51 0.131
19 NACE I -0.1010081 0.0969629 -1.04 0.298
20 NACE J -0.0737845 0.1826955 -0.40 0.686
21 NACE K -0.1327506 0.1203130 -1.10 0.270
22 NACE L -0.2696328 0.1213721 -2.22 0.026
23 NACE M -0.2294154 0.1140781 -2.01 0.044
24 NACE N -0.0138500 0.1079309 -0.13 0.898
25 NACE O -0.1510573 0.0907597 -1.66 0.096
26 NACE P -0.1903601 0.1707463 -1.11 0.265
27 NACE Q -0.2639135 0.1022324 -2.58 0.010
28 NACE R 0.3685364 0.3759394 0.98 0.327
29 NACE S -0.0843404 0.1102427 -0.77 0.444
30 NACE T 0.1979234 0.1910086 1.04 0.300
31 NACE U (reference)
32 YEAR 2002 -0.8845741 0.0648686 -13.64 0.000
33 YEAR 2003 -0.7891009 0.0624716 -12.63 0.000
34 YEAR 2004 -1.3395620 0.0674459 -19.86 0.000
35 YEAR 2005 -1.1091810 0.0601959 -18.43 0.000
36 YEAR 2006 -0.9180255 0.0586510 -15.65 0.000
37 YEAR 2007 -0.9559141 0.0613606 -15.58 0.000
38 YEAR 2008 (reference)
39 YEAR 2009 (reference)
40 Constant -11.1362100 0.4995615 -22.29 0.000
Summary Statistics: number of observations 10405
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -3877.4475
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.3152
Source: IREA, 2012
IHS — Hanappi, Hofer, Müllbacher, Winter-Ebmer / IREA — 101
Table C.9: Accrual Rate Specification with Age Dummies (AR-AD-men)
coeff. std.
# MALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 social security wealth 3.20e-06 3.57e-07 8.97 0.000
2 accrual rate -19.4543 0.9301995 -20.91 0.000
3 age 47 (reference)
4 age 48 0.4610335 1.0281950 0.45 0.654
5 age 49 -0.0319285 0.9756989 -0.03 0.974
6 age 50 0.7822930 0.8702564 0.90 0.369
7 age 51 -0.2182889 0.8824695 -0.25 0.805
8 age 52 0.1695939 0.8292300 0.20 0.838
9 age 53 -0.2474626 0.8282776 -0.30 0.765
10 age 54 0.1406295 0.8210449 0.17 0.864
11 age 55 -0.2540174 0.8197537 -0.31 0.757
12 age 56 -0.2311523 0.8183140 -0.28 0.778
13 age 57 0.2831200 0.8167729 0.35 0.729
14 age 58 -0.1600856 0.8173046 -0.20 0.845
15 age 59 -0.1728679 0.8182753 -0.21 0.833
16 age 60 0.7315296 0.8165068 0.90 0.370
17 age 61 0.4928659 0.8173351 0.60 0.546
18 age 62 0.8707856 0.8184144 1.06 0.287
19 age 63 -0.1630871 0.8238920 -0.20 0.843
20 age 64 -0.4130914 0.8299043 -0.50 0.619
21 age 65 3.7684410 0.8631891 4.37 0.000
22 age 66 1.3603720 1.0824120 1.26 0.209
23 age 67 1.2198110 1.0776440 1.13 0.258
24 age 68 (reference)
25 age 69 (reference)
26 migration 0.1109934 0.0391102 2.84 0.005
27 sick leave 0.0008607 0.0001591 5.41 0.000
28 regular employment 3.25e-06 0.0000205 0.16 0.874
29 self-employment 5.86e-06 0.0000212 0.28 0.782
30 fragmented employment 9.58e-06 0.0000931 0.10 0.918
31 unemployment 0.0000251 0.0000276 0.91 0.362
32 avg. monthly income -0.0005342 0.0000471 -11.33 0.000
33 NACE A 0.1320498 0.1965780 0.67 0.502
34 NACE B -0.3095726 0.3171468 -0.98 0.329
35 NACE C 0.1355733 0.1099794 1.23 0.218
36 NACE D 0.0162395 0.1627099 0.10 0.920
37 NACE E 0.6775572 0.4565290 1.48 0.138
38 NACE F 0.2906430 0.1129202 2.57 0.010
39 NACE G 0.0492296 0.1097345 0.45 0.654
40 NACE H -0.0074192 0.1244330 -0.06 0.952
41 NACE I 0.3608424 0.1507769 2.39 0.017
42 NACE J -0.1900320 0.1757196 -1.08 0.279
43 NACE K -0.0802152 0.1316942 -0.61 0.542
44 NACE L -0.0540982 0.2291155 -0.24 0.813
45 NACE M -0.0663440 0.1396375 -0.48 0.635
46 NACE N 0.1553118 0.1560815 1.00 0.320
47 NACE O 0.1031696 0.1228009 0.84 0.401
48 NACE P -0.4203668 0.3230669 -1.30 0.193
49 NACE Q -0.2386400 0.1979304 -1.21 0.228
50 NACE R -0.2300381 0.2736025 -0.84 0.400
51 NACE S -0.0715699 0.1861861 -0.38 0.701
52 NACE T -0.3063634 0.6730280 -0.46 0.649
53 NACE U (reference)
54 YEAR 2002 -1.1726590 0.0785054 -14.94 0.000
55 YEAR 2003 -1.1182870 0.0756777 -14.78 0.000
56 YEAR 2004 -1.5015990 0.0784182 -19.15 0.000
57 YEAR 2005 -1.1386410 0.0732615 -15.54 0.000
58 YEAR 2006 -0.9283772 0.0723969 -12.82 0.000
59 YEAR 2007 -0.9483637 0.0771407 -12.29 0.000
60 YEAR 2008 (reference)
61 YEAR 2009 (reference)
62 Constant -0.5064851 0.8298923 -0.61 0.542
Summary Statistics: number of observations 8866
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -3102.0239
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.3662
Source: IREA, 2012
102— Hanappi, Hofer, Müllbacher, Winter-Ebmer / IREA — IHS
Table C.10: Accrual Rate Specification with Age Dummies (AR-AD-women)
coeff. std.
# FEMALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 social security wealth 0.0000115 4.19e-07 27.40 0.000
2 accrual rate -1.196973 0.4732189 -2.53 0.011
3 age 47 (reference)
4 age 48 -0.6226681 0.5743543 -1.08 0.278
5 age 49 -0.1756338 0.5198530 -0.34 0.735
6 age 50 -0.7129236 0.5105878 -1.40 0.163
7 age 51 -0.8252187 0.4973576 -1.66 0.097
8 age 52 -1.2081990 0.4942277 -2.44 0.015
9 age 53 -1.2492640 0.4907634 -2.55 0.011
10 age 54 -1.5453120 0.4905498 -3.15 0.002
11 age 55 -0.7196141 0.4860213 -1.48 0.139
12 age 56 -0.5355116 0.4857381 -1.10 0.270
13 age 57 -0.0441126 0.4855711 -0.09 0.928
14 age 58 -0.6759305 0.4874850 -1.39 0.166
15 age 59 -1.1909750 0.4891365 -2.43 0.015
16 age 60 2.3340650 0.4913506 4.75 0.000
17 age 61 0.6599950 0.5244800 1.26 0.208
18 age 62 0.5699490 0.5377772 1.06 0.289
19 age 63 0.5484695 0.5656410 0.97 0.332
20 age 64 (reference)
21 age 65 (reference)
22 age 66 (reference)
23 age 67 (reference)
24 age 68 (reference)
25 age 69 (reference)
26 migration 0.1915289 0.0371573 5.15 0.000
27 sick leave 0.0007738 0.0001449 5.34 0.000
28 regular employment 0.0000343 0.0000138 2.48 0.013
29 self-employment 0.0000244 0.0000151 1.62 0.106
30 fragmented employment -0.0000623 0.0000513 -1.21 0.224
31 unemployment 0.0000159 0.0000273 0.58 0.559
32 avg. monthly income -0.0020345 0.0000832 -24.45 0.000
33 NACE A -0.0976894 0.2419147 -0.40 0.686
34 NACE B (reference)
35 NACE C -0.0309622 0.1050522 -0.29 0.768
36 NACE D 0.4767988 0.3117359 1.53 0.126
37 NACE E -0.3171485 0.4059124 -0.78 0.435
38 NACE F -0.1283288 0.1380344 -0.93 0.353
39 NACE G -0.1428865 0.0999278 -1.43 0.153
40 NACE H -0.1884233 0.1461304 -1.29 0.197
41 NACE I -0.0704217 0.1132365 -0.62 0.534
42 NACE J -0.1762835 0.2036373 -0.87 0.387
43 NACE K -0.0974823 0.1350389 -0.72 0.470
44 NACE L -0.2495986 0.1421590 -1.76 0.079
45 NACE M -0.2584718 0.1346499 -1.92 0.055
46 NACE N -0.0421547 0.1265248 -0.33 0.739
47 NACE O -0.1728954 0.1071412 -1.61 0.107
48 NACE P -0.2237468 0.1904617 -1.17 0.240
49 NACE Q -0.2956885 0.1194684 -2.48 0.013
50 NACE R 0.2971463 0.4198947 0.71 0.479
51 NACE S -0.1508765 0.1278739 -1.18 0.238
52 NACE T 0.1202312 0.2316714 0.52 0.604
53 NACE U (reference)
54 YEAR 2002 -1.0259670 0.0737886 -13.90 0.000
55 YEAR 2003 -0.9439487 0.0705044 -13.39 0.000
56 YEAR 2004 -1.440515 0.0757347 -19.02 0.000
57 YEAR 2005 -1.2243960 0.0678663 -18.04 0.000
58 YEAR 2006 -1.0275260 0.0670552 -15.32 0.000
59 YEAR 2007 -0.9679794 0.0709364 -13.65 0.000
60 YEAR 2008 (reference)
61 YEAR 2009 (reference)
62 Constant 0.1540329 0.4915417 0.31 0.754
Summary Statistics: number of observations 10393
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -3096.3644
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.4524
Source: IREA, 2012
IHS — Hanappi, Hofer, Müllbacher, Winter-Ebmer / IREA — 103
Table C.11: Peak Value Specification with Age Dummies (PV-AD-men)
coeff. std.
# MALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 social security wealth 1.85e-06 3.74e-07 4.95 0.000
2 peak value -0.0000526 2.53e-06 -20.76 0.000
3 age 47 (reference)
4 age 48 -0.0947451 1.0433700 -0.09 0.928
5 age 49 -0.5772154 0.9938722 -0.58 0.561
6 age 50 0.2288573 0.8893338 0.26 0.797
7 age 51 -0.7801184 0.9027698 -0.86 0.388
8 age 52 -0.3975827 0.8500295 -0.47 0.640
9 age 53 -0.8032418 0.8491593 -0.95 0.344
10 age 54 -0.3744482 0.8423181 -0.44 0.657
11 age 55 -0.7516418 0.8411564 -0.89 0.372
12 age 56 -0.6953793 0.8398971 -0.83 0.408
13 age 57 -0.1185759 0.8384852 -0.14 0.888
14 age 58 -0.4370513 0.8392093 -0.52 0.603
15 age 59 -0.5845869 0.8397218 -0.70 0.486
16 age 60 0.3206460 0.8384959 0.38 0.702
17 age 61 0.1153944 0.8393861 0.14 0.891
18 age 62 0.4730476 0.8403306 0.56 0.573
19 age 63 -0.5036726 0.8462528 -0.60 0.552
20 age 64 -0.9087684 0.8509780 -1.07 0.286
21 age 65 2.8341530 0.8779177 3.23 0.001
22 age 66 0.8005134 1.0932800 0.73 0.464
23 age 67 0.8519922 1.1082280 0.77 0.442
24 age 68 (reference)
25 age 69 (reference)
26 migration 0.1185175 0.0390941 3.03 0.002
27 sick leave 0.0009260 0.0001567 5.91 0.000
28 regular employment 5.73e-06 0.0000204 0.28 0.779
29 self-employment 0.0000122 0.0000211 0.58 0.563
30 fragmented employment 7.28e-06 0.0000924 0.08 0.937
31 unemployment 0.0000261 0.0000273 0.95 0.340
32 avg. monthly income -0.0004462 0.0000476 -9.37 0.000
33 NACE A 0.1695549 0.1934404 0.88 0.381
34 NACE B -0.3009627 0.3133562 -0.96 0.337
35 NACE C 0.1365589 0.1090821 1.25 0.211
36 NACE D -0.0101891 0.1628646 -0.06 0.950
37 NACE E 0.6784872 0.4511671 1.50 0.133
38 NACE F 0.2869315 0.1119614 2.56 0.010
39 NACE G 0.0626395 0.1088039 0.58 0.565
40 NACE H 0.0044283 0.1233720 0.04 0.971
41 NACE I 0.3544155 0.1496951 2.37 0.018
42 NACE J -0.1804177 0.1758559 -1.03 0.305
43 NACE K -0.0955230 0.1313313 -0.73 0.467
44 NACE L -0.0454490 0.2284844 -0.20 0.842
45 NACE M -0.0951464 0.1388350 -0.69 0.493
46 NACE N 0.1752971 0.1543571 1.14 0.256
47 NACE O 0.1136129 0.1220871 0.93 0.352
48 NACE P -0.4263840 0.3261959 -1.31 0.191
49 NACE Q -0.2324073 0.1956076 -1.19 0.235
50 NACE R -0.2226518 0.2716757 -0.82 0.412
51 NACE S -0.1031157 0.1860548 -0.55 0.579
52 NACE T -0.3103727 0.6460805 -0.48 0.631
53 NACE U (reference)
54 YEAR 2002 -1.1123080 0.0780100 -14.26 0.000
55 YEAR 2003 -1.0283960 0.0751819 -13.68 0.000
56 YEAR 2004 -1.4328340 0.0779311 -18.39 0.000
57 YEAR 2005 -1.1005570 0.0729548 -15.09 0.000
58 YEAR 2006 -0.8943319 0.0722231 -12.38 0.000
59 YEAR 2007 -0.9277640 0.0769893 -12.05 0.000
60 YEAR 2008 (reference)
61 YEAR 2009 (reference)
62 Constant 0.1890547 0.8509386 0.22 0.824
Summary Statistics: number of observations 8866
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -3117.4187
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.3630
Source: IREA, 2012
104— Hanappi, Hofer, Müllbacher, Winter-Ebmer / IREA — IHS
Table C.12: Peak Value Specification with Age Dummies (PV-AD-women)
coeff. std.
# FEMALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 social security wealth 0.0000109 4.29e-07 25.38 0.000
2 peak value -7.71e-06 1.19e-06 -6.47 0.000
3 age 47 (reference)
4 age 48 -0.6227960 0.5727614 -1.09 0.277
5 age 49 -0.1839160 0.5187594 -0.35 0.723
6 age 50 -0.6560766 0.5100205 -1.29 0.198
7 age 51 -0.7160459 0.4969180 -1.44 0.150
8 age 52 -1.1000280 0.4937079 -2.23 0.026
9 age 53 -1.1193500 0.4903025 -2.28 0.022
10 age 54 -1.4255660 0.4898483 -2.91 0.004
11 age 55 -0.6563252 0.4851110 -1.35 0.176
12 age 56 -0.4782780 0.4848194 -0.99 0.324
13 age 57 0.0188245 0.4846826 0.04 0.969
14 age 58 -0.5998214 0.4866920 -1.23 0.218
15 age 59 -1.1242350 0.4881503 -2.30 0.021
16 age 60 2.4064290 0.4900222 4.91 0.000
17 age 61 0.7242980 0.5232523 1.38 0.166
18 age 62 0.5767714 0.5368037 1.07 0.283
19 age 63 0.5535455 0.5643843 0.98 0.327
20 age 64 (reference)
21 age 65 (reference)
22 age 66 (reference)
23 age 67 (reference)
24 age 68 (reference)
25 age 69 (reference)
26 migration 0.1903671 0.0372624 5.11 0.000
27 sick leave 0.0007509 0.0001445 5.20 0.000
28 regular employment 0.0000339 0.0000138 2.46 0.014
29 self-employment 0.0000223 0.0000151 1.48 0.139
30 fragmented employment -0.0000598 0.0000512 -1.17 0.244
31 unemployment 0.0000148 0.0000272 0.55 0.585
32 avg. monthly income -0.0019209 0.0000850 -22.60 0.000
33 NACE A -0.0949878 0.2402827 -0.40 0.693
34 NACE B (reference)
35 NACE C -0.0410994 0.1047717 -0.39 0.695
36 NACE D 0.4723271 0.3165860 1.49 0.136
37 NACE E -0.3334775 0.4021136 -0.83 0.407
38 NACE F -0.1229898 0.1385596 -0.89 0.375
39 NACE G -0.1546841 0.0996414 -1.55 0.121
40 NACE H -0.2014687 0.1463807 -1.38 0.169
41 NACE I -0.0829684 0.1128684 -0.74 0.462
42 NACE J -0.2054944 0.2045451 -1.00 0.315
43 NACE K -0.0923278 0.1359093 -0.68 0.497
44 NACE L -0.2734692 0.1420211 -1.93 0.054
45 NACE M -0.2709758 0.1347375 -2.01 0.044
46 NACE N -0.0625412 0.1260202 -0.50 0.620
47 NACE O -0.1899326 0.1070142 -1.77 0.076
48 NACE P -0.2204208 0.1909186 -1.15 0.248
49 NACE Q -0.3037608 0.1194577 -2.54 0.011
50 NACE R 0.3013068 0.4239375 0.71 0.477
51 NACE S -0.1556579 0.1278161 -1.22 0.223
52 NACE T 0.0916485 0.2313449 0.40 0.692
53 NACE U (reference)
54 YEAR 2002 -0.9992719 0.0739184 -13.52 0.000
55 YEAR 2003 -0.9178607 0.0706280 -13.00 0.000
56 YEAR 2004 -1.4279200 0.0759434 -18.80 0.000
57 YEAR 2005 -1.1971000 0.0681102 -17.58 0.000
58 YEAR 2006 -0.9973045 0.0674526 -14.79 0.000
59 YEAR 2007 -0.9484017 0.0712696 -13.31 0.000
60 YEAR 2008 (reference)
61 YEAR 2009 (reference)
62 Constant 0.1466698 0.4904259 0.30 0.765
Summary Statistics: number of observations 10395
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -3078.2135
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.4557
Source: IREA, 2012
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Table C.13: Option Value Specification with Age Dummies (OV-AD-men)
coeff. std.
# MALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 social security wealth 3.40e-06 3.66e-07 9.27 0.000
2 option value -0.0006797 0.0000477 -14.24 0.000
3 age 47 (reference)
4 age 48 0.3493745 1.0699050 0.33 0.744
5 age 49 -0.1634392 1.0244270 -0.16 0.873
6 age 50 0.6354458 0.9216824 0.69 0.491
7 age 51 -0.5200380 0.9429322 -0.55 0.581
8 age 52 -0.1689937 0.8830532 -0.19 0.848
9 age 53 -0.5811168 0.8816188 -0.66 0.510
10 age 54 -0.2020537 0.8748502 -0.23 0.817
11 age 55 -0.4907403 0.8739535 -0.56 0.574
12 age 56 -0.5100510 0.8723646 -0.58 0.559
13 age 57 -0.0683418 0.8706990 -0.08 0.937
14 age 58 -0.6125232 0.8707720 -0.70 0.482
15 age 59 -1.0417410 0.8706008 -1.20 0.231
16 age 60 0.1709683 0.8698009 0.20 0.844
17 age 61 -0.0456789 0.8705845 -0.05 0.958
18 age 62 0.2721984 0.8715526 0.31 0.755
19 age 63 -0.5604065 0.8767954 -0.64 0.523
20 age 64 -1.0565770 0.8807264 -1.20 0.230
21 age 65 2.3731420 0.9066768 2.62 0.009
22 age 66 0.6408800 1.0987780 0.58 0.560
23 age 67 0.7514354 1.1410690 0.66 0.510
24 age 68 (reference)
25 age 69 (reference)
26 migration 0.1486828 0.0383607 3.88 0.000
27 sick leave 0.0006961 0.0001569 4.44 0.000
28 regular employment 0.0000506 0.0000197 2.56 0.010
29 self-employment 0.0000509 0.0000203 2.51 0.012
30 fragmented employment 0.0000387 0.0000921 0.42 0.675
31 unemployment -0.0000350 0.0000271 -1.29 0.196
32 avg. monthly income -0.0005004 0.0000490 -10.22 0.000
33 NACE A 0.1982962 0.1923177 1.03 0.303
34 NACE B -0.3716127 0.3041229 -1.22 0.222
35 NACE C 0.0849084 0.1070929 0.79 0.428
36 NACE D -0.1043618 0.1589706 -0.66 0.512
37 NACE E 0.8048549 0.4503234 1.79 0.074
38 NACE F 0.3404505 0.1101851 3.09 0.002
39 NACE G 0.0072348 0.1068358 0.07 0.946
40 NACE H -0.0268777 0.1209082 -0.22 0.824
41 NACE I 0.2660644 0.1490570 1.78 0.074
42 NACE J -0.2422998 0.1725637 -1.40 0.160
43 NACE K -0.2229041 0.1287746 -1.73 0.083
44 NACE L -0.1085948 0.2281506 -0.48 0.634
45 NACE M -0.1410540 0.1371220 -1.03 0.304
46 NACE N 0.1446860 0.1524454 0.95 0.343
47 NACE O 0.0521578 0.1201430 0.43 0.664
48 NACE P -0.5234005 0.3263457 -1.60 0.109
49 NACE Q -0.2101477 0.1917160 -1.10 0.273
50 NACE R -0.2889043 0.2620510 -1.10 0.270
51 NACE S -0.0675382 0.1849632 -0.37 0.715
52 NACE T -0.4170782 0.6321464 -0.66 0.509
53 NACE U (reference)
54 YEAR 2002 -1.1324950 0.0761338 -14.88 0.000
55 YEAR 2003 -1.0647400 0.0736369 -14.46 0.000
56 YEAR 2004 -1.4604740 0.0759893 -19.22 0.000
57 YEAR 2005 -1.1218660 0.0709615 -15.81 0.000
58 YEAR 2006 -0.8816342 0.0699324 -12.61 0.000
59 YEAR 2007 -0.9378585 0.0743050 -12.62 0.000
60 YEAR 2008 (reference)
61 YEAR 2009 (reference)
62 Constant 0.3572207 0.8808609 0.41 0.685
Summary Statistics: number of observations 8866
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -3247.0959
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.3365
Source: IREA, 2012
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Table C.14: Option Value Specification with Age Dummies (OV-AD-women)
coeff. std.
# FEMALE ESTIMATES estimate error t-stat p-value
1 social security wealth 0.0000102 4.45e-07 22.88 0.000
2 option value -0.0003289 0.000037 -8.89 0.000
3 age 47 (reference)
4 age 48 -0.4171772 0.5784596 -0.72 0.471
5 age 49 0.0470165 0.5205453 0.09 0.928
6 age 50 -0.4296968 0.5123806 -0.84 0.402
7 age 51 -0.5001995 0.4994071 -1.00 0.317
8 age 52 -0.9280039 0.4958848 -1.87 0.061
9 age 53 -0.9911418 0.4922012 -2.01 0.044
10 age 54 -1.3662590 0.4913208 -2.78 0.005
11 age 55 -0.5957094 0.4867238 -1.22 0.221
12 age 56 -0.4207979 0.4864178 -0.87 0.387
13 age 57 0.0853045 0.4863310 0.18 0.861
14 age 58 -0.5462422 0.4882281 -1.12 0.263
15 age 59 -1.0985700 0.4895143 -2.24 0.025
16 age 60 2.3439410 0.4911527 4.77 0.000
17 age 61 0.6935248 0.5247212 1.32 0.186
18 age 62 0.5838658 0.5378552 1.09 0.278
19 age 63 0.5433209 0.5657915 0.96 0.337
20 age 64 (reference)
21 age 65 (reference)
22 age 66 (reference)
23 age 67 (reference)
24 age 68 (reference)
25 age 69 (reference)
26 migration 0.1942240 0.0373296 5.20 0.000
27 sick leave 0.0006541 0.0001447 4.52 0.000
28 regular employment 0.0000434 0.0000138 3.15 0.002
29 self-employment 0.0000358 0.0000149 2.40 0.016
30 fragmented employment -0.0000814 0.0000512 -1.59 0.112
31 unemployment -9.05e-06 0.0000274 -0.33 0.741
32 avg. monthly income -0.0017830 0.0000883 -20.19 0.000
33 NACE A -0.0690803 0.2412054 -0.29 0.775
34 NACE B (reference)
35 NACE C -0.1103169 0.1050542 -1.05 0.294
36 NACE D 0.3869225 0.3137560 1.23 0.218
37 NACE E -0.3665158 0.4065475 -0.90 0.367
38 NACE F -0.1972951 0.1385738 -1.42 0.155
39 NACE G -0.2162901 0.0998111 -2.17 0.030
40 NACE H -0.2643943 0.1462921 -1.81 0.071
41 NACE I -0.1280479 0.1129401 -1.13 0.257
42 NACE J -0.2145885 0.2040033 -1.05 0.293
43 NACE K -0.1618925 0.1359528 -1.19 0.234
44 NACE L -0.3370820 0.1422832 -2.37 0.018
45 NACE M -0.3219330 0.1347547 -2.39 0.017
46 NACE N -0.0956354 0.1263734 -0.76 0.449
47 NACE O -0.2124708 0.1070363 -1.99 0.047
48 NACE P -0.2641558 0.1916239 -1.38 0.168
49 NACE Q -0.3297094 0.1195102 -2.76 0.006
50 NACE R 0.2892472 0.4208550 0.69 0.492
51 NACE S -0.1871383 0.1280671 -1.46 0.144
52 NACE T 0.0709803 0.2306211 0.31 0.758
53 NACE U (reference)
54 YEAR 2002 -0.9716169 0.0743029 -13.08 0.000
55 YEAR 2003 -0.8931463 0.0710609 -12.57 0.000
56 YEAR 2004 -1.4001520 0.0762411 -18.36 0.000
57 YEAR 2005 -1.1627520 0.0684233 -16.99 0.000
58 YEAR 2006 -0.9686167 0.0675948 -14.33 0.000
59 YEAR 2007 -0.9326999 0.0712018 -13.10 0.000
60 YEAR 2008 (reference)
61 YEAR 2009 (reference)
62 Constant 0.1916812 0.4919604 0.39 0.697
Summary Statistics: number of observations 10395
log-likelihoodL (β̂ ) -3060.0365
likelihood ratio index ρ2 0.4589
Source: IREA, 2012
Appendix D
Grid Search
108— Hanappi, Hofer, Müllbacher, Winter-Ebmer / IREA — IHS
Table D.1: Grid Search: OV-LA-WOMEN
regular self- fragmented un- avg. monthly
α γ LL SSW OV age migration sick days employm. employm. employm. employm. income
1.89 0.55 -3877.47 0.00000850 -0.0003994 0.2005424 0.151024 0.000679 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000059 -0.001413
1.96 0.56 -3877.44 0.00000851 -0.0003531 0.2008262 0.150920 0.000681 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000059 -0.001413
2.04 0.57 -3877.32 0.00000851 -0.0003118 0.2010698 0.150812 0.000683 -0.000003 -0.000005 -0.000081 -0.000059 -0.001413
1.90 0.55 -3877.20 0.00000850 -0.0003998 0.2004110 0.151025 0.000679 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000059 -0.001413
1.97 0.56 -3877.19 0.00000850 -0.0003534 0.2007061 0.150922 0.000681 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000059 -0.001412
2.05 0.57 -3877.10 0.00000851 -0.0003119 0.2009627 0.150811 0.000683 -0.000003 -0.000005 -0.000081 -0.000059 -0.001412
1.98 0.56 -3876.94 0.00000850 -0.0003536 0.2005867 0.150923 0.000680 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000059 -0.001412
1.91 0.55 -3876.94 0.00000849 -0.0004002 0.2002801 0.151026 0.000678 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000059 -0.001412
2.06 0.57 -3876.87 0.00000850 -0.0003120 0.2008562 0.150812 0.000682 -0.000003 -0.000005 -0.000081 -0.000059 -0.001411
1.99 0.56 -3876.70 0.00000849 -0.0003538 0.2004683 0.150925 0.000680 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000059 -0.001411
1.92 0.55 -3876.67 0.00000848 -0.0004005 0.2001500 0.151027 0.000678 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000059 -0.001411
2.07 0.57 -3876.65 0.00000850 -0.0003122 0.2007508 0.150815 0.000682 -0.000003 -0.000005 -0.000081 -0.000059 -0.001411
2.00 0.56 -3876.46 0.00000849 -0.0003540 0.2003514 0.150928 0.000680 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000059 -0.001410
1.93 0.55 -3876.41 0.00000848 -0.0004008 0.2000207 0.151030 0.000678 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000059 -0.001410
2.01 0.56 -3876.22 0.00000848 -0.0003542 0.2002360 0.150930 0.000680 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000059 -0.001409
1.94 0.55 -3876.14 0.00000847 -0.0004012 0.1998916 0.151033 0.000678 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001409
2.02 0.56 -3875.99 0.00000848 -0.0003544 0.2001210 0.150929 0.000680 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000059 -0.001408
1.88 0.54 -3875.93 0.00000846 -0.0004540 0.1994831 0.151139 0.000675 -0.000001 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001408
1.95 0.55 -3875.88 0.00000847 -0.0004015 0.1997632 0.151034 0.000677 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001408
2.03 0.56 -3875.75 0.00000847 -0.0003546 0.2000066 0.150931 0.000679 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000059 -0.001408
1.89 0.54 -3875.65 0.00000846 -0.0004544 0.1993432 0.151141 0.000675 -0.000001 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001407
1.96 0.55 -3875.62 0.00000846 -0.0004018 0.1996358 0.151037 0.000677 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001407
2.04 0.56 -3875.51 0.00000847 -0.0003547 0.1998932 0.150935 0.000679 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000059 -0.001407
1.90 0.54 -3875.37 0.00000845 -0.0004549 0.1992045 0.151144 0.000675 -0.000001 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001406
1.97 0.55 -3875.36 0.00000846 -0.0004021 0.1995100 0.151040 0.000677 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001406
2.05 0.56 -3875.28 0.00000846 -0.0003549 0.1997809 0.150940 0.000679 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000081 -0.000059 -0.001406
1.98 0.55 -3875.11 0.00000845 -0.0004023 0.1993861 0.151042 0.000677 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001405
1.91 0.54 -3875.09 0.00000844 -0.0004553 0.1990660 0.151147 0.000675 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001405
2.06 0.56 -3875.04 0.00000846 -0.0003551 0.1996690 0.150943 0.000679 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000081 -0.000059 -0.001405
1.99 0.55 -3874.86 0.00000845 -0.0004026 0.1992625 0.151042 0.000677 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001405
1.92 0.54 -3874.81 0.00000844 -0.0004558 0.1989280 0.151149 0.000674 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001405
2.07 0.56 -3874.79 0.00000845 -0.0003552 0.1995571 0.150947 0.000679 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000081 -0.000059 -0.001404
2.00 0.55 -3874.61 0.00000844 -0.0004028 0.1991396 0.151045 0.000676 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001404
1.93 0.54 -3874.53 0.00000843 -0.0004562 0.1987908 0.151152 0.000674 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001404
2.01 0.55 -3874.36 0.00000844 -0.0004031 0.1990179 0.151049 0.000676 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001403
1.94 0.54 -3874.26 0.00000843 -0.0004565 0.1986556 0.151156 0.000674 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001403
2.02 0.55 -3874.11 0.00000843 -0.0004033 0.1988973 0.151054 0.000676 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001402
1.88 0.53 -3874.05 0.00000842 -0.0005166 0.1982301 0.151271 0.000672 -0.000001 -0.000003 -0.000083 -0.000060 -0.001402
1.95 0.54 -3874.00 0.00000842 -0.0004569 0.1985224 0.151158 0.000674 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001402
2.03 0.55 -3873.86 0.00000843 -0.0004035 0.1987769 0.151059 0.000676 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001401
1.89 0.53 -3873.75 0.00000841 -0.0005172 0.1980818 0.151274 0.000671 -0.000001 -0.000004 -0.000083 -0.000060 -0.001401
1.96 0.54 -3873.74 0.00000842 -0.0004572 0.1983897 0.151159 0.000673 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001401
2.04 0.55 -3873.60 0.00000842 -0.0004038 0.1986563 0.151063 0.000675 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001401
1.97 0.54 -3873.47 0.00000841 -0.0004576 0.1982576 0.151162 0.000673 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001400
1.90 0.53 -3873.46 0.00000840 -0.0005177 0.1979345 0.151276 0.000671 -0.000001 -0.000004 -0.000083 -0.000060 -0.001400
2.05 0.55 -3873.33 0.00000842 -0.0004041 0.1985359 0.151067 0.000675 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001400
1.98 0.54 -3873.20 0.00000841 -0.0004579 0.1981269 0.151167 0.000673 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001399
1.91 0.53 -3873.17 0.00000840 -0.0005182 0.1977890 0.151281 0.000671 -0.000001 -0.000004 -0.000083 -0.000060 -0.001399
2.06 0.55 -3873.07 0.00000841 -0.0004043 0.1984160 0.151070 0.000675 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001399
1.99 0.54 -3872.94 0.00000840 -0.0004582 0.1979975 0.151172 0.000673 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001398
1.92 0.53 -3872.89 0.00000839 -0.0005187 0.1976457 0.151284 0.000670 -0.000001 -0.000004 -0.000083 -0.000060 -0.001398
2.07 0.55 -3872.80 0.00000840 -0.0004046 0.1982964 0.151074 0.000675 -0.000002 -0.000005 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001398
2.00 0.54 -3872.67 0.00000839 -0.0004585 0.1978680 0.151178 0.000672 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001398
1.93 0.53 -3872.61 0.00000839 -0.0005192 0.1975032 0.151286 0.000670 -0.000001 -0.000004 -0.000083 -0.000060 -0.001397
2.01 0.54 -3872.39 0.00000839 -0.0004589 0.1977381 0.151183 0.000672 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001397
1.94 0.53 -3872.32 0.00000838 -0.0005196 0.1973614 0.151289 0.000670 -0.000001 -0.000004 -0.000083 -0.000060 -0.001396
2.02 0.54 -3872.11 0.00000838 -0.0004593 0.1976085 0.151188 0.000672 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001396
1.95 0.53 -3872.04 0.00000837 -0.0005201 0.1972210 0.151295 0.000670 -0.000001 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001396
2.03 0.54 -3871.83 0.00000838 -0.0004596 0.1974792 0.151192 0.000672 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001395
1.96 0.53 -3871.76 0.00000837 -0.0005205 0.1970821 0.151301 0.000669 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001395
2.04 0.54 -3871.54 0.00000837 -0.0004600 0.1973505 0.151197 0.000671 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001394
1.97 0.53 -3871.47 0.00000836 -0.0005209 0.1969428 0.151308 0.000669 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000061 -0.001394
2.05 0.54 -3871.26 0.00000837 -0.0004603 0.1972233 0.151203 0.000671 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001393
1.98 0.53 -3871.18 0.00000836 -0.0005214 0.1968030 0.151313 0.000669 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000061 -0.001393
2.06 0.54 -3870.98 0.00000836 -0.0004607 0.1970968 0.151209 0.000671 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001392
1.99 0.53 -3870.88 0.00000835 -0.0005219 0.1966635 0.151320 0.000668 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000061 -0.001392
2.07 0.54 -3870.70 0.00000836 -0.0004610 0.1969706 0.151217 0.000670 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000060 -0.001392
2.00 0.53 -3870.58 0.00000835 -0.0005224 0.1965245 0.151324 0.000668 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000061 -0.001391
2.01 0.53 -3870.28 0.00000834 -0.0005229 0.1963862 0.151331 0.000668 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000061 -0.001390
2.02 0.53 -3869.98 0.00000833 -0.0005233 0.1962497 0.151338 0.000668 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000061 -0.001389
2.03 0.53 -3869.69 0.00000833 -0.0005238 0.1961135 0.151346 0.000667 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000061 -0.001388
2.04 0.53 -3869.39 0.00000832 -0.0005242 0.1959775 0.151356 0.000667 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000061 -0.001387
2.05 0.53 -3869.08 0.00000832 -0.0005247 0.1958425 0.151366 0.000667 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000061 -0.001387
2.06 0.53 -3868.79 0.00000831 -0.0005251 0.1957083 0.151377 0.000666 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000061 -0.001386
2.07 0.53 -3868.49 0.00000831 -0.0005255 0.1955748 0.151389 0.000666 -0.000002 -0.000004 -0.000082 -0.000061 -0.001385
Source: IREA, 2012
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Table D.2: Grid Search: OV-LA-MEN
regular self- fragmented un- avg. monthly
α γ LL SSW OV age migration sick leave employm. employm. employm. employm. income
1.91 0.54 -3641.88 0.00000302 -0.0009643 0.0483234 0.152404 0.000715 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000021 -0.000073 -0.000452
1.96 0.57 -3641.77 0.00000307 -0.0006921 0.0511981 0.152073 0.000724 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000021 -0.000072 -0.000454
1.93 0.55 -3641.31 0.00000303 -0.0008647 0.0491064 0.152291 0.000717 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000021 -0.000073 -0.000452
1.90 0.53 -3641.00 0.00000300 -0.0010795 0.0470511 0.152516 0.000709 0.000023 0.000029 -0.000021 -0.000074 -0.000450
1.95 0.56 -3640.80 0.00000304 -0.0007752 0.0499130 0.152176 0.000719 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000021 -0.000073 -0.000452
1.92 0.54 -3640.39 0.00000301 -0.0009682 0.0478243 0.152402 0.000712 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000022 -0.000074 -0.000450
1.97 0.57 -3640.36 0.00000306 -0.0006947 0.0507414 0.152063 0.000722 0.000023 0.000027 -0.000022 -0.000072 -0.000453
1.94 0.55 -3639.84 0.00000302 -0.0008681 0.0486227 0.152286 0.000714 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000022 -0.000073 -0.000451
1.91 0.53 -3639.49 0.00000299 -0.0010839 0.0465424 0.152515 0.000706 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000022 -0.000074 -0.000449
1.96 0.56 -3639.37 0.00000303 -0.0007781 0.0494442 0.152171 0.000716 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000022 -0.000073 -0.000451
1.98 0.57 -3638.95 0.00000305 -0.0006973 0.0502871 0.152055 0.000719 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000022 -0.000073 -0.000451
1.93 0.54 -3638.90 0.00000300 -0.0009721 0.0473284 0.152401 0.000709 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000022 -0.000074 -0.000449
1.95 0.55 -3638.37 0.00000301 -0.0008715 0.0481401 0.152283 0.000711 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000022 -0.000074 -0.000449
1.92 0.53 -3637.99 0.00000298 -0.0010883 0.0460373 0.152514 0.000703 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000022 -0.000075 -0.000447
1.97 0.56 -3637.92 0.00000302 -0.0007811 0.0489764 0.152165 0.000713 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000022 -0.000073 -0.000449
1.99 0.57 -3637.53 0.00000303 -0.0006999 0.0498340 0.152048 0.000716 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000022 -0.000073 -0.000450
1.94 0.54 -3637.41 0.00000299 -0.0009759 0.0468367 0.152399 0.000706 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000022 -0.000074 -0.000448
1.96 0.55 -3636.90 0.00000300 -0.0008749 0.0476608 0.152281 0.000708 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000023 -0.000074 -0.000448
1.93 0.53 -3636.48 0.00000296 -0.0010927 0.0455349 0.152514 0.000700 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000023 -0.000075 -0.000446
1.98 0.56 -3636.47 0.00000301 -0.0007841 0.0485102 0.152161 0.000711 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000023 -0.000074 -0.000448
2.00 0.57 -3636.11 0.00000302 -0.0007025 0.0493820 0.152041 0.000713 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000023 -0.000073 -0.000449
1.95 0.54 -3635.92 0.00000298 -0.0009797 0.0463484 0.152396 0.000703 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000023 -0.000075 -0.000446
1.97 0.55 -3635.44 0.00000299 -0.0008782 0.0471858 0.152278 0.000705 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000023 -0.000075 -0.000446
1.99 0.56 -3635.02 0.00000300 -0.0007870 0.0480472 0.152158 0.000708 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000023 -0.000074 -0.000447
1.94 0.53 -3634.97 0.00000295 -0.0010970 0.0450357 0.152513 0.000697 0.000023 0.000028 -0.000023 -0.000075 -0.000445
2.01 0.57 -3634.68 0.00000301 -0.0007050 0.0489311 0.152035 0.000711 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000023 -0.000074 -0.000447
1.96 0.54 -3634.43 0.00000297 -0.0009835 0.0458624 0.152395 0.000700 0.000022 0.000028 -0.000023 -0.000075 -0.000445
1.98 0.55 -3633.97 0.00000298 -0.0008815 0.0467139 0.152274 0.000702 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000024 -0.000075 -0.000445
2.00 0.56 -3633.58 0.00000299 -0.0007899 0.0475881 0.152153 0.000705 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000024 -0.000075 -0.000445
1.95 0.53 -3633.46 0.00000294 -0.0011012 0.0445398 0.152511 0.000695 0.000022 0.000028 -0.000024 -0.000076 -0.000443
2.02 0.57 -3633.25 0.00000300 -0.0007076 0.0484835 0.152030 0.000708 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000024 -0.000074 -0.000446
1.97 0.54 -3632.94 0.00000295 -0.0009873 0.0453797 0.152393 0.000697 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000024 -0.000076 -0.000443
1.99 0.55 -3632.50 0.00000297 -0.0008848 0.0462442 0.152271 0.000700 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000024 -0.000075 -0.000444
2.01 0.56 -3632.13 0.00000298 -0.0007928 0.0471318 0.152148 0.000702 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000024 -0.000075 -0.000444
1.96 0.53 -3631.94 0.00000293 -0.0011055 0.0440459 0.152508 0.000692 0.000022 0.000028 -0.000024 -0.000076 -0.000442
2.03 0.57 -3631.83 0.00000299 -0.0007101 0.0480399 0.152023 0.000705 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000024 -0.000075 -0.000445
1.98 0.54 -3631.46 0.00000294 -0.0009910 0.0449005 0.152389 0.000694 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000024 -0.000076 -0.000442
2.00 0.55 -3631.03 0.00000296 -0.0008881 0.0457776 0.152267 0.000697 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000025 -0.000076 -0.000442
2.02 0.56 -3630.68 0.00000297 -0.0007956 0.0466775 0.152143 0.000700 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000025 -0.000075 -0.000443
1.97 0.53 -3630.42 0.00000292 -0.0011097 0.0435548 0.152504 0.000689 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000025 -0.000077 -0.000440
2.04 0.57 -3630.41 0.00000298 -0.0007126 0.0475996 0.152016 0.000703 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000025 -0.000075 -0.000443
1.99 0.54 -3629.96 0.00000293 -0.0009947 0.0444231 0.152384 0.000691 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000025 -0.000076 -0.000441
2.01 0.55 -3629.57 0.00000295 -0.0008913 0.0453139 0.152262 0.000694 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000025 -0.000076 -0.000441
2.03 0.56 -3629.24 0.00000296 -0.0007984 0.0462268 0.152137 0.000697 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000025 -0.000076 -0.000442
2.05 0.57 -3628.98 0.00000297 -0.0007151 0.0471610 0.152009 0.000700 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000025 -0.000075 -0.000442
1.98 0.53 -3628.90 0.00000291 -0.0011139 0.0430664 0.152497 0.000686 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000025 -0.000077 -0.000439
2.00 0.54 -3628.46 0.00000292 -0.0009983 0.0439479 0.152380 0.000688 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000025 -0.000077 -0.000439
2.02 0.55 -3628.09 0.00000294 -0.0008945 0.0448522 0.152256 0.000691 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000026 -0.000077 -0.000440
2.04 0.56 -3627.79 0.00000295 -0.0008012 0.0457792 0.152130 0.000694 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000026 -0.000076 -0.000440
2.06 0.57 -3627.56 0.00000296 -0.0007175 0.0467258 0.152002 0.000697 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000026 -0.000076 -0.000441
1.99 0.53 -3627.37 0.00000290 -0.0011181 0.0425809 0.152489 0.000683 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000026 -0.000078 -0.000438
2.01 0.54 -3626.96 0.00000291 -0.0010020 0.0434756 0.152372 0.000685 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000026 -0.000077 -0.000438
2.03 0.55 -3626.61 0.00000292 -0.0008977 0.0443930 0.152251 0.000688 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000026 -0.000077 -0.000438
2.05 0.56 -3626.34 0.00000294 -0.0008040 0.0453334 0.152123 0.000691 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000026 -0.000077 -0.000439
2.07 0.57 -3626.14 0.00000295 -0.0007199 0.0462932 0.151994 0.000694 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000026 -0.000076 -0.000440
2.00 0.53 -3625.84 0.00000289 -0.0011222 0.0420998 0.152481 0.000680 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000026 -0.000078 -0.000436
2.02 0.54 -3625.45 0.00000290 -0.0010056 0.0430061 0.152362 0.000683 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000026 -0.000078 -0.000437
2.04 0.55 -3625.13 0.00000291 -0.0009009 0.0439365 0.152242 0.000685 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000027 -0.000077 -0.000437
2.06 0.56 -3624.89 0.00000293 -0.0008068 0.0448898 0.152115 0.000689 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000027 -0.000077 -0.000438
2.01 0.53 -3624.31 0.00000288 -0.0011263 0.0416207 0.152470 0.000677 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000027 -0.000078 -0.000435
2.03 0.54 -3623.95 0.00000289 -0.0010092 0.0425416 0.152352 0.000680 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000027 -0.000078 -0.000435
2.05 0.55 -3623.65 0.00000290 -0.0009040 0.0434831 0.152231 0.000683 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000027 -0.000078 -0.000436
2.07 0.56 -3623.43 0.00000292 -0.0008095 0.0444488 0.152106 0.000686 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000027 -0.000077 -0.000436
2.02 0.53 -3622.78 0.00000287 -0.0011303 0.0411440 0.152459 0.000674 0.000022 0.000027 -0.000027 -0.000079 -0.000434
2.04 0.54 -3622.45 0.00000288 -0.0010127 0.0420786 0.152341 0.000677 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000027 -0.000078 -0.000434
2.06 0.55 -3622.18 0.00000289 -0.0009071 0.0430348 0.152218 0.000680 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000028 -0.000078 -0.000435
2.03 0.53 -3621.24 0.00000285 -0.0011344 0.0406695 0.152446 0.000671 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000028 -0.000079 -0.000432
2.05 0.54 -3620.94 0.00000287 -0.0010162 0.0416182 0.152329 0.000674 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000028 -0.000079 -0.000433
2.07 0.55 -3620.70 0.00000288 -0.0009101 0.0425881 0.152206 0.000677 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000028 -0.000078 -0.000433
2.04 0.53 -3619.70 0.00000284 -0.0011384 0.0401985 0.152428 0.000668 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000028 -0.000080 -0.000431
2.06 0.54 -3619.42 0.00000286 -0.0010197 0.0411592 0.152315 0.000671 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000028 -0.000079 -0.000431
2.05 0.53 -3618.16 0.00000283 -0.0011424 0.0397305 0.152410 0.000665 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000029 -0.000080 -0.000430
2.07 0.54 -3617.90 0.00000285 -0.0010232 0.0407037 0.152297 0.000668 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000029 -0.000080 -0.000430
2.06 0.53 -3616.61 0.00000282 -0.0011463 0.0392670 0.152389 0.000662 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000029 -0.000080 -0.000428
2.07 0.53 -3615.07 0.00000281 -0.0011502 0.0388067 0.152366 0.000659 0.000022 0.000026 -0.000030 -0.000081 -0.000427
Source: IREA, 2012
Appendix E
Hazard Rate Figures
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Appendix F
Supplement: Development of Pension
Systems in Europe
The modern notion of retirement as a period of leisure time in old age, funded by a public benefit for everyone
beyond a certain age, or who has worked a certain number of years, is a relatively new idea. Indeed, major parts
of the European population were not entitled to an old age pension before World War II. (Esping-Andersen,
1990)
Before the industrial revolution the structures of society and employment were different to modern day
Europe, and so were the means of protection against poverty and inability to work. With the exception of
Britain, the majority of the European population still worked in agricultural production in the mid 19th century.
A (very) basic provision of social security for these people was usually provided by their masters. As far back as
the late middle ages, craftsmen organised themselves in guilds which, in addition to their political function, also
provided insurance; similar organisations were founded by other groups such as mine workers. The main source
of poverty was inability to work or the passing of an earning spouse or parent. Accordingly, the main benefits
provided by friendly societies and the like were disability and sickness benefits, burial costs and pensions for
surviving dependents (Sigerist, 1999). However, these plans were only accessible to those who could afford to
pay the contributions. Also, the church provided relief for the poor and — increasingly over time — so did the
public sector. However, this help was only given on an individual basis and was means tested, such that most
people, also those older than the age of 65, continued to work or otherwise depended on their family’s support.
(Esping-Andersen, 1990)
The first ideas for a public pension system were already formulated during the French revolution, but at the
same time, the idea that poor relief might adversely effect labour supply emerged. In the early 19th century,
England spent a comparatively large percentage of GDP on poor relief (estimated to about 2.7 %), but by 1834
Malthus’ arguments against extensive public poor relief resulted in the establishment of the new poor law which
led to a tightening in the eligibility criteria for benefits (Cousins, 2005).
In the late 19th century industrialisation changed the living conditions for the masses; cities experienced
a rapid growth, dependent work increased, as did the risk of unemployment due to economic conditions or
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inability to work. In general, wages were too low to accumulate savings to rely on. This led to an incidence of
poverty that the so far existing systems of poor relief were not able to deal with (Sigerist, 1999).
F.1 Establishment of the First Pension System
In 1889, Germany was the first country to establish a general pension insurance scheme. Bismarck, the German
chancellor at that time, wanted the state to take responsibility for social security and its funding. One motive
for introducing social security was to weaken public support for the social democratic movement by fulfilling
their most important demands within the existing political framework. Bismarck’s idea of a social insurance
was a system for all economically disadvantaged groups, centrally organised and administered by occupational
groups. The former charity from the government would become a subsidy and the necessary contributions
would be split between employers and employees (Sigerist, 1999).
These ideas were heavily opposed in parliament, and Bismarck had to make major concessions. The modi-
fied proposal approved by the Reichstag was a regional pension plan, with the administration and some subsidy
to the pensions paid by the state, but premiums to be covered by employees and employers in equal shares.
Insurance was for people doing manual work independently of their earnings and other workers who were earn-
ing less than a given threshold. It established a disability pension by granting payments to disabled or sick
individuals for the time after accident insurance payments and an old age pension for all individuals of at least
seventy years of age (Sigerist, 1999).
Bismarck was able to improve on this minimum social security and enhance regulations over time. The
pension insurance was extended to white collar workers in 1911, changing it from insurance for the poor to one
for the majority of the population. By establishing different pension institutions, this was also a manifestation
of social class division between the workers and the middle class (Ebbinghaus and Schulze, 2007). In 1916,
the pension age was reduced to 65 (Sigerist, 1999). Despite being the first example of a comprehensive public
social insurance system, the German system was no pay-as-you-go system, but fully funded before the Second
World War. This was possible because for the first years there were no benefits to be paid out (Ebbinghaus and
Schulze, 2007).
F.2 Spread across Europe
After Germany had introduced a public pension system, the number of countries which provided old age pen-
sions to their workers increased rapidly. Denmark was the second country to install this kind of pension system
in 1891. The introduction in Italy (1919) was somewhat delayed, due to less industrialisation and a differ-
ent setting of social institutions, most prominently the stronger position of the Catholic Church and a weaker
labour movement than in other European countries. In the Netherlands, an earnings related pension scheme for
employees was introduced in 1913 due to lobbying by the Christian parties, while the workers movement and
the liberal party had pressed for a universal pension scheme. In Britain, a universal retirement benefit for all
citizens above 70 who did not reach a certain earnings threshold was introduced in 1908. Sweden introduced a
similar system in 1913 (Ebbinghaus and Schulze, 2007). By 1920, almost all Western European countries had
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introduced old age pensions (Schludi, 2005).
An important factor in the development of social insurance systems was the degree of industrialisation. The
countries with the highest shares of population working in industry had the broadest welfare programmes in
1920 (namely the four insurances: accident, sickness, old age and unemployment). The states with the most
advanced welfare programmes were mainly constitutional monarchies: Constitutional monarchies might have
had an interest in state funded welfare programmes to appease the strengthening labour movement; also their
better established bureaucracies were more apt to provide for the administration of such big schemes. Among
these early establishing countries were Germany, Denmark, Austria and Sweden. A country that introduced
welfare regulations despite relatively low economic development was Romania, but also Spain had a relatively
low development status at the time of introduction. France and Belgium in contrary introduced their welfare
schemes relatively late (Schludi, 2005).
In the following decade welfare systems and benefits were expanded considerably, but with big differences
between the countries. Countries with an autocratic legacy, such as Germany and Austria, had the broadest
welfare system and relatively high benefits. The level of industrialisation and trade unionism was comparatively
high, while openness to trade was quite limited. The United Kingdom had a high level of industrialisation and
trade union coverage, but benefits were relatively low. With regard to the development of social security schemes
and the size of the benefits, the small open northern economies (Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands) fell in
the middle between these two. Other developed countries in Europe at that time, such as France, Switzerland or
Norway, which were on average slightly less industrialised, had relatively limited welfare schemes.
Government spending on social insurance was low, the highest spenders in Europe were Norway, Denmark
and the UK, who spent around one percent of GDP on social programmes. Until the Second World War, social
spending in these countries consisted mainly of poor relief, and to a lesser extent spending on health services.
Only after 1924, the young Weimar republic of Germany took leadership in social spending, trying to establish
some social peace. In this effort Germany spent more than 4.8 % of its GDP on social transfers in 1930.
After the great depression public and political opinion was dominated by a Keynesian confidence in the state,
and the emphasis was put on employment as a foundation for social insurance. The Second World War raised a
sense of solidarity within the population and expanded the institutional framework that eased the organisation of
larger welfare programmes. The term "Social Security" was coined by the Atlantic Charta of Roosvelt, meaning
the "freedom of want and fear". A policy concept concretizing the aims and measures was the Beveridge Plan,
published in 1942. It became a unifying aim of the Allies, but also a very important issue for Scandinavia and
the resistance movements in continental Europe. The International Labour Organisation also strongly oriented
its claims on the lines set out by Beveridge (Glootz, 2005). The plan proposed to grant equal welfare benefits to
all citizens, independently of their income, while at the same time providing some income insurance depending
on individual circumstances (like the number of children). The plan also proposed a public health system which
should not depend on insurance payments. Also, organisational structures should be merged to a national level.
Although it relied on heavy intervention by the state, the plan was based on a liberal ideal, focusing on basic
needs, while leaving the rest to private insurance companies (Hockerts, 1983).
After the war spending on social security substantially increased in the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and
Italy, partly because of the hardships of the war and the increased awareness of the risk of poverty for the middle
class. Besides, the threat of expanding communism made the church and conservative parties favour measures of
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redistribution. (Lindert, 2005) The systems, however, remained largely the same, only the Netherlands switched
from an income dependent to a universal pension system, and in Germany and Italy formerly funded financing
was transformed into pay-as-you-go systems (Ebbinghaus and Schulze, 2007).
Britain had introduced its generous social system by 1948, which was very much based on Beveridge’s
advices. One part of it was the old age pension insurance which was based on the principles of equal benefits
without needs test and the inclusion of the whole population. Also the Scandinavian countries introduced social
security systems with universal coverage (Glootz, 2005), (Hockerts, 1983).
In France, plans existed for the establishment of a similar system, but their full implementation was hindered
by the opposition of the middle class. While in Great Britain about 90 % of the workers were employees, in
France less than two thirds of the population were wage dependent employees (the agricultural sector and self
employment were more important). They introduced old age insurance on an autonomous occupational basis
but did not mandate other insurances for the whole population (Hockerts, 1983).
Western Germany hardly restructured its social insurance system after World War II, although the Allied
Forces proposed changes. These were rejected because on the one side existing benefits would have been
reduced and on the other side social insurance was becoming an issue of national identity, being a prominent
and positive characteristic of the German state since before the war(Hockerts, 1983).
F.3 The Golden Age of Welfare
The economic growth of the 1950s and the accompanying wage increase devalued pension payments which
so far had not been indexed in any way. The countries with Bismarckian pension systems reacted to this by
expanding the state pension system, while countries with Beveridge-style systems shifted the responsibility to
the employer, the employees or the unions. In Germany, an indexation to gross wages (leading to higher pension
than wage growth) was introduced. Italy and Austria extended pension systems stepwise to new groups, and the
replacement rate rose to 80 %, making public pension provision sufficient as a sole old age income (Ebbinghaus
and Schulze, 2007).
But also in countries with a Beveridge-style system, the "golden age of welfare" led to an increase in pen-
sion benefits. Already in the early 1950s, Sweden introduced an income dependent second tier of the public
pension system in addition to the pre-existent low universal benefits. Other countries followed in the 1960s
and 70s, leading to a convergence of the Beveridge and Bismarckian types of pension systems. Also, contribu-
tions for periods without a proper wage income, like maternity leave, military service or unemployment, were
increasingly paid by the state (Ebbinghaus and Schulze, 2007).
The United Kingdom was a late-bloomer in the group of countries with a Beveridge-style system, introduc-
ing the SERPS (State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme) in 1975. At that time occupational pension schemes
were already well established, so a possibility to opt out of SERPS was provided. Only Denmark and the
Netherlands abstained from introducing an income dependent tier, leaving this part to occupational or industry
sector plans established on a collective bargaining agreement (Ebbinghaus and Schulze, 2007).
During this expansion period (1950-1975), many countries experienced increases in public spending on
welfeare as a percentage of GDP that were in the double digits; the biggest increase was from 27 to 54 %
in the Netherlands. Social transfers amounted to between around 15 % of GDP in Switzerland and 27 % in
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the Netherlands. Not only the Scandinavian countries but also continental European countries like Germany,
France, Italy and Austria spent a similar proportion of their GDP on welfare. The enormous economic growth
within this era also enabled the introduction of social benefits beyond the relief of utter poverty. Moreover, part
of the spending rises in this period were due to the factors still troubling social security systems today, namely
technical development in the medical sector and the effects of an ageing population on the pension system
(Lindert, 2005); (Hockerts, 1983).
F.4 The Retrenchment Period of Pension Systems
The first oil crisis put an end to this expansive development. The main causes of of the emerging problems
of the pension systems were the demographic development, deficits in government budgets and the increase of
unemployment. Early retirement regulations were frequently thought to be an adequate remedy against raising
unemployment. But also technological development in combination with increased international competition
made older employees less attractive for firms, and agreements for employee pensions and subsidies were struck
to encourage early retirement. But also unofficial early retirement options such as disability pensions or special
regulations for older long term unemployed persons were created or extended. This increase in early retirement,
however, put enormous pressure on public budgets (Ebbinghaus and Schulze, 2007).
For example the German pension reform of 1972 introduced the option of early retirenment for those over
63 with a long insurance history and facilitated early retirement for the unemployed. This led to a decrease in
the percentage of those who retired at the regular retirement age of 65, from about 50 % of men and 25 % of
women at the time of the reform, to only about 10 % for both sexes in 1983. Similar early retirement options
were introduced in Austria and many other continental European countries (Talos, 2006). In the Scandinavian
countries as well as in the UK, early retirement was and still is a much less used option today. Nevertheless,
also in these countries, pension systems imposed pressure on public budgets. In an effort to contain pension
expenditures, Germany, the UK and Sweden changed the indexation of pensions (Ebbinghaus and Schulze,
2007).
In Austria, this turning point in welfare state development occured somewhat later, with budgetary pressures
becoming evident around 1980 with the pension system being a major cause. Since then state contributions to
the public pension system have experienced large increases. Contributions have risen between 1980 and 2003
by close to 200 % while expenditures increased by almost 240 % (Talos, 2006). In the last three decades of the
twentieth century, the average retirement age has fallen from close to 62 for men to 58.4 and from 60.4 to 56.7
for women (Hofer and Koman, 2006).
At the same time, new types of workers to whom the pension system was poorly atuned, emerged, such as
part time employees or people with a discontinuous employment history. Even though service sector and female
employment increased, total contributions to the pension system did not rise sufficiently, because these types
of employees were typically poorly remunerated. Furthermore, their own pension entitlements are often not
sufficient, which is why they rely on their families’ pensions or minimum incomes (Ebbinghaus and Schulze,
2007).
Although actual social benefits in Europe didn’t shrink substantially between 1980 and 1995 — with the
exceptions of Austria and the Netherlands — the political discourse about social welfare changed fundamentally.
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Before this period, the social consensus implied that economic growth would result in increased social spending.
But after growth slowed down, unemployment increased and the consequences of an ageing population became
obvious, the question arose, how the growth of social spending could be curbed (Lindert, 2005); (Hockerts,
1983).
F.5 Typologies of Pension Systems
F.5.1 Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
According to Esping-Andersen (1990) three welfare state models emerged out of the two main historical tracks
(Bismarck and Beveridge). This was mainly due to the numerical decline of the working class: the universal
benefits did not appeal to the newly developed middle class, since they were very low — as the middle class
grew in numbers, these benefits lost support within the population as the number of beneficiaries decreased.
The three systems developed as a way of dealing with this new preference structure. There are three major
characteristics, along which Esping-Andersen distinguished the three regimes.
The first characteristic is de-commodification, by which he means policies that counteract the dependency
of the individual on the market to provide for his or her own living by selling his or her labour [. . . the degree
to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market
participation [. . . ] i.e. the strength, scope, and quality of social rights.][Esping-Andersen (1990), p.37] A second
factor is stratification, which means the consolidation or weakening of existing hierarchical structures. Besides
income distribution and poverty the main focus hereby is on factors constituting social citizenship, like class
mobility in the education system. The third measure is the quality and spread of post-industrial employment,
meaning non-production work in the service sector. Here the main factors analysed are the composition of these
jobs, gender division and how these factors are influenced by the welfare state.
The first system type which underwent little serious transformation comes from the traditional Bismarck
system to a wider ranging social insurance system, which Esping-Andersen calls "the corporatist system". It
mainly dealt with the increasing middle class by including new groups into the government system, but keeping
an institutional separation. A typical example of the corporatist state is Germany. Germany tied pension benefits
to earnings instead of contributions in the late 1950s, accentuating inequalities in pension. The corporatist
system often originated under an autocratic regime and was designed to consolidate support of the regime. It is
therefore characterised by fostering stratification in the society and very favourable conditions for civil servants.
Because the church often played a role in the construction of pension schemes in the coporatist state, it favours
the traditional family. There is a strong earnings-benefits relation, frequently based on insurance schemes,
separated by class, replicating the position an individual obtained in the society. On average the benefits are
high, but mostly excluding women who did not participate in the labour market. Furthermore, care facilities
are frequently scarce and benefits encourage mothers to stay at home. Apart from women’s labour market
participation, also the employment rate of disabled and the elderly is low because of regulations with favourable
conditions for early retirement. Since benefits mostly depend on contributions de-commodification is higher for
those who have a history of continuous employment. In addition to Germany, other central European countries
like France and Austria belong to this group.
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Esping-Andersen dubs the second type of welfare system prevalent in Anglo-Saxon countries "the liberal
system". In countries with the liberal system the diminution of the working class led to a dualistic system, where
the better-off looked for insurances provided by the market and/or benefits negotiated with their employers,
while those who could not afford this relied on low state benefits. Since major parts of the population do not
rely on the state benefits, political support for them is decreasing, while government expenditures to support
private insurances have been increasing. The liberal regime type is characterised by low benefits paid on a
needs tested basis. Consequently, the labour market participation of the elderly, women and the disabled is
high, as is commodification. Post-industrial employment is common, providing labour for professionals under
good conditions and poorly paid jobs for the less educated. The better-off buy their social security on the market,
the worse-off have to rely on low benefitsTherefore, stratification is rather high in the liberal system.
A third type of regime also started from an egalitarian system, but instead of leaving major parts of social
insurance to the market, this type decided to increase state provision to meet the demands of the middle class
and therefore found their support for further increases. In these cases a flat-rate benefit was topped up with
an earnings-related scheme. This regime type is called "social-democratic regime", mainly the Scandinavian
countries fit this description. This regime type aims to diminish stratification in the society. The benefit level is
usually high and based on the demands of the middle class but the access is universal. To maintain this benefit
level high labour market participation is necessary. Therefore, employment among the disabled and the elderly
is encouraged and, while unemployment benefits are generous, the measures to induce employment are rather
strict. Benefits are mostly earnings related but the contributions are paid by taxes. As in the corporatist system
there is little private provision of social insurance. Female employment is encouraged — high taxation makes
it difficult to live comfortably off one salary, also facilities like child care are easily available and at the same
time provide jobs that are mainly performed by women. De-commodification and "de-stratification" are high
but limited by their affordability to the state.
F.5.2 World Bank Three Pillar Typology
Figure F.1: World Bank Typology: Different types of retirement-income provision
First Pillar 
publicly managed  
poverty alleviation 
Second Pillar 
mandatory 
privately managed 
Third Pillar 
voluntary  
savings 
Source: The World Bank (1994); IHS (2011)
One of the most widely used typologies of pension systems is the three pillar system the World Bank
developed in its 1994 report "Averting the Old Age Crisis". It suggests to divert pension provision to a multi-
pillared system.
The first pillar is publicly managed poverty alleviation. It could be a means-tested benefit, a minimum
pension or a flat benefit. It is funded by tax revenues on a PAYG basis, giving a further incentive to keep
benefits at a rather low level. This is also meant to encourage market insurances to grow. Its main objectives are
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income redistribution towards the poor and an insurance in case of low returns to savings.
The second pillar should — as the first one — be mandatory, but privately managed. It is supposed to
consist of personal savings or an occupational plan. This shall prevent relative poverty, meaning a decrease in
consumption after retirement by introducing an earnings-related part.
The third pillar is made up of voluntary savings.
F.5.3 The OECD Typology
Figure F.2: OECD Typology: Different types of retirement-income provision
Pension System 
First Tier 
Mandatory 
Adequacy 
Basic 
Resource-
tested/ social-
assistance 
Minimum 
Pension (linked 
to second tier) 
Second Tier 
Mandatory, 
Savings 
PUBLIC 
Defined Benefit 
Points 
Notional 
Accounts 
PRIVATE 
Defined Benefit 
Defined 
Contribution 
Third Tier 
Voluntary, 
Savings 
Source: OECD (2009b)
The OECD typology is more descriptive than the World Bank’s, but the two bear many similarities. Here the
first and second tier are mandatory, the second tier can either be public or private. The first tier is similar to the
first pillar of the World Bank typology. It is designed to prevent old age poverty and exists in all OECD countries
in one of four possible forms: basic pension, targeted pension, minimum pension or social assistance. Basic
pensions are flat rate universal benefits, which are not affected by income (neither before nor after retirement),
but might be affected by years of work. Targeted pensions, on the other hand are reduced by additional income.
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Minimum pensions are similar to targeted pensions with the difference that one must be entitled to earnings
related pension from the second tier to receive a minimum pension. Minimum pensions are the most widely
used type in Europe under the first tier. In countries with none of the former measures or additional to former
measures elderly are eligible to general social assistance if they receive insufficient other pension income.
The second tier’s task is not only to prevent poverty of elderly but to generate an appropriate standard of
living. In Europe a public defined benefit plan is the most common way to achieve this objective, where retire-
ment benefits are defined by time of contribution payments and height of earnings. Further public alternatives
are pension points, where workers accumulate points according to their contributions which are multiplied by
a certain value at retirement, and notional account schemes in which a fictional account is set up for each con-
tributor where contributions and rates of return are noted. In most cases, but not necessarily, public schemes
are PAYG (pay-as-you-go) financed. If the administration is not undertaken by the government, the scheme is
counted as private, also in case the employer acts as an insurer. Private second tier systems might take the form
of defined benefits or defined contribution schemes. In the latter case the contributor gets an individual account
where contributions are accumulated and invested and usually an annuity has to be bought at retirement.
Finally, the third tier consists of voluntary private pension plans. (OECD, 2005a), (OECD, 2005b), (OECD,
2009b)
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F.5.4 Empirical Patterns
Soede and Vrooman (2008) tested empirically if pension systems could indeed be categorised according to
Esping-Andersen. They performed a categorical principal component analysis with 34 variables on the manda-
tory parts of the pension systems of 19 countries of the European Union and four additional states. The two main
dimensions of the principal component analysis along which the countries were categorised were the generosity
of the system and the amount of mandatory private insurance.
They found four clusters of which two largely correlate with Esping-Andersen’s typology — the corporatist
and the liberal cluster —, while of the other two one partly corresponds to the social-democratic cluster and
the last one does not appear in the typology. The corporatist cluster is found to have a high pension level
but with little funding. It consists of most central European countries, but also Finland and Portugal. The
main characteristics corresponding to this pension regime are a high replacement rate and high expenditures,
differentiated occupational schemes, low participation rates especially among the elderly while already having
a relatively high dependency ratio. For recent reforms typical measures were found to be an increase in the
pension age or contribution period and a reduction in benefits.
The liberal cluster has very low benefits, but also funding for some countries, namely the US and Canada is
below average, and only slightly above for the UK and Ireland. Traits that were found typical for this group are
low replacement rates but with considerable difference between low and high paid workers, high participation
and a strong expected increase in the dependency ratio.
The cluster comprising most social-democratic regime countries was called mandatory private since this is
its main characteristic, but the level of benefits is quite disperse. Beside Sweden and Denmark also Australia and
Poland can be found in this cluster. One feature of these countries is a generally high indexation of pensions, but
the group is also characterised by schemes based on defined contributions, easily accessible minimum pensions
and a less important mandatory earnings related scheme. Furthermore, high participation rates and an early
ageing process (mainly before 2025) can be observed.
The last cluster is called moderate pensions and consists of Norway, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Belgium. The funding here is similar to the liberal countries while the pension level is a bit higher, but still
below average. Pensions consist to a large part of PAYG earnings related schemes; also, other features are
similar to the corporatist cluster with lower benefits, but the countries within the group are relatively varied.
There seems to be a lot of overlapping with the terminology of Esping-Andersen, but there are also countries
which do not neatly fall into his scheme.
Rhodes and Natali (2004) set up a new classification by combining the "old" OECD three pillar model,
Esping-Andersen’s three worlds as well as a classification by Ferrera (1993) based on the sharing of social risks
and a publication of Bonoli (2003) where the prevalence of public provision is examined. Further the primary
administrator of the pension system — state or social partners — was emphasised by Marier (2002). As a result
Natali and Rhodes obtained four different regime types:
(i) Austria and Germany fall into the "pure occupational system", where the social insurance manages insur-
ances which are divided according to occupational categories.
(ii) The next category is also organised along occupational lines but adds to the status maintaining system a
means-tested scheme as an influence from the Beveridge systems. Among others, Spain, France and Italy
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belong to this group. Both groups are also characterised by an underdeveloped private pension sector.
(iii) This is not the case for the "universal + occupational" group, to which the Netherlands, Denmark and
Great Britain belong. Basic pensions in these cases are universal and generally low, but accompanied by
a second pillar which might be public, occupational or private.
(iv) The fourth case is the "pure universal system" in which the first and the second pillar are combined. Both
are universal and financed on a PAYG basis through taxation. This system is the prevailing one in the
Scandinavian countries. (Rhodes and Natali, 2004)
Similar to Soede and Vrooman (2008), who found the reforms most necessary in the corporatist cluster,
Rhodes and Natali (2004) found that reforms were most needed in the two groups that organise pensions along
occupational lines (i) and (ii). Rhodes and Natali (2004) diagnosed them with poor GDP growth rates, inequity
between generations and classes, instability in financing and political difficulties in changing the system. Re-
forms point into the direction of increased funding to compensate for reductions in first pillar benefits, harmonise
pension schemes and create a credit system to include new career patterns and improve independent pensions
for women.
Similar problems were found in the "pure universal model", especially in Sweden which carried out a major
pension reform in the late 1990s (see G). But in these countries also factors which provide stability to the system
can be found, like the aforementioned high participation rates and the financing of the pension system out of tax
revenues, which makes it less vulnerable to cuts due to competitiveness effects. Problems seem to be less grave
in the mixed system, partly because important reforms have already been undertaken. Their multi-pillar design
makes them politically less assailable, which on the one hand makes it easier to reform them, on the other hand
less pressure is created for problems of inequality or due to new career patterns. A problem for these systems
— as has been shown in the early 2000s and also in the past few years — is the dependency on financial market
conditions and the threats this might pose on retirement incomes.
Appendix G
Supplement: A Country Comparison of
Pension Systems
Table G.1: Overview Classification of Selected Countries
AT DE CZ SE UK
Esping- Corporatist Corporatist Social Liberal
Andersen democratic
Sooede Corporatist Corporatist Moderate Social democratic− Liberal
& Vroman Pensions mandatory private
Natali Pure Pure Pure universal Universal &
& Rodes occupational occupational occupational
Source: IHS, 2011
G.1 Germany
Germany is categorised as a "corporatist state" with a pure occupationally managed pension system. Its public
pension system is pay-as-you-go. Until 2005, the Statutory Pension Insurance had three institutional branches:
blue-collar workers and insured self-employed were administered by 23 regional insurance funds, the federal
railway insurance fund and the seamen insurance fund; white-collar workers were administered by the Federal
Insurance Fund for Salaried Employees; and the third used to be the Federal Insurance Fund for Miners. In
2005 the fund for salaried workers and miners were merged and the number of regional insurance funds was
reduced through mergers (Guardiancich, 2010).
Germany’s first tier is social assistance for people with low income. The publicly organized second tier is a
point scheme which calculates pensions as
Pension = Personal Points * Pension Value Point * Pension Factor
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For each year of insurance individuals receive one pension point if they are average earners, adequately more
or less if they are above or below average. When they retire, their points are summed up and multiplied by a
"pension point value", which is linked to average earnings (with a different value for the New Länder). Addi-
tionally, there is a pension factor. The pension factor depends on changes in the contributions to the statutory
and subsidized private pension schemes and on a sustainability factor which relates pensions to the country’s
dependency ratio. Thus, pension income is not only indexed by gross wages, the increases due to valuation
are limited. In 2008/2009 total contributions amounted to 19.9 % and were equally split between the employer
and the employee (Guardiancich, 2010). Germany has one of the highest coverage through voluntary private
pension plans and in particular the highest among low earners (OECD, 2009a). Most third tier private plans
are defined-contribution plans of 4 % as these yield most public subsidies. (OECD, 2009a)
The eligible retirement age is 65, rising to 67 by 2029 (Guardiancich, 2010). With 45 years of contribution or
with reductions of 3.6 % people can retire at the age of 63. If they decide to work after the age of 65 a bonus
of 6 % per year is granted. (OECD, 2009a) The German replacement rate is 61.3 % for median earners, 59.2 %
for those 50 % below median earnings and 60.3 % for those 50 percent above median earnings. (OECD, 2009a)
The public pension spending results in 11.4 % of GDP. (OECD, 2009a)
G.2 Czech Republic
The Czech Republic reformed its pension system right after the collapse of the communist regime by establish-
ing a pay-as-you-go system. (Pension Funds Online, 2011)
In the Czech Republic the first tier consists of a basic pension which accounts for 7.5 % of average earnings
and is independent of individual earnings. Besides, there is a minimum pension (included in the basic pension)
which accounts for 11.4 % of average earnings plus targeted social assistance. The second tier is publicly
provided by an earnings-related scheme. The accrual rate is 1.5 for each contributing year. In addition, there
is a progressive benefit formula with three replacement codes: for incomes below 46.5 % of average earnings
the replacement rate is 100 %, for incomes below 111.4 % it is 30 % and above this threshold it is 10 %. The
retirement age will be gradually increased to 65 for men and between 62 and 65 for women, depending on the
number of children. Retirement is possible three years before the standard retirement age with a reduced accrual
rate; for people who work beyond the standard age, the accrual rate is raised. Around 45 % of employees have a
voluntary occupational or personal pension, but the third tier’s contributions tend to be small.(OECD, 2009a)
G.3 Sweden
Sweden is categorised as "social democratic" and has a pure universal pension system. Primarily, contributions
are paid as taxes and are part of the state budget, but there is also a privatised mandatory contribution part which
is managed by the Premium Pension Authority (Guardiancich, 2010).
Sweden’s first tier is called a "guaranteed pension". It is an income-tested top-up for low earners above the
age of 65. Besides, means-tested housing benefits are an important source of income for pensioners (OECD,
2009a). The second tier consists of a PAYG-system with notional accounts and of a private defined-contribution
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scheme. 14.88 % of gross earnings are paid to the worker’s personal account (OECD, 2009a). On retirement, the
total pension balance is divided by an annuitisation divisor which is based on average expected remaining life
expectancy (the same for men and women) and a notional future growth factor of 1.6 % (Socialdepartementet
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs/ Riksförsäkringsverket, 2003). Since life expectancy decreases with age,
the divisor decreases, hence the calculated annual pension income increases with age. Therefore, there are no
incentives to retire early and, thus, a statutory retirement age can be avoided. Furthermore, the system ensures
the so called lifetime-earnings principle, as old workers can combine work and pension by withdrawing only
a part of their annual pension (OECD, 2009a). Furthermore, 2.33 % of labour income are paid into a private
investment account (premium pension) and yield interest according to the return on the capital fund chosen by
the pension-saver (Socialdepartementet Ministry of Health and Social Affairs/ Riksförsäkringsverket, 2003).
The median net replacement rate yields 64.1 %; people with 50 percent below median earnings receive 79.3 %
and people with 50 % above median earnings 81.2% (OECD, 2009a). The public pension spending amounts to
7.7% of GDP (OECD, 2009a).
G.4 United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is categorised as "liberal country" with a universal and occupational pension system. Its
pension system is partly a pay-as-you-go system. The state provision is seen more or less as a top-up mecha-
nism for pensioners on low incomes. Private provision is popular which represents a difference to most other
European countries (Mayshew, 2001).
The first tier scheme in the United Kingdom is a flat rate basic pension which accounts for 14 % of average
earnings, and applies for those with a work history of 39/44 years for women and men, respectively (OECD,
2009a). Reduced basic pension can be received at the age of 65 and after at least 11 years of contribution
(Mayshew, 2001). For women the eligible age for retirement used to be 60, but it is in the process of being
equalised. By 2046 for both men and women the retirement age will be raised to 68. In addition, means-tested
benefits are given to people over 60 under the "minimum income guarantee" (OECD, 2009a). The second tier
consists of two schemes. First, there is the state earnings-related scheme (SERP) which adds up the replacement
rate based on workers’ lifetime earnings (OECD, 2009a). Secondly, workers have the option to "contract out" of
SERP and pay either into an occupational scheme, personal scheme or into a mixed scheme (Mayshew, 2001).
The most popular voluntary pensions are occupational and defined-benefit schemes (OECD, 2009a). Compared
to Germany, the voluntary coverage by the third tier is smaller for low, but higher for high earners in the United
Kingdom. (OECD, 2009a)
The median net replacement rate is 40.9 %, people with 50 % below median earnings receive a higher replace-
ment rate of 63.8 % and people with 50 % above median earnings a lower replacement rate of 29.2 % (OECD,
2009a). The public pension spending amounts to 5.7 % of GDP. (OECD, 2009a)
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